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Abstract
In this dissertation, the author explores the jurisprudential foundations of the 
“relevant and persuasive” doctrine, which authorizes Canadian judges to rely on 
international and comparative human rights when interpreting the Charter o f Rights and 
Freedoms. Viewed in its best light, this doctrine improves respect for human rights in two 
distinct ways: securing Canada’s compliance with its international human rights 
obligations and enhancing the responsiveness of state law to the global and multicultural 
context of Canadian society. However, actual jurisprudence suggests that the doctrine has 
helped undermine principles of respect for constitutional supremacy and respect for 
international law, in part because it does not contain clear, objective criteria governing 
what counts as a relevant and persuasive norm. In the absence of such criteria, “result- 
oriented” judges are free to instrumentally pick norms that help rationalize decisions 
made entirely on the basis of political and ideological factors. Some would go so far as to 
argue that the doctrine enables judges to use the rhetoric of human rights to 
constitutionally entrench relations of domination; there is some empirical evidence to 
support this claim.
Given the increasingly global context of contemporary judicial decision-making, 
it is surprising that judges have not yet offered a convincing justification for the relevant 
and persuasive doctrine. This dissertation attempts to offer such a justification. Weaving 
together a wide range of legal and moral philosophy, argumentation theory and 
international law/international relations theory, the author hypothesizes that judicial 
decisions about the relevance and persuasiveness of international and comparative human 
rights follow the contours of rhetorical and dialogical processes distinctive to law. With a 
view to testing this hypothesis, he develops analytical frameworks that help observers 
rationally identify, construct and evaluate “persuasive” international and comparative 
human rights arguments. Using the court-led reconstitution of the Canadian security 
certificate regime as a case study, he then attempts to demonstrate how the relevant and 
persuasive doctrine operates, how it coheres with principles of respect for constitutional 
supremacy and international law, and how it can improve respect for human rights among 
a wide range of globally-situated discursive communities.
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The Art of Persuasion: International/C om parative Human 
R ights, The Supreme Court of Canada and the R econstitution of 
the Canadian Security C ertificate Regime
Chapter 1
A. Introduction
Anyone interested in whether, how, and why international law influences legal decision 
making in Canada would do well to examine the post-9/11 transformation of our security 
certificate regime. First established in 1976, security certificate legislation authorizes the 
executive to arrest, detain, and ultimately deport non-citizens who are believed on reasonable 
grounds to pose a threat to, among other things, Canadian national security.1 Traditionally, 
executive decisions about whether to issue a certificate were preceded by extended, adversarial 
proceedings in which security-cleared lawyers would challenge the evidentiary bases for 
allegations.2 In 2001, parliament amended the regime to better contend with a range of growing 
security threats, including international terrorism and crime.3 Borrowing heavily from similar 
legislation in the United Kingdom,4 as well as partial reforms it had made in the 1990’s, 
parliament truncated traditional checks on decisions about certificates in 2001, replacing them 
with a regime characterized by extreme secrecy, executive discretion, and expeditiousness. 
Certificates began to be issued without any prior independent review, while significant portions 
of proceedings concerning the reasonableness of certificates and conditions of detentions were
1 Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, R.S.C. 2001, c. 27, Division 9.
2 Murray Rankin, “The Security Intelligence Review Committee: Reconciling National Security with Procedural 
Fairness” (1990) 3 C.J.A.L.P. 173. Although, in the 1990s, Parliament bifurcated this system, diverting cases 
involving foreign nationals directly to the Federal Court o f Canada, with significantly fewer protections.
3 Among relevant international laws addressing these threats are: United Nations Security Council, 4385th Meeting, 
“Resolution 1373 (2001)” (S/RES/1373), 28 September 2001; United Nations Security Council, 4956th Meeting, 
“Resolution 1540 (2004)” (S/RES/1540), 28 April 2004; United Nations Security Council, 5261st Meeting, 
“Resolution 1624 (2005)” (S/RES/1624), 14 September 2005.
4Prevention o f  Terrorism Act (UK),1989(repealed), c. 4; Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act (UK), 2001, c. 24,
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held in the absence of anyone but a reviewing judge and government officials.
Although legislative alterations to the security certificate regime capture in some ways 
the extent to which international (and foreign) law can influence domestic law and policy, 
subsequent judicial reviews of this regime are far more interesting in this regard. In 2007 and 
2008, the Supreme Court issued two landmark judgments on the constitutionality of the new 
certificate provisions and associated security intelligence practices. In CharkaouiI,5 it found that 
some of the new provisions infringed s. 7 of the Charter o f  Rights and Freedoms, primarily for 
failing to meet weighty criminal law standards of procedural fairness. Prior to this point, lower 
courts and the Supreme Court itself had consistently ruled that criminal law standards were 
inapplicable to this context because certificate proceedings were formally administrative in 
nature, and, because Canada’s duty to protect citizens from security threats outweighed its duty 
to respect the human rights of non-citizens.6 Displaying a significant shift in attitude, the 
Supreme Court recognized that the indefinite detention and the human rights abuses to which 
named persons would be exposed if deported to select countries rendered certificate proceedings 
analogous to criminal proceedings and, accordingly, were subject to basic criminal law principles 
concerning procedural fairness, disclosure, and adversarial challenge.7 Relying on these 
principles, the court held that named persons are entitled to a fair hearing, which includes the 
rights to know the case against them, to respond to that case, and to have decisions about the 
reasonableness of certificates made on the basis of facts and law.8 It concluded that excluding 
named persons from significant portions of proceedings and denying them access to all but
Part 4.
5 Charkaoui v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), [2007] 1 S.C.R. 350 (“Charkaoui I").
6 Canada (Minister o f  Employment and Immigration) v. Chiarelli,[ 1992] 1 S .C .R .711.
7 Charkaoui I, supra at para. 25. The principled basis for this application was first established in Dehghani v.
Canada (Minister o f  Employment and Immigration), [ 1993] 1 S.C.R. 1053, at p. 1077. For academic commentary on 
this point, see Hamish Stewart, “Is Indefinite Detention o f  Terrorist Suspects Really Constitutional?”(2005) 54 
U.N.B.L.J. 235.
summaries of evidence used against them unjustifiably infringed their rights.
Although relevant to context, international law was not referenced until the court began 
considering whether the government’s legislative objectives could be effectively pursued through 
less restrictive measures. But even here, the story really began with domestic law and policy. The 
most obvious alternative to the impugned provisions was the pre-9/11 certificate regime, through 
which the Security Intelligence Review Committee (SIRC) — a body that oversees and reviews 
the activities of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service — vigorously tested the reliability, 
sufficiency, and weight of the government’s allegations. Another alternative was a similar 
regime used in the United Kingdom -  a regime that the UK modeled after the SIRC system in 
the 1990’s. The UK’s version, however, omitted many of the procedural safeguards 
characteristic of the SIRC system.9 It was clear that Canada’s post-9/11 certificate regime bore 
more similarities to the UK model than its predecessor. Relevantly, foreign and international 
courts had declared the UK model incompatible with international human rights in two landmark 
cases: Chahalv. United Kingdom0 and Re A and Others.n
It would have been reasonable to suppose that the Supreme Court of Canada might take 
these decisions as reason to force a return to the SIRC system. However, the court commented 
favourably on the UK model, noting that it had been improved in response to Chahal and A and 
Others, largely through a “special advocate” system. Again modeled after the SIRC regime, the 
special advocate system authorized security-cleared counsel to challenge the UK’s claims for 
national security confidentiality as well as the weight, credibility, and sufficiency of undisclosed 
evidence. However, even with these improvements, many argued that the new regime simply
8 Ibid. at para. 29.
9 Relevant legislation includes: Immigration Act (U.K.), 1971 c. 77; Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act, supra 
note 4; The Prevention o f  Terrorism Act, supra note 4.
10 [1996] ECHR54.
spread a veneer of legality over a deeply flawed set of extraordinary measures.1 Nonetheless, the 
Supreme Court of Canada in Charkaoui /held that parliament’s use of a special advocate system 
would make the impugned certificate provisions constitutional.13
As everyone expected, parliament chose to amend certificate provisions in the image of 
the UK special advocate system in its 2008 amendment to the Immigration and Refugee 
Protection Act (IRPA). On the one hand, named persons are now entitled to be represented by 
security-cleared advocates authorized to challenge the government’s applications for non­
disclosure of classified information and to challenge the relevance, reliability, and weight to be 
accorded to evidence submitted during secret hearings.14 On the other hand, the amended 
provisions deny special advocates express authorization to access all information on the 
government’s file relevant to a named person, to subpoena documents and witnesses, to 
communicate with named persons once classified information has been accessed, and to 
communicate with each other about procedural and substantive issues that arise in their 
respective proceedings.15 Only the bare minimum of changes had been made.
Within months of this amendment, the Supreme Court did a surprising thing in 
CharkaouiII,16 it chose to refine the amended certificate regime in order to give effect to those 
international human rights standards it flat-out refused to enforce a year earlier. It did so by 
imposing upon the government a general duty to retain and disclose all information on file
11 A and others v Secretary o f  State fo r  the Home Department, [2004] UKHL 56.
12 Craig Forcese & Lome Waldman, Seeking Justice in an Unfair Process: Lessons from  Canada, the United 
Kingdom, and New Zealand on the Use o f  "Special Advocates ” in National Security Proceedings (Ottawa: Faculty 
of Law [Common Law Section], University of Ottawa, 2007). For criticisms of the United Kingdom model, upon 
which the Canadian model was premised, see: United Kingdom, House o f Commons and House of Lords, Joint 
Committee on Human Rights, “Review o f Counter-terrorism Powers, Eighteenth Report o f Session 2003-2004” HL 
158, HC 173 (4 August 2004) at para 40; United Kingdom, House o f  Commons, Constitutional Affairs Committee, 
“The Operation of the Special Immigration Appeals Commission (SI AC) and the use o f Special Advocates-Seventh 
Report o f Session 2004-2005” Vol. I, HC 323-1 (3 April 2005).
13 Charkaoui /, supra note 5 at para. 87.
14 IRPA, supra note 1, ss. 85.1 (1)(2), 85.2.
15 Ibid., ss. ss. 85.4(2)(3), 85.5.
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relevant to a named person to special advocates and reviewing judges, and by authorizing 
reviewing judges to forward such information as can be safely disclosed directly to named 
persons.17 This decision was again predicated on an analogy between certificate proceedings and 
criminal law proceedings, as well as a further analogy between the post-9/11 activities of civilian 
intelligence agencies and the work of law-enforcement agencies. On the basis of these analogies, 
civilian intelligence agencies and all other relevant executive bodies were required to obey 
Charter-based disclosure obligations normally applicable only to the police and Crown
I 8prosecutors.
In both principle and practice, C/zartaou///compensates for the absence of legislative 
provisions granting special advocates the power to access all information in the government’s 
possession and to subpoena documents and witnesses, two core features of the SIRC model that 
were deliberately excluded from both the UK model and post-9/11 certificate provisions. 
Charkaoui//disclosure obligations have also since been interpreted by lower courts to enable 
special advocates to communicate with each other about confidential information, again 
compensating for restrictive legislative language in this respect.19 While the Supreme Court did 
not strike down or rewrite legislative provisions, it encouraged lower court judges to exercize 
their legislatively-mandated discretion to bring certificate provisions closer into step with 
international human rights standards.
What is particularly interesting about Charkaoui ICxs that the court’s reasoning was not 
expressly structured by international law nor was it formally concerned with the constitutionality 
of the amended provisions. The court did not cite international law or the new provisions even
16 Charkaoui v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) (2008), 294 D.L.R. (4th) 478 ("Charkaoui IT').
17 Ibid. at para. 2.
,8 /?. v. Slinchcombe [1991] 3 S.C.R. 326; R. v. Egger, [1993] 2 S.C.R. 451; R. v. O'Connor, [1995] 4 S.C.R. 411; R.
v. La, [1997] 2 S.C.R. 680.
once, relying exclusively on the application of hornbook criminal law principles and standards to 
the exercize of executive discretion over matters of disclosure. Yet, viewed within the broader, 
post-9/11 transformation of the security certificate regime, and Canadian national security law 
and policy most generally, this decision was arguably steeped in international perspectives. The 
court was, for instance, careful to outline how Canadian national security agencies have been 
sharing intelligence with foreign and international national security agencies in flagrant disregard 
of the principles of privacy, fairness, and public review.20 The consequent high profile rights 
abuses inflicted upon Maher Arar, Abdullah Almalki, Ahmad El-Maati, and others stood as one 
of the reasons why the court chose to impose exacting disclosure obligations upon Canadian 
security intelligence agencies.
Given this context, one could argue that the Supreme Court’s decision was intended to 
retroactively compensate for amended certificate provisions that were formally consistent with 
the Charter,\ but which fell below international human rights standards. Precisely how and why 
international human rights shaped this decision is, however, hard to explain. Why would a court 
interested in enforcing international human rights not just state that this is what it was doing? 
Why would such a court have signaled to Parliament just a year earlier that the further adoption 
of a deeply flawed UK-style regime would have made certificate provisions consistent with the 
Charted How did it decide upon the appropriate balance between international human rights and 
international counter-terrorism law in Charkaoui P. What caused the court to alter this balance in 
Charkaoui IP. Were these decisions even influenced by international law, or was international 
law simply used to rationalize decisions made on the basis of Canadian constitutional values,
'9Harkat(Re) 2009F.C. 59.
20 Charkaoui 11, supra note 16 at para. 29. See also, Canada, Parliament, Report o f  the Events Relating to Maher 
Arar: Analysis and Recommendations by the Commission o f  Inquiry into the Actions o f  Canadian Officials in 
Relation to Maher Arar (Queen’s Printer, 2006; International Commission of Jurists, “Assessing Damage, Urging
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norms, and expectations or, indeed, political expedience? Viewed in context, one gets the sense 
that international law factored into the court’s reasoning in the Charkaoui decisions. Yet, the 
nature of this influence is, by all outward appearances, untraceable.
This dissertation will explore whether, how and why international and comparative 
human rights played a distinctive role in the court-led reconstitution of the Canadian certificate 
regime. More precisely, I will sketch a rough analytical framework through which the subtle and 
often modest impacts of international and comparative human rights on judicial decision-making 
in any given context can be glimpsed more clearly. In this way, I will argue that the insights we 
acquire by examining the reconstitution of the security certificate regime enable us to make 
general normative and theoretical claims about the processes by which international and 
comparative human rights can, under the right conditions, exert persuasive influence on 
Canadian judges and other authoritative decision-makers.
In a manner of speaking, this would not be the first study of this kind.21 Many attempts 
have been made to relate the concepts and categories that form what I shall call the “law of 
reception” (i.e. the law governing the judicial application of international and foreign law to 
domestic and/or transnational legal problems) to a variety of maps. Legal maps are supposed to 
accurately depict doctrinal landscapes, highlighting relationships among relevant categories 
(organizing divisions) and concepts (recurring ideas), explaining why decisions are made one
Action: Report o f the Eminent Jurists Panel on Terrorism, Counter-Terrorism and Human Rights” (Geneva. 2009) at 
67-73.
21 For a small sampling, see: Gibran Van Ert, Using International Law in Canadian Courts (The Hauge, London, 
New York: Kluwer Law International, 2002); Karen Knop, “Here and There: International Law in Domestic Courts” 
(2000) 32 New York University Journal o f International Law and Politics 501; Irit Weiser, “Effect in Domestic Law 
o f International Human Rights Treaties Ratified without Implementing Legislation”, in The Impact o f  International 
Law on the Practice o f  Law in Canada. Proceedings o f the 27th Annual Conference o f  the Canadian Council on 
International Law, Ottawa October 15-17, 1998 (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 1999); William Schabas, 
International Human Rights Law and The Canadian Charter o f  Rights and Freedoms, 2nd edition (Carswell, 1996); 
Anne F. Bayefsky, International Human Rights Law: Use in Canadian Charter o f  Rights and Freedoms Litigation 
(Toronto and Vancouver: Butterworths, 1992); Ed Morgan, International Law and the Canadian Courts (Toronto: 
Carswell, 1990); Ronald St. J. MacDonald, “ International Treaty Law and the Domestic Law o f Canada” (1975) 2
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way and not another. As we will see, though, the categories and concepts that comprise the law 
of reception are not adequately depicted by existing maps, especially those which are advertised 
to exhaustively enumerate the materials out of which sound decisions in this field are to be made. 
This is not to say that there are no accurate or useful maps, for there are. It is to say that no single 
map can accurately describe the totality of the law of reception and, what is more, attempts to 
simplify what is an enormously complex, fluctuating juridical field distort the landscape in 
contradictory ways, namely, by reducing our ability to understand and interact with unfamiliar 
environments.
Exploring the multiple dimensions of private law, Stephen Waddams made similar 
points, noting that judges, lawyers, scholars, and other legal cartographers change the very 
landscape they map by privileging some facts, values, and principles over others.22 Equally 
accurate maps may differ only in that they emphasize different dimensions of the same 
landscape; maps have a “rhetorical component, in that they are calculated not only to describe, 
but to persuade readers of the merits of the view favoured by the writer”.230ne can readily see 
similarities among legal cartography, advocacy and judicial decision-making, underscoring the 
importance of attaining a critical perspective on the maps we use to guide ourselves through an 
increasingly important field of law.
In the remainder of this introduction, 1 will survey the nature and limitations of the 
various maps we use to understand the law of reception. In the next section, I will sketch the 
doctrinal landscapes that comprise this law. This will involve the juxtaposition of a traditional 
“presumption of conformity” doctrine and a more recent, “relevant and persuasive” doctrine. I
Dalhousie Law Journal 307.
22 Stephen Waddams, Dimensions o f  Private Law: Categories and Concepts in Anglo-American Legal Reasoning 
(Cambridge University Press.2003).
23 Ibid. at 21.
will argue that cases such as Charkaoui I  and I I  are best understood as flowing from the relevant 
and persuasive doctrine, but that we lack a convincing explanation of how this doctrine works. In 
the second section of this introduction, I will explore theoretical perspectives on the relevant and 
persuasive doctrine, focusing on nascent “transnational” maps sketched out by a small selection 
of Canadian scholars. I will outline the strengths and weaknesses of these maps, from a 
descriptive as well as a normative standpoint. In the third section, I will outline the core research 
questions to be addressed and the methods by which I will answer them. Finally, I will provide a 
general outline of the remainder of the dissertation.
B. Law or Not Law? Doctrine, Jurisprudence, and the Place of International Law in
Canadian Courts.
In contrast to some other common law jurisdictions, nowhere in Canadian constitutional 
or statutory law will one find clear rules governing when and how our judges are to receive 
international law.24 Lacking external direction, judges have derived guiding concepts and 
categories from various sources, including international law, English common law, Canadian 
constitutional law, and the facts and issues of individual cases. Historically, there have been two 
basic concepts that have organized divisions between international law and domestic law: 
monism and dualism.25 Monism allows one to conceive of international law and domestic law as 
belonging to an holistic legal order, within which valid norms of one legal order stand as valid 
norms within the other. Each legal order contains its own fundamental rules and principles 
regarding how ordinary norms are to be created, interpreted, applied, and enforced. However,
24 The United Kingdom and South Africa, for instance, have respectively used statutory and constitutional 
provisions to clarity their laws of reception. See: The Human Rights A ct (UK), 1998, c. 42; Constitution o f  the 
Republic o f  South Africa Act 108 o f  1996 (hereinafter, the South African Final Constitution), ss. 39,233.
25 Benedetto Conforti, International Law and the Role o f  Domestic Legal Systems, (Kluwer Academic Publishers.
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once in existence, norms of international law are automatically a part of domestic law, meaning 
that judges are free to use them in any given dispute to alter domestic rights and obligations. 
Dualism, by contrast, requires one to conceive of international law and domestic law as closed 
systems. Norms of international law cannot alter domestic rights and obligations unless they are 
transformed into domestic legal norms by the legislatures. Judges may only use international law 
to alter domestic rights and obligations if they are so permitted by statutory or constitutional 
provisions.
Dichotomous in nature, monism and dualism support a wide range of additional binaries 
that have characterized the Canadian law of reception. To begin, there are distinctions made 
between different sources of international law, of which two are immediately relevant: 
customary international law and international treaty law.26 Customary international law consists 
of rules of law derived from the consistent conduct of States acting out of the belief that the law 
requires them to act that way. Generally speaking, it is discerned through the widespread 
repetition by states of similar international acts over time (state practice), where the acts occur 
out of a sense of obligation (opinio juris)}1 Given the slow processes by which it is normally 
formed, customary international norms are comparatively stable, few in number, and concerned 
with very broad issues that affect virtually all states equally. International treaty law, by contrast, 
arises through the express agreement of two or more states to bind themselves to any given state
1993); Leslie C. Green, “International Law: A Canadian Perspective” in The Canadian Encyclopedic Digest 
(Ontario), 2nd ed., vol. 17, Title 81, (Carswell, 1988) at 32.
26 Statute o f  the International Court ofJustice, 3 Bevans 1179; 59 Stat. 1031; T.S. 993; 39 AJIL Supp. 215 (1945), 
art. 38.
27 The Case o f  the S.S. Lotus (France v. Turkey) (1927), P.C.I.J. Ser. A., No. 10 North Sea Continental Shelf Cases 
(Federal Republic o f  Germany v Denmark; Federal Republic o f  Germany v Netherlands), [1969] ICJ Reports 
4.There is considerable debate about what constitutes state practice and opinio juris', see, Myers. S. McDougal “The 
Hydrogen Bomb Tests and the International Law o f the Sea” (1955) 49 AM. J. INT. L. 356; Anthea Elizabeth 
Roberts, “Traditional and Modem Approaches to Customary International Law: A Reconciliation” (2001) 95:4 The 
American Journal o f International Law 757; Anthony D'Amato, The Concept o f  Custom in International Law 
(Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press. 1971); H.W.A. Thirlway, International Customary Law and its 
Codification (Leiden: A. W. Sijthoff. 1972).
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of affairs and tends to require significant alteration of domestic law and policy. The contractual 
nature of treaties permits greater levels of specificity, variation, and enforcement, as they may be 
designed and redesigned to account for any and all matters of social life that concern two or 
more states. For this reason, the number of international treaty norms vastly exceeds the number 
of customary international norms and, especially when supplemented with international 
monitoring, reporting, and adjudicative bodies, have far greater effects on domestic law and 
policy.28
Canadian courts have tended to view customary international law through a monist lens,29 
whereas they have tended to view international treaty law through a dualist lens.30 This means 
that judges have traditionally felt free to apply international customs without legislative pre­
approval, but have tended to apply only those treaties that the legislatures have chosen to 
implement through statute. The reason for this distinction is that the two types of international 
law interfere with the functions and authority of domestic legislatures in different ways and to 
different degrees. Given the steadily increasing numbers of treaties covering all aspects of social 
life, the direct judicial application of international treaties can significantly interfere with both 
federal and provincial legislative authority and lend itself to considerable uncertainty as to what 
are one’s domestic rights and obligations at any one time.
The law of reception also accounts for broader normative and functional distinctions 
among the powers and responsibilities of the executive, the legislative, and the judicial branches 
of government. Classically, the federal executive alone possesses the authority to assume (and
28 Some have gone so far as to predict the collapse of international customary law as a source o f international law: 
Patrick Kelly, “The Twilight o f Customary International Law” (2000) 40 Virginia Journal o f International Law 449.
29 MacDonald, supra note 21. Some argue that this is not clearly the case; see, Stepehn J. Toope, “Keynote Address: 
Canada and International Law” in The Impact o f  International Law on the Practice o f  Law in Canada. Proceedings 
of the 27,h Annual Conference of the Canadian Council on International Law, Ottawa, October 15-17, 1998 (The 
Hague: Kluwer Law International, 1999) 33 at 37.
30 Canada (AG) v. Ontario (AG) [Labour Conventions Case], [1937] 1 D.L.R. 673 (J.C.P.C.) at 678.
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discharge a limited class of) international legal obligations and the legislatures alone possess the 
authority to implement most international treaty law. The judiciary possesses authority to give 
direct effect to international customary law and the legislation that implements international 
treaty law. As recognized by the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in the seminal Labour 
Conventions Case, these traditional divisions are informed by a host of constitutional values 
pertaining to representative democracy, including federalism and Parliamentary sovereignty.31
Relatively recent changes to Canadian constitutionalism as well as to the international 
legal and political order have destabilized the delicate balance among these concepts and 
categories. The Charter o f  Rights and Freedoms, for example, has introduced human dignity as a 
constitutional value deserving of eminent respect, while it has significantly altered the 
relationships among the three branches of government. Obviously, the Charter has enabled the 
judiciary to review the merits of validly enacted law for consistency with constitutional rights. 
This is relevant to the law of reception since many of the Charter's provisions were drafted in 
consideration of international and comparative human rights,32 suggesting that the judiciary have 
some authority to use international law (and international human rights in particular) as 
interpretive aids independently of legislative pre-approval.33
Taken as a whole, the above elements of the law of reception point to a final organizing 
division — that which distinguishes between principles of respect for international law and 
principles of respect for constitutional democracy. But what does it mean to “respect” 
international law and constitutional democracy? Does respect for international law mean that the 
judiciary is obligated to ensure substantive harmony between domestic and international legal
31 Federalism was the more dominant concern in this case, although parliamentary sovereignty was also a defining 
principle: MacDonald, supra note 21.
2 Bayefsky, supra note 21 at 62-63.
33 Debates over the precise contours o f this authority will be examined in Chapter 2.
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norms or, in a word, secure “compliance” with international law?34 Or does it mean the judiciary 
should engage with international legal values and institutions in good faith, but it need not 
replicate precise norms within domestic law? Does respect for constitutional democracy require 
the judiciary to ensure that all its decisions be traceable to basic norms of the Canadian 
constitution with little to no reliance on extra-legal materials? Or does a “constitution” describe a 
set of autonomous legal values that structure any and all political associations and which 
accordingly transcend the constitutional texts of any one state? If so, can we argue for a set of 
global constitutional values which may take priority over domestic laws in cases of conflict?
Traditionally, divisions between respect for international law and respect for 
constitutional democracy have been informed by a number of ideas, including the idea that there 
is always at least a latent tension between the two sets of principles, and, that the latter ought to 
take primacy over the former in cases of conflict. The “presumption of conformity” doctrine, as 
the earliest doctrine governing choices about the reception of international law, represents this 
perspective. This doctrine states that judges may presume that parliament intends to comply with 
Canada’s international legal obligations, and should interpret common and ambiguous statutory 
law to that effect.35 As the title of the doctrine implies, “conformity” describes substantive 
identity between domestic legal norms and obligatory international legal norms; the content of 
the former must conform to the content of the latter.
However, the doctrine also states that legislatures possess the exclusive authority to
34 The concept o f “compliance” will be deliberately left vague for the moment, to be clarified slightly later in this 
Chapter and more fully in Chapters 2 and 3.
35 Re Arrow River and Tributaries Slide and Boom Co. v. Pigeon Timber Co., [1932] 2 D.L.R. 250 (S.C.C.); In the 
Matter o f  a Reference as to the Powers o f  the Corporation o f  the City o f  Ottawa and the Corporation o f  the Village 
o f  Rockclijfe Park to Levy Rates on Foreign Legations and High Commissioner's Residences, [ 1943] S.C.R. 208; 
Daniels v. R., [1968] S.C.R. 517; R. v. Zingre, [1981] 2 S.C. R. 392; National Corn Growers Assn. v. Canada 
(Import Tribunal), [1990] 2 S.C.R 1324; Gordon Estate v. Grail, [1998] 3 S.C.R. 437; Pushpanathan v. Canada 
(Minister o f  Citizenship and Immigration) (1988), 160 D.L.R. (4th) 193 (S.C.C.); Baker v. Canada (Minister o f  
Citizenship and Immigration), [1999] 2 S.C.R. 817; R. v. Sharpe, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 45; 114957 Canada Ltee
implement international treaty law and, what is more, they may legislate contrary to international 
treaty and customary law if they so desire. Adopted in the pre-C/rar/erera, the presumption of 
conformity doctrine is concerned entirely with preserving values of representative government 
from undue judicial and executive interference. In the words of Iacobucci J. courts must proceed 
“with caution...lest we adversely affect the balance maintained by our Parliamentary tradition, or 
inadvertently grant the executive the power to bind citizens without the necessity of involving 
the legislative branch”.36And so respect for international law means conformity of behavior to 
rules whereas respect for constitutional democracy means respect for the primacy of 
representative government.
Although the presumption of conformity doctrine provides a range of highly specific 
criteria regarding when, how, and why judges may receive international law, these criteria have 
been unevenly interpreted and applied, so much so that Stephen Toope has referred to the 
jurisprudence as an “appalling mess”.37 While useful as a starting point, doctrine quickly gets 
lost amidst a wide range of inconsistent decisions that seem to be shaped as much by judges’ 
subjective attitudes towards international law and constitutional democracy as by the doctrine 
itself. Some judges may be described as committed internationalists, who have welcomed 
international law with open arms. They consider international treaty law to be useful as an 
interpretive aid irrespective of whether or not it has been legislatively implemented or whether or 
not it is even binding on Canada. Dickson C.J., for example, stated that the Charter “should 
generally be presumed” to provide protection which does not fall below that provided by similar 
international human rights provisions,38 that “various sources of international human rights law”
(Spraytech, Societe d'arrosage) v. Town o f  Hudson [2001 )2 S.C.R. 241; R. V. Hape, [2007] 2 S.C.R. 292.
36 Baker, supra note 35 at para. 80.
37 Toope, supra note 29 at 34.
38 Reference Re Public Service Employee Relations Act (Alberta), [1987] 1 S.C.R. 313 at 349.
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may be “relevant and persuasive sources of interpretation of the Charter’s provisions”39 and, that 
“Canada’s international human rights obligations should inform not only the interpretation of the 
content of the rights guaranteed in the Charter but also the interpretation of what can constitute 
pressing and substantial s. 1 objectives”.40
This passage suggests at least two things. First, it suggests that the Charter should 
provide protections that are at least as great as those provided by binding international human 
rights. Demonstrating an infringement of the latter, in other words, should create a rebuttable 
presumption that a remedy is justified, much as courts remedy unjustifiable infringements of 
Charter rights. Second, it suggests that international and comparative human rights should serve 
as interpretive aids in determining the content, scope, and application of Charter rights. This 
second position treats international and comparative human rights alike as contextual resources 
or sources of information and insight rather than as free-standing, enforceable rights. The 
Supreme Court has since conflated these two readings. In Baker v. Canada (Minister o f 
Employment and Immigration), it state that the “values” of international human rights “may help 
inform the contextual approach to statutory interpretation”, thereby adopting the intemational- 
human-rights-as-interpretive-aids approach.41 In R. Hape, by contrast, it suggested that binding 
international human rights have been implemented into domestic law through the Charier and. 
that courts might be justified in providing remedies when these international human rights are 
violated.42 However, it then went on to say that binding international human rights might also 
function as interpretive aids, thereby making it difficult to determine how we ought to 
conceptualize the specific intersection of international human rights and the Charter.
39 Ibid. at 348.
40 Slaight Communications Inc. v. Davidson, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 1038 at 1056-1057.
41 [1999] 2 S.C.R. 817 at 861. This principle has been used to justify the use of international law generally; see 
114957 Canada Ltee (Spraytech, Societe d'arrosage) v. Town o f  Hudson [2001] 2 S.C.R. 241.
We are accordingly left with a wide spectrum of possible positions. Judges such as 
lacobucci J., view international law as a source of confusion and, worse still, as potentially 
corrosive to the coherence and integrity of Canadian law. Others view international law as 
binding on and enforceable in Canada or, at the very least, useful as an interpretive aid. Between 
these two poles reside the majority of judges who cannot seem to make up their minds about 
whether, how, and why they will receive international law. In one case, they will work 
assiduously to find a place for international law in their judgments. Then, seemingly without 
rhyme or reason, these same judges display indifference, impatience, or outright hostility 
towards international legal arguments. We have already glimpsed features of this approach in the 
Charkaoui cases, in which international law was used in a highly ambivalent fashion and was left 
out of the final judgment altogether in Charkaoui 11.
Any credible map of the law of reception must account for such inconsistent reasoning. 
One way to do this would be to simply acknowledge divergences, but insist that only those 
decisions that satisfy the criteria laid out within the presumption of conformity doctrine qualify 
as valid or justifiable components of the law of reception. This approach —which I will term the 
“traditional” approach — possesses numerous merits beyond that of simplicity.43 On the one 
hand, it can enhance judicial respect for international law qua law, traditionally understood, since 
international law is regarded as something to be obeyed, rather than as something that can be 
occasionally turned to for interpretive assistance. On the other hand, it maintains respect for 
representative government, limiting as it does the capacity of judges and the executive to use 
international law to alter domestic rights and obligations independently of legislative will.
Yet, the traditionalist’s stringently doctrinal map conceals the inherent complexity within
42 Hape, supra  note 35.
431 will provide a more nuanced account o f traditional perspectives in Chapter 2. Good examples o f traditionalist
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this field, the true nature of judicial reasoning, and basic changes to the forms and functions of 
Canadian law — changes that cannot be attributed just to the Charter. Judges had already adopted 
“modem” or “contextual” approaches to statutory construction prior to and following the 
entrenchment of the Charter, situating the public interest and values of human dignity alongside 
legislative will as important indicia of legal meaning,44 These approaches unsettled the strict 
criteria established by the presumption of conformity doctrine, with judges such as Pigeon and 
Gonthier J.J. using international treaties to redefine unambiguous legislative objectives and 
provisions, even provisions that had not strictly performed an implementing function 45
Of course, the Charter itself reflects and reinforces more fundamental changes to the 
ways in which Canadian law is created, interpreted, and applied. It is not easy imagine how the 
presumption of conformity doctrine can account for the domestic legal effect of binding 
international law in settings where there is no implementing legislation or where the will of the 
legislatures is not paramount. While we might turn to cases like Hape and treat binding 
international human rights as enforceable in Canada, this raises questions about whether such 
rights are separate sources of constitutional law, how the scope and content of these rights might 
be proven and limitations justified, and what would happen in the event of a conflict between 
binding international human rights and formal constitutional provisions. Finally, the traditionalist 
cannot account for the fact that the presumption of conformity doctrine obviously has not been 
adequate to the problems judges face; if it did, jurisprudence would display uniform elegance. 
Because doctrine alone has failed to determine choices, some account must be given of what
scholars include: Bayefsky, supra note 21; van Ert, supra note 21; Weiser, supra note 21.
44 Stephan Beaulac, “International Treaty Norms and Driedger’s ‘M odem’ Principal [sic] o f Statutory 
Interpretation” in Legitimacy and Accountability. Proceedings of the 33rd Annual Conference o f the Canadian 
Council on International Law, Ottawa, October 14-16, 2004 (Ottawa, On: Allegra Print & Imaging, 2005) 141; Ruth 
Sullivan, Driedger on the Construction o f  Statutes, 3rd Ed., (Butterworths, 1994) at 330.
45 National Corn Growers Assn. v. Canada, supra note 35; Capital Cities Communications Inc. v. Canadian Radio- 
Television Commission [1978] 2 S.C.R. 141 at paras. 188-189.
extraneous factors have played a role. Insisting on doctrinal order when it is patently absent risks 
decoupling our maps from the reality they are supposed to depict.
An alternative would be to identify a parallel doctrine that can explain divergences within 
the jurisprudence and, beyond this, to suggest that decision-making generally is influenced by a 
host of factors that operate well outside of the ambits of any one doctrine, if  not law itself. An 
attractive candidate is the “relevant and persuasive” doctrine, which emerged out of Dickson 
C.J.S injunction to use international law as an interpretive aid during Charter review. Whereas 
the presumption of conformity doctrine is limited to the intersection of general international law 
and ordinary domestic law (e.g. common law, legislation), the relevant and persuasive doctrine is 
directly concerned with the relationship between international and comparative human rights and 
the Charter. Within this new setting, judges are authorized to use any and all forms of 
international and comparative human rights norms as a resource for interpreting the content and 
scope of Charter rights.
The relevant and persuasive doctrine is potentially useful for grounding a more modem 
map of the law of reception. To begin, the destabilizing effects of variances in the use and non­
use of international law may be reduced by distinguishing between doctrine that applies in 
ordinary cases and doctrine that applies in Charter cases. Variances within the latter may be 
explained on the grounds that international law was or was not considered to be relevant or 
persuasive in any given case, as was done in the Charkaoui decisions. But this raises more 
questions than it answers. First, cases like Hape suggest that the presumption of conformity 
doctrine has been applied, albeit in a woefully inadequate way, to Charter review; the relevant 
and persuasive doctrine is just one candidate for explaining intersections between international 
human rights and the Charter. Second, what, if anything, accounts for variances within non-
Charter cases, where the presumption of conformity doctrine has quite simply failed to 
determine choices about whether, how, and why to receive international law? Quite 
independently of the Charter, judges have contradicted the presumption of conformity doctrine 
by using international treaties to refine the meaning of unambiguous or non-implementing 
legislation or, alternatively, by refusing to use international law when it was clearly relevant. 
Given the contemporary judicial adoption of contextual approaches to statutory construction, the 
presumption of conformity doctrine is unlikely to become any more accurate in the future. Just 
the reverse is likely to be true.
Third, and considering only the relevant and persuasive doctrine, there are no objective 
criteria for determining when international law is “relevant” and “persuasive”. The presumption 
of conformity doctrine sets out a fairly comprehensive set of objective criteria, so that observers 
can at least identify deviant decisions. Reducing the law of reception to judges’ subjective 
attitudes towards international law allows judges to pick and choose international law on the 
basis of instrumental utility, in flagrant disregard for principles of respect for international law 
qua law and principles of respect for representative government, traditionally conceived.46 The 
latter is especially harmful in the context of Charter review, where the use of international law 
during judicial review can result in the invalidation of legislation.47 This is not to say that the 
relevant and persuasive doctrine cannot be justified on its merits or, alternatively, that traditional 
concepts and categories are no longer meaningful. It is to say that serious work needs to be done 
to map the relationships between doctrine and actual decision-making in terms of long-standing 
concepts and categories that remain vital frames of reference within changing environments.
46 Bayefsky, supra note 21 at 89, 95; Van Ert, supra note 21 at 255-264.
47 Weiser, supra note 21.
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C. Theoretical Perspectives on the Relevant and Persuasive Doctrine
Some of this work was begun by a number of scholars who share an affinity for 
transnational legal perspectives. Transnational legal perspectives generally blur or break down 
conceptual, functional, and hierarchical distinctions between international law and domestic law 
as well as other binaries, such as law/non-law, public/private and state/non-state.48Historically 
related to critical or “anti-formalist” perspectives on state law, the transnational legal 
perspectives in which I am interested recognize that the formation, operation, and effectiveness 
of state law depend in large part upon its intersections with non-state normative orders, either 
through overt institutional relationships or through the influences of legal actors’ socially and 
historically situated perspectives.49 In keeping with the core claims of some American legal 
realists, this judicially-oriented approach to transnational law emphasizes: the indeterminacy of 
legal (and non-legal) rules; the causal or motivational impact of social structures and institutions 
on judicial decision-making;51 the possibility and practical importance of accurately describing 
and predicting decision-making in terms of these broader social forces; and, a normative 
endorsement of “policy-oriented”52 decision-making as a basis for enhancing law’s
48 Phillip Jessup, Transnational Law (Yale University Press, 1956); Craig Scott, “ ’Transnational Law” as Proto- 
Concept: Three Conceptions” (2009) 10:7 German Law Journal, 859; Peer Zumbansan, “Transnational Law” in 
Encyclopedia o f  Comparative Law, J. Smits ed., (Edward Eiger Publishing 2006) 738.
49 Influential, classic legal realist works (largely o f the sociological variety) include: Oliver Wendell Holmes, “The 
Path of the Law” (1897) 10 Harvard Law Review 457; Herman Oliphant, “A Return to Stare Decisis” (1928) 14 
American Bar Association Journal 71; Underhill Moore & Theodore Hope, “An Institutional Approach to the Law 
o f Commercial Banking” (1929) 38 Yale Law Journal; Karl Llewellyn, “A Realistic Jurisprudence: The Next Step”
(1930) 30 Columbia Law Review 431; Karl Llewellyn, “Some Realism about Realism: Responding to Dean Pound"
(1931) 44 Harvard Law Review 1222; Edward S. Robinson, “Law: An Unscientific Discipline” (1934) 44 Yale Law 
Journal 235.
50 This is to say that the class o f valid or legitimate legal reasons applicable to a case cannot justify one and only one 
decision. Even if legal reasons could be arranged to produce multiple justified decisions, non-legal reasons will be 
necessary to select one rather than an alternative; Brian Leiter, “American Legal Realism” The University o f Texas 
School o f  Law: Public Law and Legal Theory Research Paper No. 042 (October 2002) at 3-6.
51 Not all realists adopted this “sociological” approach; Leiter, supra note 50 at 9-14.
52 By “policy-oriented” 1 mean decisions that are consciously directed towards the (re-)distribution o f values that are 
found, not within precedent, statutory or constitutional rules, or even the facts o f an individual case, but broader 
social, economic, and political institutions and perhaps even universal moral principles; see, Harold D. Lasswell & 
Myres S. McDougal, “Legal Education and Public Policy” (1943) 52:2 Yale Law Journal 203 at 207.
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responsiveness to ambient social values, customs, and expectations in accordance with some 
conception of justice.
Transnational legal perspectives also share many core claims made by legal pluralists,53 
who situate legal decision-making within social fields occupied by a multiplicity of legal and 
other normative orders (hereafter simply “normative” orders). In addition to the diverse array of 
normative orders that operate within a nation’s jurisdiction, there are a wide variety of 
international and global normative orders that compete with state authority and seek to impose 
demands directly on domestic individuals, communities, and organizations. Although some see 
the co-existence of multiple, overlapping, and centrally uncoordinated normative orders as a 
serious problem,54 transnationalists tend to see legal pluralism as a potentially desirable state of 
affairs. Appreciating the challenges that “global legal pluralism”55 poses to the effectiveness and 
authority of state law, transnational legal perspectives may extend so far as to call us to break 
faith with state law altogether, focusing instead on the capacities of non-state normative orders to 
govern local or discursive communities,56 or, it may extend only so far as to reconfigure state law 
in the hopes of enhancing its capacity to interact with transitioning environments.57
Karen Knop is a prominent example of someone who takes the latter approach. Knop
53 Classic legal pluralists works include: Sir Henry Sumner Main, Ancient Law: Its Connection with the Early 
History o f  Society and its Relation to M odem Ideas, 16th edn. (London: John Murray, 1897); Karl Llewellyn, The 
Cheyenne Way: Conflict and Case Law in Primitive Jurisprudence, (Norman: University o f Oklahoma Pres, 1941); 
Kwamena Bentsi-Enschil, “The Colonial Heritage of Legal Pluralism” (1969) 1 Zambia Law Journal 1; Leopold 
Pospisil, The Anthropology o f  Law: A Comparative Theory o f  Law (New York: Harper and Row, 1971); Sally Falk 
Moore, “Law and Social Change: The Semi-Autonomous Social Field as an Appropriate Subject of Study” (1973) 7 
Law & Society Review 719; M.B. Hooker, Legal Pluralism: An Introduction to Colonial and Neo-Colonial Laws 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975); H.W. Arthurs, Without the Law: Administrative Justice and Legal Pluralism in 
Nineteenth Century England (Toronto: University o f  Toronto Press, 1985).
54 Sally Engle Merry, “Legal Pluralism” (1988) 22:5 Law & Society Review 869 at 871.
55 Paul SchifTBerman, “Global Legal Pluralism” (2007) 80 Southern California Review 1155.
56 Global Law Without the State, Gunther Teubner, ed., (Dartmouth: 1997); Gunther Teubner “The Two Faces of 
Janus: Rethinking Legal Pluralism” (1992) 13 Cardozo Law Review 1443; Niklas Luhmann, “Law as a Social 
System” (1988-1989) 83 Nw. U. L. Rev. 136; Gunther Teubner, “Substantive and Reflexive Elements in Law” 
(1983) 17 Law and Society Review 239.
57 Scott, supra note 48 at 852.
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sees the Canadian law of reception as a setting within which judges may reflect upon the full 
range of normative orders that intersect with the facts, issues, and official state laws that are 
connected to a dispute and, in so doing, produce more informed, critical, socially responsive, and 
better justified decisions.58 Of course, judgments of this kind can be exceedingly difficult when 
interested parties are located in distinct ethnic, cultural, and geographic settings, when parties to 
a dispute may well reject the authority of state law, and when the facts and issues of a case fall 
across multiple legal fields and jurisdictions. Judges (and lawyers) must be prepared to 
consciously traverse unfamiliar social settings, adequately understand the ethical and cultural 
dimensions of a dispute, decide which norms are applicable and how, forecast how alternative 
decisions will affect (hypothetical) others, and envision creative ways of resolving conflicts 
among seemingly incommensurable positions. This dedication to recognizing and wrestling with 
the full complexity of a legal problem contributes to higher quality judgment while at the same 
time improving levels of legitimacy and effectiveness.
Knop argues that many of the concepts and categories that comprise traditional 
approaches to the law of reception have failed to determine decisions, and, that unwavering 
fidelity to doctrine can both obscure what is actually going on and hinder innovation. Rather than 
being concerned with what categories a legal norm falls into, judges should be concerned with 
using any and all materials that would help them identify and respond to underlying values and 
interests; doctrine should guide but not rigidify reasoning. Likening this process to translation, 
the reception of international law may be viewed as a loose communicative process whereby
58 Knopswpra 21; Hugh Kindred “Making International Agreements and Making Them Work Within a 
Multicultural Federal State: The Experience o f Canada” in Stephen Tierney, ed., Multiculturalism and the Canadian 
Constitution (UBC Press. 2007); Reem Bahdi “Gloablization o f Judgment: Transjudicial ism and the Five Faces of 
International Law in Domestic Courts” (2006) 34:3 The George Washington International Law Review 555; Mayo 
Moran, “Authority, Influence and Persuasion: Baker, Charter Values and the Puzzle o f Method”, in David 
Dyzenhaus, ed., The Unity o f  Public Law (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2004); Jutta Brunnee & Stephen J. Toope, “A 
Hesitant Embrace: Baker and the Application o f International Law by Canadian Courts” in David Dyzenhaus, ed,
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terminology is borrowed from “external” social and cultural contexts and then encoded in terms 
more familiar to those operating in domestic contexts. This interaction destabilizes internal 
structures of meaning and exposes decision-makers to alternative ways of seeing and doing 
things. Through repeated interaction, decision-makers may come to adopt expanded or 
alternative social roles and identities that permit them to better appreciate the needs, interests, 
and expectations of interested parties who have been historically excluded from channels of 
authoritative decision-making.
This general transnational narrative underlines the importance of debates about the law of 
reception. To begin, those debates might be useful to those of us interested in more accurately 
describing jurisprudence as well as to human rights advocates practically concerned with the 
conditions under which international and comparative human rights are most likely to be 
considered relevant and persuasive. Consider again the Charkaoui decisions. Here, international 
and foreign law was clearly important in establishing the context and the nature of the problems 
posed by the post-SIRC certificate regime. International counter-terrorism law was one of the 
vehicles through which the legislative and executive branches of government forged, or at least 
legitimized, institutional linkages with foreign governments, including the UK and the United 
States. Described as “transgovemmentalism”,59 these kinds of relationships are characterized by 
the formation of direct interactions between the component institutions (e.g. legislative bodies, 
executive departments and agencies, the judiciary etc.) of two or more states, typically with little 
input or oversight by non-participating institutions and actors. When encoded into law, the 
policies and practices of these institutions can become enormously resistant to change.
The Unity o f  Public Law  (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2004) 357 at 357-36.
59 Kal Raustiala “The Architecture of International Cooperation: Transgovemmental Networks and the Future o f 
International Law” (2002) 43 Virginia Journal o f International Law 1; Anne-Marie Slaughter, “The Real New World 
Order” ( 1997) Foreign Affairs 183; Robert Keohane & Joseph Nye, “Transgovemmental Relations and International
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Transgovemmentalism highlights yet again the growing disconnect between the concepts 
and categories emphasized by traditionalists and the changing forms and functions of Canadian 
law. Although useful in coordinating responses to common problems, transgovemmental 
networks respond to both domestic and foreign policy preferences and tend to escape the pull of 
constitutional norms that are, conventionally, more or less territorially-bounded. This is a 
particularly attractive consequence in the field of national security, where governments may 
conceal the extent of their participation in questionable activities, such as foreign intelligence 
gathering or extraordinary rendition. Can the Canadian government, for example, be held 
responsible for the human rights abuses inflicted upon a named person subsequent to their 
deportation? How direct must Canada’s involvement or foreknowledge of potential abuse be to 
activate Charter scrutiny? Should the government be prohibited from using foreign intelligence 
it has acquired from a state known to engage in torture? Should the rights afforded to named 
persons be limited due to the fact that they are non-citizens? Alternatively, does their status as 
refugees require enhanced protections? The answers to these questions are not to be found 
exclusively within doctrine, as in many instances they have not yet been seriously addressed. 
Courts have to be creative in finding solutions to these problems and, when problems transcend 
national borders, so too must their solutions.
In the Charkaoui decisions, we can see just this sort of dynamic. International and 
comparative human rights helped construct possible solutions to the problems posed by 
international counter-terrorism law and global intelligence agency cooperation. Both the 
government and human rights advocates incorporated international and comparative human 
rights into their submissions regarding the content and scope of relevant Charter provisions. The
Organizations” (1974) 27:1 World Politics 39.
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government stressed its obligations under inter-national counter-terrorism law as well as its 
strong opposition to the reinstatement of the SIRC regime, suggesting that the UK’s special 
advocate model would be a preferable alternative. Critics of course see here a shared learning 
process, in which Canadian officials turned to the UK for insight into how a veneer of legality 
could be spread over an essentially abusive regime. Cognizant of this, human rights advocates 
stressed the insufficiency of the UK model relative to international human rights standards and 
domestic alternatives.
At first glance, the Charkaoui decisions demonstrate that international and comparative 
human rights performed a kind of informational function, helping the court decide which among 
a range of possible decisions to make. That being so, it may be that the relevance and 
persuasiveness of international and comparative human rights is linked to how well they enable 
judges to appraise the practical and normative consequences of alternative decisions that could, 
in theory, be made on the basis of domestic normative materials alone e.g. Charter principles, 
legislative provisions, precedent, domestic policy preferences. International and comparative 
human rights perform the distinctive function of indicating how recurring transnational problems 
have been addressed within other jurisdictions and with what effects.
But what determines the ends towards which a judge will put this knowledge? What are 
the pathways through which extrinsic normative and empirical information enter judicial 
contexts and how direct are they or should they be? Must courtroom proceedings be designed to 
accommodate extensive inter-personal interactions so that judges and parties to a dispute can 
literally see and feel how their actions impact affected persons and groups? Or must we rely on 
judges’ willingness to contemplate how their decisions might impact upon (hypothetical) others? 
What is the ethical “stuff’ that enables choices to be made amongst equally valid or legitimate
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alternatives?
Knop insists that decision-making that is consciously oriented along the lines of the 
relevant and persuasive doctrine is conducive to more ethically responsive judgment, but 
reasonable interpretations of the Charkaoui cases suggest just the reverse. Clearly, abstract 
values of human dignity alone cannot explain the influence of international and comparative 
human rights law, since the use of such law can facilitate the realization of ends that are 
inconsistent with those values. More concrete values that comprise ambient social policy hardly 
fare any better, especially in the context of national security where political communities tend to 
view “outsiders” with suspicion, if not outright hostility. Perhaps in the absence of a strong 
doctrinal framework, we are again left with judges’ prior attitudes, values, and idiosyncrasies, 
just as traditionalists contend. Until we can explain how international and comparative human 
rights can exert a measurable and predictable influence on judicial reasoning, the endorsement of 
the relevant and persuasive doctrine and associated maps comes at the greater price of normative 
uncertainty.
D. Research Questions and Methodology
There are three basic questions now before us. First, what does it mean to say that 
international and comparative human rights exert a persuasive influence on judges? This 
question directs our attention to whether such law alters the content and path of judicial 
reasoning or whether it simply serves as a means of rationalizing decisions made on the basis of 
other factors altogether. Second, how does persuasive influence fit with principles of respect of 
international law qua law and principles of respect for constitutional democracy? This question 
forces us to account for the place which traditional concepts and categories occupy in changing 
socio-legal environments. Finally, how do we go about appraising the domestic legal
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effectiveness o f international and comparative human rights? The question of effectiveness 
forces us to contend with whether, how, and why international and comparative human rights 
influence the choices, commitments, and behaviour of broader discursive communities that help 
to construct, and are affected by, judicial decisions.
One of the core arguments of this dissertation is that the relevant and persuasive doctrine 
can be justified on the basis of traditional juristic principles, including principles of respect for 
international law and constitutional democracy. My claim is that, from a transnational 
perspective, these two sets of principles need not exist in a state of tension with each other nor 
need they be disregarded as altogether out of step with the contextual realities of contemporary 
decision-making. In the next section, I will outline the methods by which I will defend this 
claim.
D. I. Compliance. Persuasive Influence, and Respect for International Law 
As we have noted, securing compliance with international law is one of the traditional 
functions of the law of reception. From a traditionalist perspective, compliance is understood to 
consist in substantive conformity between domestic and international legal rules. Domestic 
courts do very little by way of producing or even modifying international law. No matter what 
kind of international law they use, the content of this law will already have been established by 
international actors. A judge’s job is to take this law as she finds it, to use it to fill out gaps in 
pertinent legislative provisions and, in a small selection of cases, to modify common law rights 
and obligations in like fashion. So basic is this function that the presumption of conformity 
doctrine was so styled because of it.
But this is hardly the only tenable conception of compliance. Benedict Kingsbury has 
aptly noted that “the concept of ‘compliance’ with law does not have, and cannot have, any
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meaning except as a function of prior theories of the nature and function of the law to which it 
pertains”.60 Harkening back to our first organizing divisions, we see that traditionalists generally 
hold a dualist view, in which domestic law and international law are conceived to be separate 
bodies of rules. In positivist fashion, their concern is to separate law from non-law, and to 
correlate the effectiveness of international law with its vertical integration into similarly pre­
configured domestic legal rules. But alongside this positivist, rule-based approach stands a 
process-based approach, in which law is distinguished from non-law on the basis of how it 
organizes argumentative interactions towards the realization of public values or ends, rather than 
on the basis of a legal rule’s content, pedigree, or general place within a more or less static 
. institutional framework.61 From such a perspective, compliance is a matter of degree, in which 
participation in legal process exposes legal actors to diverse perspectives and, if the conditions 
are right, alters their pre-existing values, interests, and identities. The spectrum of compliance 
captures the relative degrees to which this participation and subsequent identity/interest- 
alteration occurs.
According to Harold Koh and some of his intellectual forebears, including Myres 
McDougal and Harold Lasswell, persuasion is one of the primary casual mechanisms by which 
law operates and through which compliance is secured.62 Developing a transnational perspective 
very similar in orientation to Knop’s, Koh argues that international law improves judgment by
60 Benedict Kingsbury, “The Concept of Compliance as a Function o f Competing Conceptions of International Law” 
(1998) 19 Michigan Journal o f International Law 345 at 346.
61 One core claim common to all process-based approaches is that law is best distinguished from non-law in terms of 
its functional orientation towards certain ends or purposes, rather than in terms o f concepts drawn from language-use 
or conventional social practices; Patrick Capps, Human Dignity and the Foundations o f  International Law  (Oxford 
& Portland: Hart Publishing, 2009) at 40-42.
62 Harold Koh, “Why Do Nations Obey International Law?” (1997) 106 Yale L.J. 2599; Harold Koh, “Transnational 
Legal Process” (1996) 75 Nebraska Law Review 181; Myres S. McDougal, Harold D. Lasswell & W. Michael 
Reisman, “World Constitutive Process Authoritative Decision” (1967) 19:3 Journal o f Legal Education 253 at 257, 
279; Harold D. Lasswell & Myres S. McDougal, “Jurisprudence in Policy-Oriented Perspective” (1966-1967) 19:3 
Florida Law Review 486 at 503; Myres S. McDougal, Harold D. Lasswell & James C. Miller, The Interpretation o f  
Agreements and World Public Order: Principles o f  Content and Procedure (New Haven: Yale University Press,
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exposing judges and other decision-makers to alternative ways of seeing and doing things. This 
occurs in three distinct stages that comprise what he calls “Transnational Legal Process” (TLP).63 
First, both state and non-state actors operating in different social environments interact, usually 
by identifying collective problems, desires, interests or goals that emerge through the course of 
longer-term transnational social interactions. Second, they share in the argumentative 
enunciation, interpretation, and/or application of a rule in order to collectively address a 
common problem or to collectively pursue a common goal. Finally, state actors internalize the 
rule, making it a part of their own value set.
This entire process may be described as “norm-intemalization”, and stands as one of 
Koh’s most important contributions to compliance theory. Norm-intemalization captures the 
transformation of an international legal rule from an inert logical proposition which wafts down 
from higher authorities to something that regularly guides behaviour through means independent 
of coercion. Norms may be, and often are, expressed in terms of rules, but they are at root 
something inseparable from the attitudes that their subjects hold towards them. The very 
existence of norms depends on the fact that people observe them; they are in a sense descriptions 
of or explanations for human behaviour. Rules, by contrast, may be analytically separated from 
the social context within which they operate, viewed simply in terms of their logical or semantic 
components. Norm-intemalization in Koh’s sense of the term describes the generation of lasting 
ethical bonds amongst participants in the legal process, in which they make the values, interests, 
and needs of others reasons for behaving one way rather than another.64
1967).
63 Koh, “Transnational Legal Process”, supra note 62 at 203-205.
64 These bonds are probably strongest when formed through inter-personal communication, but such communication 
is not strictly necessary, so long as decision-makers and other participants consciously direct their minds to how 
their reasoning, positions, and actions might impact upon (hypothetical) others; Craig Scott, “Diverse Persuasion(s): 
From Rhetoric to Representation (and Back Again to Rhetoric) in International Human Rights Interpretation” (2008) 
4:1 Comparative Research in Law & Political Economy 1 at 61-63. Koh seems to assume the former, inter-personal
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Adding detail to this rough framework, Jutta Brunnee and Stephen Toope, two leading 
experts on the Canadian law of reception, describe persuasion as “rhetorical activity producing 
increasingly influential mutual expectations or shared understandings of actors”.65 Shared 
understandings are both generated by interaction and serve “as a basis for further mutually 
constructed identities and institutions”. 66 Enmeshed in repeated interactions such as, for 
example, courtroom proceedings, actors assert positions that are constructed in large part out of 
the values, identities, knowledge, and culture of the communities to which they belong. In this 
way, positions in law cannot be purely idiosyncratic, unwavering, or expressive of one’s egoistic 
self-interests. What is more, a host of procedural and substantive rules constrain the content, 
timing, and general form of legal-positions as well as who is authorized to express them; not just 
anyone can address the court and not just any sort of argument will do. Through the course of 
legal interaction, parties are forced to adapt or reformulate their personal positions to fit the 
expectations of the broader public concerning what counts as a valid or justified argument. The 
moulding of positions around these system-wide shared understandings or common starting 
points is a precondition of sensible dialogue in any argumentative context and, in law, is a 
hallmark of persuasive arguments.67 Ultimately, it establishes the best chance for disputants to 
identify points of compromise and mutual respect.
Recalling the first question looming over Knop’s transnational narrative, Koh, Toope,
communication in his theory, but as 1 will detail in Chapters 2 and 3, it is possible (and desirable) to adopt the 
broader approach forwarded by Scott.
65 It must be noted that Brunnee & Toope do not share Knop’s “comparative law” conception of the Canadian law of 
reception. Unlike Knop, they argue that we should retain formal distinctions between binding international human 
rights and non-binding international and comparative human rights. Jutta Brunnee & Stephen J. Toope 
“International Law and Constructivism: Elements o f an Interactional Theory of International Law” (2000) 39 
Columbia Journal o f Transnational Law 19 at 65; Jutta Brunnee & Stephen J. Toope Legitimacy and Legality in 
International Law: An Interactional Account (Cambridge University Press, 2010).
66 Brunnee & Toope, “Interactional Theory”, supra  note 65 at 66.
67 Friedrich V. Kratochwil, Rules, Norms, and Decisions: On the Conditions o f  Practical and Legal Reasoning in 
International Relations and Domestic Affairs (Cambridge University Press, 1991).
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and Brunnee’s process-based conception of compliance seems well-positioned to explain how 
international and comparative human rights might exert a meaningful, persuasive influence on 
judicial reasoning. International and comparative human rights can serve as a shared standard 
against which diverse legal arguments can be constructed and appraised, perhaps helping to 
counter the distorting influence that political and ideological power has on rational 
argumentation. In so doing, they can guide decision-makers towards judgments that more fully 
actualize system-wide values associated with human dignity. What is more, they can serve as 
repositories of more diverse community values, identities, knowledge, and culture, expanding the 
normative horizons available to judges and other decision-makers beyond those offered by the 
communities to which they personally belong. In these respects, international and comparative 
human rights facilitate the generation understanding by promoting and protecting equal, critical 
and fair dialogue among disputants.
Of course, it remains to be seen whether TLP accurately describes how Canadian judges 
used international and comparative human rights in the Charkaouicases. Did they internalize 
international and comparative human rights norms, as Koh would predict, or did they remain 
unaffected by ethics, using international and comparative human rights in order to rationalize 
relations of domination? What are the precise ways in which the argumentative interactions 
among diverse participants and perspectives were ordered and what were the effects of the 
judgments on these actors? We also need to clarify what it means to say that decisions have 
given “effect” to international and comparative human rights. Does this mean that judges have 
internalized values of human dignity or, more fully, that their decisions have projected these 
values outwards, facilitating norm-intemalization within other (non-)participating discursive 
communities? Hopefully, a review of the certificate regime through the lens of TLP will help
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answer these questions, and in turn help us to appreciate the full extent to which the 
reconstitution of the certificate regime has or has not altered the policies and practices of national 
security agencies.
D. II. Constitutional Perspectives on the Law of Reception
A transnational map of the law of reception should also provide an account of the second 
pillar of the law of reception: principles of respect for constitutional democracy. Just as with 
compliance, the concept of respect for constitutions does not have, and cannot have, any 
meaning except as a function of prior theories of the nature and function of the constitutions to 
which it pertains. A large part of this dissertation will be concerned with examining how 
different conceptions Qf constitutionalism influence the perceived legitimacy of the relevant and 
persuasive doctrine. Borrowing from the insights of Mattias Kumm, I shall describe two very 
general paradigms of constitutionalism: one statist and the other cosmopolitan.68
Statist constitutionalism describes a paradigm in which a constitution is the supreme law 
of a state. In democratic states, constitutions both constitute and are authorized by the will of a 
territorially-bounded population, establishing the basic rules upon which all legal and political 
authority within a state rests as well as legitimizing the coercive power of state institutions. The 
statist paradigm “establishes an analytical link among the constitution as a legal document, 
democracy as a foundational value, and the sovereign state as an institution”.69 It stresses the 
importance of linking the creation, amendment, interpretation, application and enforcement of 
ordinary legal rules to foundational and publicly-accessible sources of authority, the content of 
which has been determined outside the realm of contested politics. Although particular legal 
norms and institutional arrangements may change within a state, what does not change are 
fundamental rules governing what counts as “valid” law, what institutions are authorized to
68 Mattias Kumm, “The Cosmopolitan Turn in Constitutionalism: On the Relationship between Constitutionalism in 
and Beyond the State” in Jeffrey L. Dunoff & Joel P. Trachtman, eds., Ruling the World? Constitutionalism, 
International Law, and Global Governance (Cambridge University Press, 2009) 258.
69 Ibid. at 265
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create and change law (and how), and what institutions are authorized to apply law and to 
adjudicate disputes arising within the system. The institutional character of law may be said to be 
among the most widely accepted descriptive (and normative) elements of a legal system, 
understood in terms of positivist ambitions, assumptions, and values.70
Statist paradigms are resistant to the application of constitutional vocabulary to non-state 
or global settings. This causes tension between those invested in this paradigm and those who 
seek to locate elements of state authority within international law and other “external” normative 
frameworks. Cosmopolitan paradigms of constitutionalism, by contrast, provide an “integrative 
basic conceptual framework for a general theory of public law that integrates national and 
international law”.71 Here, state constitutions are but one manifestation of a more fundamental 
concept of constitutionalism which encompasses the organization, operation, and interactions of 
a plurality of public legal orders. There are, in other words, various overlapping constitutions 
that cut across national boundaries, limiting, transforming and sometimes undermining the 
authority of the state. A cosmopolitan paradigm helps us construct, understand, justify and 
criticize the exercise of increasingly fragmented and shared public authority.72 In this way, it 
seeks to resolve tensions produced by the collision of various state, international, transnational, 
and global regimes.73
For Kumm, a cosmopolitan paradigm links authority to a complex standard of public 
reason, jurisdictional and procedural principles, as well as the legitimate concerns of outsiders.74 
Broadening the sources of authority beyond those located within state constitutions, 
cosmopolitan constitutionalism legitimizes judicial recourse to international law as authoritative 
within certain circumstances. Depending on the institution that has produced a norm and that 
institution’s recognized authority over a given issue, a domestic court conceivably could be
70 Joseph Raz, The Authority o f  Law  (Clarendon Press, 1979) at 43; H.L.A. Hart, The Concept o f  Law  (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1961).
71 Kumm, supra note 68 at 264.
72 Ibid. at 267.
73 For a skeptical view, see Andreas Fischer-Lescano & Gunther Teubner, “Regime-Collisions: The Vain Search for 
Unity in the Fragmentation of Global Law” (2004) 25 Michigan Journal o f International Law 999.
74 Kumm, supra note 68 at 268.
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authorized to prioritize an international legal norm over their home state’s constitution.
As with conceptions of compliance, statist and cosmopolitan conceptions of 
constitutionalism appear at first glance to connect respectively with traditional and transnational 
perspectives on the law of reception. The presumption of conformity doctrine clearly maps onto 
statist paradigms, insofar as the judicial reception of international law is strictly constrained by 
the supreme authority of constitutional rules and principles linked (in Canada) to federalism and 
parliamentary sovereignty. In the event of conflict between international and domestic law, the 
latter always wins out. By contrast, the relevant and persuasive doctrine seems to resonate with 
cosmopolitan paradigms, insofar as it potentially recognizes international and comparative 
human rights as bases upon which ordinary law may be invalidated. This is likely the view of 
many traditionalists, who worry that the relevant and persuasive doctrine will enable judges to 
ignore traditional constitutional limits on their authority, using international and comparative 
human rights law as a pretext to either illegitimately override legislative will or abdicate their 
responsibilities to give meaningful protection to Charter rights.
Despite appearances, however, the presumption of conformity doctrine could actually 
draw support from cosmopolitan conceptions of constitutionalism, insofar as it supports the 
judicial enforcement of international human rights during the course of Charter review. In such a 
situation, binding international human rights may operate as separate sources of constitutional 
law on a par with Charter rights and, pushed to the limits, may be triumph in conflicts with 
formal constitutional provisions. In other words, state law, policy and practices are reviewable 
against international human rights and not just the Charter.
The relevant and persuasive doctrine, meanwhile, may be explained in ways that are 
wholly consistent with, or at least comprehensible within, the statist paradigm. To begin, 
justifying the assertion of public authority by reference to public reason and recognizing the 
global and multicultural contexts of law are hardly practices inimical to state constitutionalism. 
To the contrary, the former practice at least is part and parcel of what it means to engage in rights
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discourse.75 Even if no rights infringements are found or no remedies are offered when rights are 
infringed, rights by their nature force governments to justify the exertion of public power in 
relation to such standards as fairness, equality, proportionality, and human dignity. By the same 
token, it is incumbent on rights-holders to assert the interest or values served by a right and to 
persuade decision-makers that these stand as conclusive reasons for deciding one way and not 
another i.e. for imposing correlative duties on the state.76 When the interests and values that 
inform rights are global and multicultural in scope, it follows that justifications will have to be 
sensitive to the perspectives of territorial, social, and/or political outsiders. This does not require 
that a judge give effect either to domestic law or to international law or that somehow decision­
making is bereft of constitutional authority. International and comparative human rights instead 
serve as sources of information and insight that inform the scope, content, and applicability of 
Charter rights.
Further, critical perspectives on law that underpin TLP convincingly illustrate that 
judicial decision-making does not consist in the deductive or inductive application of pre­
existing legal rules to new fact scenarios.77 So far as I am aware, no complete account of judicial 
reasoning explains, convincingly, how decisions are made without recourse to extra-legal 
materials, such as morality, ideology or social science data. This is not to say pre-existing law 
makes no difference whatsoever or that judges regularly decide solely on the basis of whimsy 
and caprice. It is to say that logic alone cannot determine a decision and, moreover, that greater 
determinacy is achieved when judges make explicit and reflectively articulate what extrinsic 
materials play a role in their reasoning.78 Even when logic provides a range of equally valid or 
justifiable conclusions, the selection of one over the others will be influenced in no small way by 
concrete values or desired ends. All things being equal, international and comparative human 
rights are just as good (and possibly better than) any other normative material that helps judges
75 Scott, supra note 64 at 4-12; Joseph Raz, “On the Nature of Rights” (1984) 93 Mind 194 at 208.
76 Scott, supra note 64 at 7-8; Joseph Raz, The Morality o f  Freedom (Oxford University Press, 1988) at 262, 297.
77 Holmes, supra note 49; Oliphant, supra note 49; Llewellyn, supra note 50.
78 John Tasioulas, “In Defence o f Relative Normativity: Communitarian Values and the Nicaragua Case” (1996)
16:1 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 85 at 104; Karl Llewellyn, The Common Law Tradition: Deciding Appeals
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meet the needs of a community but whose pedigree cannot be linked to Canadian constitutional 
rules and principles.
There is nothing that should be surprising or unfamiliar about this, if one has paid 
attention to important critical debates in jurisprudence. One might even go so far as to say that 
the law of reception is in many ways part of the common law tradition of viewing the 
constitution as a “living tree” that is rooted in social context and that must be tended in order to 
remain vital.79 Far from serving as an independent source or “root” of Canadian law, 
international and comparative human rights nonetheless contain many rules and principles that 
are embedded as well within the Charter. The values and interests that inform the content of all 
of these rights (international, comparative and domestic) are similar and, in some cases, may 
even be identical. Juridical engagement with these interests and values, mediated through 
international and comparative human rights, can expand the environment within which Canadian 
law operates, providing room for it to grow in step with shifting social realities. The practice of 
relying on contextual values and interests during the course of judicial review has been accepted 
as a legitimate practice by prominent positivist scholars.80 International and comparative human 
rights are among the various resources that judges may use to perform this long-standing role.
To give greater weight and clarity to this claim, I will argue that international and 
comparative human rights influence judicial reasoning primarily through analogy. Unlike 
metaphors, analogies describe similarities in the relationships that inhere between two sets of 
phenomenon; they do not focus on similarities in the phenomenon themselves, although some 
level of similarity is important. Analogical reasoning in the context of the law of reception means 
that one analyzes the ways in which recurring transnational legal problems are separately 
addressed by domestic law and in international or foreign jurisdictions, all of which start from 
the same or similar basic principles e.g. equality, due process, fairness etc.. Careful reviews of 
how international or foreign decisions and broader rule formulations have or have not succeeded
(Boston: Little Brown, 1960) at 35-45.
79 Edwards v. Canada (Attorney General), [1930] A.C. 124.
80 Will J. Waluchow, A Common Law Theory o f  Judicial Review: The Living Tree (Cambridge University Press,
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in actualizing certain principles can help Canadian judges identify the comparative desirability 
and feasibility of possible decisions. But the ends desired as well as the legal mechanisms 
through which they are actualized remain in large part domestically constituted; they remain 
linked to Charter provisions and other constitutional sources of authority.
This kind of reasoning quite simply does not require that external law replace or overbear 
domestic law. It requires only that external law help decision-makers appraise the comparative 
merits of alternative decisions that could, in theory, be made on the basis of domestic normative 
materials alone but which would otherwise be inattentive to the global and multicultural nature 
of pertinent values, interests, and problems. As scholars, we have to face the fact that reliance on 
extra-legal reasons happens, and must happen, anyway. To do otherwise is to provide a 
descriptively inaccurate, normatively bare, and theoretically dissatisfying map of the law of 
reception and of legal decision-making in general.
E. International Law, Dom estic C ourts, and T ransnational Legal Process
Throughout the remainder of this dissertation, I will build upon these observations and 
claims, providing a more detailed account of 1) what it means to say that international and 
comparative human rights exert a persuasive influence on judicial reasoning; 2) how the relevant 
and persuasive doctrine coheres with principles of respect of international law qua law and 
principles of respect for constitutional democracy; and, 3) how we may appraise the 
effectiveness of international and comparative human rights law on domestic law. Hopefully, 
answering these questions will allow me to sketch a rough analytical framework useful for 
identifying whether, how, and why international and comparative human rights arguments 
played a distinctive role in the court-led reconstitution of the Canadian security certificate 
regime. Depending on the results of this analysis, we may be able to draw descriptive and 




The dissertation is in this way best understood as an exercize in inductive reasoning. 
Ultimately, I hope to use a review of the certificate regime to make general normative and 
theoretical claims about the persuasive influence of international and comparative human rights 
on judicial reasoning in Canada. I will certainly not be advancing a new theory. Instead, I will be 
explaining and, where necessary, refining existing analytical frameworks offered by scholars 
such as Knop, Koh, Toope and Brunnee. This approach should produce the dual result of 
highlighting the strengths and weaknesses of these theoretical frameworks and enhancing our 
understanding of how international and comparative human rights contributed to the 
reconstitution of the certificate regime.
In the second chapter, I will detail the interrelationships among the basic elements that 
comprise the law of reception. This will include depictions of doctrinal landscapes as well as 
maps that emphasize different dimensions of this landscape. I will critically reflect on the 
comparative descriptive and normative merits of traditional and transnational maps, arguing that 
a transnational map better reflects contemporary juridical environments and is particularly well- 
suited for explaining and justifying the relevant and persuasive doctrine. However, I will also 
detail serious deficiencies with transnational perspectives, such as doubts about their ability to 
explain how international and comparative human rights exert a persuasive influence on judicial 
reasoning, how the relevant and persuasive doctrine links up with indispensable legal concepts 
and categories, and how we might resolve questions about impact.
In the third chapter, I will begin shoring up these deficiencies by more rigorously 
unearthing the juristic bases for the relevant and persuasive doctrine and by constructing a more 
stable analytical framework. This latter task will involve the presentation of Koh’s TLP as the
perspective most suitable to the former task. Once the framework has been put in place, I will 
use it to resolve lingering tensions regarding the content of, and relationship between, principles 
of respect of international law and principles of respect for constitutional democracy. In addition 
to providing an abstract account of why the relevant and persuasive doctrine is normatively 
tenable, this work will produce a set of hypotheses concerning how international and 
comparative human rights exert persuasive influence.
In the fourth chapter, I will apply this framework to the case of the security certificate 
regime in an effort to test these hypotheses. It should be obvious by now that the precise role 
played by international and comparative human rights in the reconstitution of the certificate 
regime is unclear. With this in mind, I will focus on how and why international and comparative 
human rights helped improve the quality of judicial reasoning in this context. This will involve 
the reconstruction of key arguments, careful attention to which actors made them and with what 
materials, what factors rendered them persuasive, and how resulting judgments contributed to 
improvements in the material wellbeing of named persons and affected communities. The 
concluding chapter will review how this case study has, or has not, supported hypotheses about 
the persuasive influence of international and comparative human rights.
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The purpose of this chapter is to chart the doctrinal landscapes within which international 
and comparative human rights acquire domestic legal effect in Canada, and, to analyze 
contending attempts to explain and justify the associated jurisprudence. I will be especially 
concerned with weaving together descriptive, normative, and theoretical claims. Descriptively, I 
will survey the legal categories and concepts that have structured the Canadian law of reception 
as well as problematic disconnects between classical doctrine and developing judicial practices. 
This descriptive account will begin with the presumption of conformity doctrine and move to the 
relevant and persuasive doctrine. Normatively, I will reflect on the comparative merits of 
traditional and transnational maps of the law of reception in terms of descriptive accuracy, 
explanatory power, and justificatory potential. Theoretically, I will survey the core claims and 
weaknesses of transnational legal perspectives on the law of reception, including: what it means 
to say that international and comparative human rights exert a persuasive influence on judges and 
other authoritative decision-makers; how this influence can be understood in fairly conventional 
jurisprudential terms; and, how international and comparative human rights affect interactions 
among various discursive communities.
B. International Human R ights and D om estic Courts 
Before moving to the Canadian law of reception, it would be useful to briefly review 
some preliminary matters, including: what are international human rights; what it means to say 
they are “binding”; and, what is their conceptual, functional, and juridical relationship to
41
domestic courts. This will clarify the meaning of recurring terms and ease us into some of the 
thorny normative issues that will arise later on.
B. I What are International Human Rights?
International human rights are a species of human rights, which may be defined as 
“norms inhering in the human condition that constitute the basis for the mutual recognition of the 
dignity of all individuals, no matter what their circumstances”.'The term “rights” is important, 
implying both conceptual and functional connections to morality and positive law.2 There are 
many historical and contemporary perspectives on the ontological status of human rights and 
their relationships to morality and positive law.3 Historically, human rights have been thought to 
exist: by virtue of divine decree; as objective matters of fact about the moral universe; as 
objective matters of fact about universally practiced customs and norms; and, as a discursive 
mechanism that supports the identification and endorsement of moral reasons for behaving one 
way rather than another. In any of these instances, positive law performs the distinctive function 
of giving free-standing moral norms greater clarity, force or effect.4
Alternatively, the existence of human rights may be reduced to their status as positive 
domestic or international laws. A human right may thus be said to exist internationally if — and 
only if— it is created through a treaty, customary international law or another recognized source 
of international law, while it may be said to exist domestically if — and only if— it is created
1 David Kinley, “Human Rights Fundamentalisms” (2007) 29 Sydney Law Review545 at 550; see also, the Preamble 
to the Universal Declaration o f  Human Rights, GA res. 217A (III), UN Doc A/810 at 71 (1948).
2 Amartya Sen, “Elements o f a Theory o f  Human Rights” (2004) 32:4 Philosophy and Public Affairs 315.
3For comprehensive histories o f  the idea of human rights, see: Samuel Moyn, The Last Utopia: Human Rights in 
History (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2010); Charles R. Beitz, The Idea o f  Human Rights 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009); Micheline R. Ishay, The History o f  Human Rights: From Ancient Times to 
the Globalization Era (Berkeley: University o f California Press, 2008); Christopher Tomuschat, Human Rights: 
Between Idealism and Realism, 2nd edn. (Oxford University Press, 2008).
4 Henry J. Steiner & Philip Alston, International Human Rights in Context: Law, Politics, Morals (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1996).
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through statute, constitutional act, or judicial decree. In this strict sense, rights are a class of 
determinate legal rules that are recognized by political institutions authorized and able to enforce 
them through the effective deployment of sanctions and other (dis)incentives. For those who 
adopt this view, our use of the legal language of rights to describe purported moral phenomena is 
a conceptual mistake. In the words of Jeremy Bentham, “from real laws come real rights; but 
from imaginary laws, from laws of nature, come imaginary rights”.5
It is well beyond the scope of this dissertation to dwell on debates about the ontology of 
human rights. For reasons that will become clear shortly, I will adopt a discursive approach to 
human rights, from which we may identify (at least) three functional characteristics.6 First, and 
most obviously, human rights are used by advocates to secure the recognition of rights-holders’ 
high priority values and interests. In particular, human rights facilitate the recognition of freedom 
and autonomy, which in turn describe rights-holders’ capacity both to choose personal and public 
life projects, and to access and make use of material, normative, and symbolic resources 
sufficient to realize those ends.7 Insofar as each person has freedom and autonomy, there is a 
need to resolve coordination problems that arise when the legitimate ends, values, and interests 
of two or more rights-holders conflict e.g. as a result of resource scarcities. The values and 
interests that underpin human rights are accordingly both collective and individual in nature. 
Human rights simultaneously protect individual freedom and autonomy, and, strengthen political
5 As quoted in Christopher MacLennan, Toward the Charter: Canadians and the D emandfor a National Bill o f  
Rights, 1929-1960 (McGill-Queens University Press, 2003) at 7.
6 This tenets o f  this discursive approach are outlined in: Joseph Raz, The Morality o f  Freedom (Oxford University 
Press, 1988); Joseph Raz, “On the Nature of Rights” (1984) 93 Mind 194. For a similar view, see Craig Scott, 
“Diverse Persuasion(s): From Rhetoric to Representation (and Back Again to Rhetoric) in International Human 
Rights Interpretation” (2008) 4:1 Comparative Research in Law & Political Economy 1.
7 Patrick Capps, Human Dignity and the Foundations o f  International Law  (Oxford & Portland: Hart Publishing, 
2009) at 112-114; Alan Gewirth, The Community o f  Rights (Chicago: University o f Chicago Press, 1996); Alan 
Gewirth, Reason and Morality (Chicago: University o f Chicago Press, 1978); Jurgen Habermas, “Struggles for 
Recognition in the Democratic Constitutional State” in Amy Gutmann, ed., Multiculturalism (Princeton: Princeton
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communities by creating conditions conducive to social stability, cooperation, and progress.
Some would go so far as to say that human rights are constitutive of democratic societies insofar 
as they both guarantee the individual the capacity and resources to act within the body politic, 
and form the very rationale for the (legitimate) existence of a political community in the first 
place.8
Second, human rights have addressees or prospective duty-holders. Broadly speaking, 
they address all human beings and/or rational agents capable of influencing distributions of 
resources through their acts and omissions. That said, they tend to be directed towards 
governments, partly because of governments’ role in framing collective values and partly 
because governments are capable of doing comparatively large amounts of good or harm. 
Governments may be directly obligated to protect and promote human rights (as potential rights- 
violators), or they may be indirectly obligated to prevent or remedy the violation of human rights 
by private actors (as rights-protectors).
Third, due to their nature as high-priority rights and as coordination mechanisms, human 
rights require robust justifications for the imposition of duties on addressees. They need not be 
viewed as pre-determined “trumps” that an individual may wield against any given policy 
preference on the basis of logical necessity.9 Rather, they may be viewed as a resource for 
structuring ongoing discursive practices among various individuals and groups about how to 
resolve recurring conflicts over the distribution of value.10 Joseph Raz explains the point in the 
following way: ‘“x has a right’ if and only if x can have rights, and, other things being equal, an
University Press, 1994).
8 Capps, supra note 7, Chapter 7; David Kinley, Civilizing Globalization: Human Rights and the Global Economy 
(Cambridge University Press, 2009) at 9-12.
9 Ronald Dworkin, “Rights as Trumps” in, Jeremy Waldron, ed., Theories o f  Rights (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1984) 153.
aspect of x’s well-being (his interest) is a sufficient reason for holding some other person(s) to be 
under a duty”.11 Notice that he is careful to state that rights provide a “sufficient” rather than an 
“exclusive” or “complete” reason for holding another under a duty, meaning that rights stand as 
presumptive but refutable reasons for supposing one has to act one way and not another. The 
existence of a right does not entail the existence of a duty; it merely orients discussion around 
shared “intermediate conclusions” that may be revised as new values, facts, and arguments are 
considered.12 Yet another way of making this point is that human rights correlate to a multiplicity 
of potential duties;13 human rights imply, but do not necessarily entail, correlative legal 
obligations that the state may justifiably impose on private parties.
Applying these general claims to discourse in adjudicative contexts, we should begin by 
noting that there are at least two classes of duty-bearers: parties who have allegedly wronged a 
rights-holder, and authoritative decision-makers who may be justified in imposing legal 
obligations on others. In court, for example, a judge must be persuaded to identify the existence 
of a specific human right, decide upon its content, scope and applicability in light of the facts of 
a dispute, and then to oblige third parties to act in accordance with this right. These three, 
analytically separate, steps unfold over the course of legal proceedings and, in keeping with our 
claims about legal indeterminacy in the last chapter, we must admit that the content of human 
rights norms is insufficient to provide one unique and valid decision. What is the content of a 
right to adequate housing, for instance, will vary in non-arbitrary ways when recognized 
different historical, cultural, and economic settings. The same holds true of duties; one’s
10 This is not to say rights cannot conflict. It is only to say that rights can be correlative with a multiplicity of duties; 
see Jeremy Waldron, “Rights in Conflict” (19S9) 99:3 Ethics 503.
' 1 Raz, “On the Nature”, supra note 6 at 195.
12 Scott, supra note 6.
13 Waldron, supra note 10.
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recognized right to adequate housing may not entail that a particular government agency is 
obligated to furnish housing, especially if there is a lack of resources and/or competing, high 
priority values and interests at stake.
By viewing human rights as discursive mechanisms, we see that they frame, but do not 
determine, decisions about the imposition of legal obligation. This raises questions of jurisdiction 
and authority: who is authorized to issue legal decisions about human rights and within what 
jurisdictions (e.g. domestic, international, public, private) do discursive practices take place? If 
discourses unfold in multiple jurisdictions, does the purportedly universal nature of human rights 
require uniform reasoning, or, may different interpretive communities legitimately produce 
separate and possibly conflicting obligations? If we can have multiple, inconsistent 
interpretations about the imposition of legal obligation, are the decisions of some communities 
more authoritative than others and, if so, for whom and on the basis of what criteria? These 
questions highlight the importance of reflecting on the comparative roles and responsibilities of 
domestic and international legal institutions in determining human rights and obligations.
B. II. How do International Human Rights Relate to Domestic Courts?
Human rights have traditionally been matters of domestic jurisdiction. The American 
Declaration ofIndependence and the French Declaration o f  the Hights o f  Man, for instance, both 
state that individuals possess inherent and inalienable rights simply by virtue of being human. 
However, constitutional rights documents only apply domestically, limiting the spectrum of 
possible rights-holders, addressees, and contexts to which they are applicable. This produces a 
number of infelicitous consequences. To begin, only a subsection of persons physically resident 
within a jurisdiction enjoy the full protection of legal rights. American and French human rights 
documents, for instance, specified that rights applied to “men” and, practically speaking, did not
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protect most minorities. Reliance on domestic legislation also reduces the geographic scope of 
human rights, undercutting the hypothesis that human rights apply to all human beings or 
rational agents.
International law stands as an attractive alternative since it is global in scope and can 
provide an outside perspective from which one may criticize a government’s failure to respect 
the human rights of those within its jurisdiction. However, as the law governing inter-state 
relations, international law traditionally had little to say about human rights or the manner in 
which states could or should treat those within their jurisdiction.14 Starting with the Universal 
Declaration o f Human Rights (UDHR)15 in 1948, the international community has made a 
concerted effort to concretize and give effect to a growing range of human rights. As part of this 
international legalization of human rights, we have witnessed: the positivization of norms 
through their location in recognized sources of international law, the specification of rights and 
obligations through their reasoned application to diverse fact scenarios by interpretive 
communities (e.g. treaty-monitoring bodies, international, regional, and domestic adjudicative 
bodies, etc.), and the enforcement of rights through a variety of persuasive and coercive means, 
including the issuance of authoritative judgments at the international and regional level, reviews 
of state compliance by treaty bodies, and the mandatory cooperation of domestic legal 
institutions in the implementation of rights.
Cumulatively, these functions produce “binding” international human rights norms, 
which is to say that states are obligated not to act contrary to the principles and purposes of a
14 Trevor Farrow, “Globalization, International Human Rights, and Civil Procedure”(2003) 41:3 Alberta Law 
Review 671 at 678.
15 UDHR, supra note 1.
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norm (and its host treaty more generally), and to implement it into domestic law.16 Every 
international human rights treaty for this reason requires that persons whose rights have been 
violated be provided with an “effective remedy”.17 If domestic courts or tribunals fail to 
discharge this obligation, victims may then file complaints with specified international courts or 
tribunals.
Relying on analogies between international law and domestic law, critics assert that the 
effectiveness of international human rights has been obstructed by our lack of a centralized 
institution authorized to enunciate, interpret, and apply international legal norms. Without this 
institutionalization, international law remains a “primitive” or capricious legal order lacking in 
the qualities necessary for it to evolve into a pithy, coherent, and well-orchestrated legal 
system.18 International relations theorists have long argued that the decentralized nature of 
international law renders it dependant on the vicissitudes of international politics. Political 
realists, for example, argue that international law is nothing but an instrument of domination 
which powerful states use to rationalize the imposition of their will upon weaker states. l9Absent 
coercion of this type, states will voluntarily commit themselves only to those obligations that 
serve, or at least do not interfere with, the pursuit of their own power. Some argue that this may 
result in the production of vague treaties which afford states the interpretive latitude they need to
16 Vienna Convention on the Law o f  Treaties, UN Doc. A/Conf.39/27; 1155 UNTS 331; 8 ILM 679 (1969); 63 AJIL 
875 (1969), arts. 18, 27,29
17 For example, see: International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, GA res. 2200A (XXI), 21 UN GAOR 
Supp. (No. 16) at 52, UN Doc. A/6316 (1966); 999 UNTS 171; 6 ILM 368 (1967), art 2(3).
18 H.L.A. Hart, The Concept o f  Law  (Clarendon Press) at 87-90.
19 Hans Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle fo r  Power and Peace, 2nd edn., (Alfred A.Knopf.
1954); Hans Morgenthau, “Positivism, Functionalism and International Law” (1940) 32:2 The American Journal o f 
International Law 260; Edward Hallett Carr, The Twenty Years' Crisis, 1919-1939: An Introduction to the Study o f  
International Relations (New York: Harper & Row, 1964); Georg Schwarzenberger, Power Politics: A Study o f  
InternationaI Society (London: Stevens, 1951); Georg Schwarzenberger, The League o f  Nations and World Order: A 
Treatise on the Principle o f  Universality in the Theory and Practice o f  the League o f  Nations (London: Constable: 
1936).
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avoid being found in non-compliance.20 This might explain why international human rights 
treaties, hardly ideal mechanisms for enhancing state power, are composed largely of abstract 
principles with few specific rules or standards.
Nonetheless, a significant measure of specificity is added through the common practice 
of attaching to treaties a standing committee to monitor the performance of member states, and to 
which those states are required to submit periodic reports on compliance. The International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) exemplifies this approach. The ICCPR created 
the Human Rights Committee (HRC), to promote compliance with its norms.21 The eighteen 
members of the HRC serve as independent experts rather than as state representatives. This 
potentially gives them some independence from the positions of their governments. The HRC 
regularly expresses its views as to whether a particular practice is a human rights violation, but it 
is not authorized to issue legally binding decisions. This is to say that states are not required to 
treat the HRC’s views as authoritative pronouncements of their international legal obligations 
and so may act contrary to them and refuse to give them domestic effect.
B. HI Summary
In sum, international human rights are discursive mechanisms that frame debates about 
the imposition of legal obligation. Viewed in this way, they are functionally identical to domestic 
human rights, such as those found in some constitutional documents. They differ insofar as they 
are global in scope, whereas domestic human rights are applicable only to matters within the 
jurisdiction of a particular state. International human rights are also distinctive in that their
^George W. Downs et al., “Is the good news about compliance good news about cooperation?”( 1996) 50:3 
International Organization 379; for a different view on international human rights treaties and compliance, see Oona 
A. Hathaway, Do Human Rights Treaties Make a Difference? (2002 ) 111:8 Yale Law Journal 1935.
21 Sarah Joseph, et at., The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights Cases, Materials, and Commentary,
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content is constructed through the interpretations of multiple, informal discursive communities 
operating in various international fora without coercive power. By contrast, domestic human 
rights are produced by authoritative political institutions which often have the capacity to enforce 
their will through coercive measures.
Domestic courts are an important part of the international human rights enterprise. They 
can help secure compliance with binding international human rights by offering remedies to 
persons whose rights have been violated, a function that is not adequately performed by treaty 
bodies lacking in authority or influence. They can also contribute to the specification of 
international human rights by applying them to changing factual contexts. However, the 
production of workable rules and standards ultimately depends on the reasoning of interpretive 
communities that are not authorized to promulgate binding law. Domestic courts may be 
reluctant to use the views of such communities as reasons for their decisions or, at least, as 
reasons sufficient to outweigh domestic laws and policy preferences. From the international 
perspective, there is also concern that increased juridical reliance on the opinions of specialized 
interpretive communities can lead to a patchwork of law, where the content of international 
human rights varies from context to context;22 a problem the internationalization of human rights 
was originally supposed to remedy.
C. Internation al (Human R ights) Law in C anadian Courts: The 
Presum ption o f Conform ity D octrine  
As noted in the introductory chapter, scholars have described the Canadian law of 
reception by reference to “monist” and “dualist” perspectives. From a “monist” perspective,
second edition (Oxford University Press, 2005); Dominic McGoldrick, The Human Rights Committee: Its role in the 
development o f  the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (Clarendon Press, 1994).
Anne Bayefsky, The UN Human Rights Treaty System: Universality at the Crossroads (Kluwer Law International,
international law and domestic law form a unified system, whereby international laws, once 
established, are at one and the same time domestic laws. A monist approach reduces, but does 
not eliminate, the tensions raised by pluralistic approaches to the interpretation of international 
human rights, since there can be no conflict between international law and constitutional law; the 
two are part of an holistic legal order. In the English common law tradition, upon which 
Canadian courts have steadily relied, monism has notionally governed the reception of 
customary international law.23 As suggested in the introductory chapter, this is a mixed blessing 
for human rights advocates since there are comparatively fewer customary human rights norms 
in international law and, unlike international treaty law, such norms develop slowly and quite 
independently of the work of broader, non-state interpretive communities.
From a “dualist” perspective, by contrast, international law and domestic law are separate 
legal systems or orders.24 While international legal norms may be valid in international contexts, 
they cannot alter domestic rights and duties unless they are transformed into domestic legal 
norms through positive acts performed by designated legal authorities. A dualist approach thus 
raises hierarchical distinctions, both between domestic law and international law, and between 
binding and non-binding international law. It is here that the formally non-binding status of 
norms produced by non-state interpretive communities becomes especially relevant to domestic
2001).
23 R. v. Hape, [2007] 2 S.C.R. 292 at paras. 35-39; see also Ronald St. J. MacDonald, “International Treaty Law and 
the Domestic Law o f Canada” (1975) 2 Dalhousie Law Journal 307. Some argue that this is not clearly the case; see 
Stephen J. Toope, “Keynote Address: Canada and International Law”, in The Impact o f  International Law on the 
Practice o f  Law in Canada. Proceedings o f  the 27,h Annual Conference o f  the Canadian Council on International 
Law, Ottawa October 15-17, 1998 (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 1999) 33 at 37; Stephen J. Toope, “The 
Uses of Metaphor: International Law and the Supreme Court o f Canada” (2001) 80 Canadian Bar Review 534 at 
539.
24 Some would dispute the claim that international law constitutes a “system”; see H. Patrick Glenn, "Doin' the 
Transsystemic: Legal Systems and Legal Traditions" (2005) 50:4 McGill L.J., 863. Since 1 do not want to engage 
with this debate right now, I will refer to international law as a legal/normative order or framework unless 
referencing someone else.
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courts concerned with stringently channeling the flow of international human rights into 
domestic law. To such judges, the views of interpretive communities are relatively unlikely to be 
considered valid norms of international law and, hence, appropriate for domestic implementation 
through the law of reception. Indeed, the Vienna Convention on the Law o f Treaties specifies 
that, in interpreting a treaty, adjudicators are to have regard to the “ordinary meaning” of 
terminology in its “context and in light of its object and purpose”.25 It is generally agreed that 
this provision directs interpreters of the intentions of states parties at the signing of the treaty as 
opposed to subsequent interpretations made by treaty bodies that are neither states nor parties to 
the treaty.
Dualism is the approach which Canadian courts have traditionally taken with respect to 
international treaties. Canada (AG) v. Ontario (AG) (the Labour Conventions case) is the first 
case in which a dualist law of reception was authoritatively established. In this case, Lord Atkin 
of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council made a distinction between the formation and the 
implementation of a treaty. He stated that, while "the making of a treaty is an executive act, ... 
the performance of its obligations, if they entail alteration of the existing domestic law, requires 
legislative action".26 As to the scope of the executive's power to negotiate and conclude treaties, 
Lord Atkin stated "that the creation of the obligations undertaken in treaties and the assent to 
their form and quality are the function of the executive alone".27 While the Privy Council was 
silent on the matter, the Supreme Court of Canada's ruling in this case, delivered by Duff C.J., 
was that the federal executive possesses the exclusive constitutional jurisdiction to negotiate and
25 Vienna Convention, supra note 16, art. 31.
26 AG (Canada) v. AG (Ontario), [1937] 1D.L.R. 673 (J.C.P.C) at 679; for English precedent, see also Reg. v. Keyn
(1876) 2 Ex. D. 63.
27 Ibid. at 679-683.
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conclude international treaties.28
These two judgments signified that respect for representative government (i.e. federalism 
and Parliamentary sovereignty) is a controlling principle in the Canadian law of reception.29 
This is evident in the rule that legislation is the exclusive means by which international treaty 
law is to be given domestic legal effect. The judiciary’s role is to police constitutional 
boundaries, ensuring that the federal executive does not use its exclusive authority to negotiate 
and conclude treaties that encroach upon provincial or federal legislative jurisdiction. Judges are 
likewise to restrain themselves from giving domestic legal effect to even binding international 
law without legislative pre-approval. However, several years prior to the Labour Conventions 
case, Canadian.courts had articulated a second controlling principle: that of respect for 
international law. This principle is expressed within the “presumption of conformity” doctrine, 
which holds that judges will, absent clear evidence to the contrary, presume that legislatures 
intend for statutes to conform to Canada’s international legal obligations and will interpret 
legislation accordingly.30
28 AG (Canada) v. AG (Ontario), [1936] 3 D.L.R. 673 (S.C.C.) at 697.
29 For other cases in which this principle has been recognized, see: Francis v. The Queen, [1956] S.C.R. 617; R. v. 
Wedge, [1939] 4 D.L.R. 323 (B.C.S.C.); Spitz v. Secretary o f  State o f  Canada (1939), 2 D.L.R. 546; R v. Sikyea 
(1964), 46 W.W.R. 65; Schavernoch v. Foreign Claims Commission [1982] 1 S.C.R. 1092; R v. Videoflicks Ltd  
(1984), 48 O.R. (2d) 395, 15 C.C.C. (3d) 353; Ahani v. Canada (Attorney General) (2002), 58 O.R. (3d) 107, 208 
D.L.R. (4th) 66; Baker v. Canada (Minister o f  Citizenship and Immigration), [ 1999] 2 S.C.R. 817 at paras. 78-81.
30 Commentators often cite Re Arrow River and Tributaries Slide and Boom Co. v. Pigeon Timber Co., [1932] 2 
D.L.R. 250 (S.C.C.) as the first case in which this rule was affirmed in Canada. However, no judge in this case 
explicitly stated this rule. Smith J. did appear to accept the Ontario Supreme Court’s invocation o f it during appeal: 
see Re River and Tributaries Slide and Boom Co. v. Pigeon Timber Co., [1931] 2 D.L.R. 216 (O.S.C.) at 217-218. In 
any event, the presumption o f conformity rule has been invoked, althbough not always applied, in many subsequent 
cases, including: Hape, supra  note 23; Baker, supra note 29 (mentioned but arguably not applied); In the Matter o f  a 
Reference as to the Powers o f  the Corporation o f  the City o f  Ottawa and the Corporation o f  the Village o f  Rockcliffe 
Park to Levy Rates on Foreign Legations and High Commissioner's Residences, [ 1943] S.C.R. 208 ; Daniels v. 
White., [1968] S.C.R. 517; R. v. Zingre, [1981] 2 S.C. R. 392; National Corn Growers Assn. v. Canada (Import 
Tribunal), [1990] 2 S.C.R 1324; Gordon Estate v. Grail, [1998] 3 S.C.R. 437; Pushpanathan v. Canada (Minister 
o f  Citizenship and Immigration) (1988), 160 D.L.R. (4th) 193 (S.C.C.); R. v. Sharpe, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 45; 114957 
Canada Ltee (Spraytech, Societe d'arrosage) v. Town o f  Hudson [2001 ]2 S.C.R. 241. Finally, the doctrine has 
earlier roots in English common law, see Buvot v. B arbut(\165) 3 Burr. 1481; 4 Burr. 2016; Triquet v. Bath ( \1 64)
3 Burr. 1478; Heathfleld v. Chilton (1767) 4 Burr. 2015; Sir George Comewall Lewis, On Foreign Jurisdictions and
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The presumption of conformity doctrine attempts to harmonize principles of respect for 
constitutionality with principles of respect for international law, although the former wins out in 
cases of conflict. As the jurisprudence has evolved, doctrine became characterized by four 
operational elements. These elements are: that there exist ambiguities in legislation or 
regulations the clarification of which requires international legal perspectives;31 that the 
legislation or regulations in question implement or in some way touch upon the international 
legal norms used;32 that the international legal norms used are binding on Canada; and, that the 
purpose of using the doctrine is to secure consistency between the substance of a particular 
domestic legal norm and the substance of a particular international legal norm. Despite the fact 
that these conditions had been elearly laid out in early case law, they have since been routinely 
altered or altogether disregarded.
C. 1. Ambiguity, Canons of Statutory Interpretation, and the Value of International Law 
The requirement that legislative provisions be ambiguous before judges may have 
recourse to international law was perhaps most famously articulated by Pigeon J. in Daniels v. 
White.i}Here, Pigeon J. stated that the presumption of conformity doctrine is “not often applied, 
because if a statute is unambiguous, its provisions must be followed even if they are contrary to 
international law”.34 Citing English authorities,35 he went on to say that, if the intent of 
parliament is “clear and unmistakable then the plain words of a statute.. .(can) not be disregarded 
in order to observe the comity of nations and the established rules of international law”.36 This 
ruling reflects a powerful tradition in statutory (and treaty) interpretation in which the textual
the Extradition o f  Criminals ( London: J.W. Parker & Sons, 1859) at 66-67.
31 For a famous iteration o f this element, see Pigeon J.’s ruling in Daniels v. White, supra note 30 at 541.
32 There are a number o f exceptions to this element which 1 will detail below.
33 Citation located supra, note 30.
34 Ibid. at 20.
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qualities of a statute are accorded near-exclusive priority over other, substantive or contextual 
sources of meaning in the clarification of ambiguities.
Ambiguities in legislative provisions may arise for a number of reasons, including the 
inherent limitations of language or the emergence of unforeseen situations that cast doubt on 
legislative intent. The law of reception was traditionally structured around “textual” and 
“intentionalisf ’ canons of interpretation that respectively require judges to have recourse to the 
plain meaning of the text itself and to consider other documented indicia of parliamentary intent 
e.g. the meaning of neighbouring provisions, the objectives and purposes of the statute itself, the 
meaning of cognate or previous statutes, parliamentary debates, and so on.37 This approach might 
be connected to a formalist approach to constitutional supremacy, in which the judiciary’s role is 
restricted to the interpretation of law that may only be validly created by the legislatures. It is 
only when judges cannot infer clear meaning or intent from official texts that recourse may be 
had to the terminology of implemented treaties. But, even here, recourse is had to the plain 
meaning of states party to the treaty as expressed in the language of treaty provisions, 
consistently with equally traditional international legal methodologies.38
Textual and intentionalist approaches to statutory interpretation reflect a confusing 
attitude towards implemented international treaties as extraneous, contextual materials rather
35 Inland Revenue Commissioners v. Collco Dealings Ltd. [[1962] A.C. 1, 39 Tax Cas. 526],
36 Daniels v. White, supra note 30 at 20.
37 For some somewhat recent Supreme Court judgments textual approaches, see: Ontario v. C.P. Ltd, [1995] 2 
S.C.R. 1028 at 1049-50; R. v, McIntosh, [1995] 1 S.C.R. 686 at 705. For academic (and largely critical) 
commentary, see: Geoff R. Hall, “Statutory Interpretation in the Supreme Court o f Canada: The Triumph of a 
Common Law Methodology” (1998) 40 Advocates Quarterly 38; Paul Perell “Plain Meaning for Judges, Scholars 
and Practioners” (1998) 20 Advocates Quarterly 24; Barbara Child, “What Does 'Plain Meaning' Mean These 
Days?” (1992) 3 Scribes Journal o f Legal Writing 1; William Eskridge and Philip Frickey, “Statutory Interpretation 
as Practical Reasoning” (1990) 42 Stanford Law Rev. 321; Frederick Schauer, “Statutory Construction and the 
Coordinating Function o f Plain Meaning” (1990), Supreme Court Review 231.
38 Vienna Convention, supra note 16, art. 31.
55
than as materials directly relevant to the identification of parliamentary intent.39 In contrast to 
textual and intentionalist cannons of interpretation, more modem “contextual” canons of 
interpretation encourage judges to favour interpretations of law that promote the realization of 
public values, needs, and expectations.40 Morality, the needs and interests of affected parties, and 
the broader public interest here stand alongside parliamentary intent as legitimate sources of 
meaning and, perhaps, of legality. Although arguably the current, dominant mode of statutory 
interpretation, contextual interpretation contradicts the assumption that statutes and other indicia 
of parliamentary intent are the only valid bases upon which judgment may rest and so was not 
often employed in the law of reception’s early years.
Whatever may be the (de)merits of relying on values as the basis of adjudication, it is not 
immediately clear why many judges considered international law to fall within the contextual, 
rather than textual or intentionalist, approaches to interpretation. After all, the ambiguity of an 
implementing legislative provision does not negate the fact that it expresses parliament’s intent to 
give effect to an international treaty that was in all likelihood closely scrutinized before the 
federal executive issued its consent to be bound. Surely international treaty provisions, and 
perhaps even records of treaty negotiations, would be as useful for inferring parliamentary intent 
as other documented sources, such as parliamentary debates or contiguous legislative provisions. 
The inherent interpretive utility of legislatively implemented international treaty documents 
nonetheless has often been overshadowed by the needless assumption that any use of such texts 
must be oriented towards the separate and constitutionally suspect end of securing compliance
39 It also fails to appreciate the full extent o f legal indeterminacy and gives undue force to the separation of power 
thesis, as I will discuss shortly.
40 Stephane Beaulac, “International Treaty Norms and Driedger’s ‘Modem’ Principal o f Statutory Interpretation”, in 
Legitimacy and Accountability. Proceedings o f  the 33rd Annual Conference o f  the Canadian Council on 
International Law, Ottawa, October 14-16, 2004 (Ottawa: Allegra Print & Imaging, 2005) 141; Ruth Sullivan,
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with international law.
The interplay of textual/intentionalist and contextual canons of interpretation has been 
such that judges have often been unwilling to use the presumption of conformity doctrine even if 
there exist bona fide ambiguities in legislative provisions. For instance, in R v. Sikyea ,A] the court 
was asked to use the 19/6 Migratory Birds Convention to interpret the term “scoter” in the 
Migratory Birds Convention Act. Sikyea was charged under the Act for shooting and killing a 
protected bird. Sikyea argued that he had an Aboriginal treaty right to hunt the bird and that the 
convention explicitly stated that it did not interfere with Aboriginals’ rights to hunt migratory 
birds for subsistence. Although the term “scoter” was, by virtue of these arguments, rendered 
ambiguous, the court nonetheless adopted a strict, textual approach, deriving its definition of 
“scoter”, not from parliamentary records or debates, but from Murray’s New English 
Dictionary.42 The court was concerned that excessive reliance on international documents would 
create rather than resolve a pre-existing ambiguity, stating that it was not “concerned with 
interpreting the Convention, but only the legislation by which it is implemented”.43 It did not 
explain, however, why a definition found in a dictionary should be granted greater weight than 
the very international law the legislation in question implemented (or, for that matter, Aboriginal 
treaty rights).
A textual/intentionalist approach to statutory interpretation was also used to preclude the 
application of international law in Schavemoch v. Foreign Claims Commission.44 In this case, 
Estey J. overturned the decisions of the Federal Court of Appeal and the Foreign Claims
Driedger on the Construction o f  Statutes. 3rd edn. (Butterworths. 1994).
41 Citation located supra note 29.
42 Ibid. at 79.
43 Ibid. at 80.
44 Citation located supra note 29.
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Commission, both of which used international legal sources to define the meaning of the term 
“Canadian Citizen”, as it appeared in regulations that were intended to implement an agreement 
between Canada and Czechoslovakia. The purpose of these regulations was to enable Canadian 
citizens resident in Czechoslovakia to claim compensation for assets that the latter had 
nationalized. Based on representations made by the Canadian Ambassador involved in 
negotiations with Czechoslovakia, the Court of Appeal and Commission both held that the 
respondent to be ineligible to make a claim because she was a dual citizen whose “dominant” 
nationality was Czechoslovakian and not Canadian.
In overturning this decision, Estey J. argued that recourse to the international agreement 
and treaty negotiations were unauthorized because the meaning of the term “Canadian Citizen” 
was plainly defined within the Canadian Citizenship Act. In issuing this ruling, Estey J. relaxed 
the ambiguity requirement, holding that the use of international legal sources as interpretive aids 
is authorized if one can show that legislative or regulatory provisions are either patently or 
latently ambiguous — a rule that would have been tremendously useful in Sikyea.45 Projecting 
domestic canons of statutory interpretation into the international domain, Estey J. went on to say 
that use of evidence of intention must be restricted to the interpretation of formal treaty 
provisions. Judges were directed to not rely on background or contextual materials that may be 
of use in constructing the intentions of states party to a treaty, such as treaty negotiations, as 
these could unravel the plain or literal meaning of international treaties that in most cases should 
be adequate for the purposes of adjudication. In Estey J’s words: “the simple fact that the 
Regulations were an implementation of the Agreement does not entitle a court to take the next
45 Ibid. at 1098.
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step to ascertain what the parties intended to but did not embody in the Agreement”.46
In short, the intentions of the Canadian executive in negotiating and signing a treaty 
matter little when the treaty itself is used as an interpretive aid to construct legislative intent. But 
again, the intentions of the executive are likely to factor into parliament’s decision to implement 
international treaties (most especially in a Westminster-style government), and so it is hard to 
imagine why judicial consideration of this fact should be a problem. The explanation may well 
involve the Supreme Court’s persistent position that the separation of powers stands as an 
essential feature of Canadian constitutionalism, despite the credible claim Canada’s retention of 
the British system of parliamentary government is “utterly inconsistent with any separation of 
the executive and legislative functions”.47
In addition to being hard to defend on its own terms, judicial formalism has failed to 
obscure the pervasiveness of value or equity-driven analysis in many cases. In Shavemoch, for 
instance, the court used the ambiguity element to exclude the consideration of international law 
that prohibited a Canadian Citizen from claiming compensation for material losses, despite the 
fact that the international nature of the dispute suggested that binding and implemented 
international treaties were directly relevant. Similarly, Sikyea involved a dispute over a term that 
had no legal meaning whatsoever, and still the court chose to rely on a dictionary rather than an 
implemented international treaty, adding to the judiciary’s long history of obstructing indigenous 
persons’ access to justice. Notwithstanding the purported purpose of textual and intentionalist 
canons of interpretation, decisions such as these suggest that international law’s use or non-use 
has often been driven, not by its inherent interpretive utility, but by the values and policy 
concerns of judges. As the legal realist would insist, textual and intentionalist canons of
46 Ibid. at 1099.
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interpretation not only fail to exclude policy as a basis of judgment, but can help mask and even 
legitimize result-orientation.
Predictably, Estey J.’s distinction between patent and latent ambiguities paved the way 
for greater informality and confusion in the law of reception. Gonthier J., for instance, made use 
of this distinction in National Com Growers Assn. v. Canada (Import Tribunalj,48 affirming that 
international treaties may be used, not only when there are latent ambiguities in legislation, but in 
order to identify ambiguities. In other words, judges may use international law to destabilize 
what might otherwise be fairly settled terminology, justifying its retrospective use as an 
interpretive aid.
C. II Implementation: Direct and “Passive”
As mentioned, international treaties are supposed to have no domestic legal effect unless 
implemented through statute.49 There have nonetheless been numerous examples where judges 
have interpreted domestic laws in light of unimplemented (though binding) treaties. In Re Arrow 
River and Tributaries Slide and Boom Co. Ltd., for instance, the Supreme Court of Canada was 
asked to decide if a piece of ordinary, non-implementing provincial legislation conflicted with 
the terms of an international treaty. Smith J. seemed to have recognized that the presumption of 
conformity holds unless legislators clearly and explicitly express their intention to violate 
international treaty law.50 However, he avoided using the doctrine by construing the terms of the 
treaty so narrowly that it did not apply to the areas regulated under the impugned legislation. 
Lamont J., on the other hand, truncated the rule, arguing that the legislatures have the sovereign 
right to violate international law and that the courts should not enforce a treaty unless the
47 Peter W. Hogg, Constitutional Law o f  Canada, student ed., (Carswell, 1999) at 321.
48 Citation located supra note 30.
49 One exception to this rule are treaties which are self-executing and/or which fall within the royal prerogative.
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legislatures clearly specify that statutes be read consistently with Canada’s international legal 
obligations.51
In Capital Cities Communication v. C.R. T.C.,52 the majority upheld the requirement that 
treaties be implemented before they can be used even as interpretive aids. The dissent, led by 
Pigeon J., argued that it “is an oversimplification to say that treaties are of no legal effect unless 
implemented by legislation”.53 Citing English authorities,54 Pigeon J. argued that the 
presumption of conformity doctrine applies notwithstanding the fact that a particular treaty has 
not been legislatively implemented and that parliament must clearly state its intention to violate 
international treaty obligations. Failing this, judicial notice ought to be taken of the expectations 
of parties to, and beneficiaries of, international treaties irrespective of whether such treaties have 
been incorporated into domestic law.55 It should also be noted that Pigeon J., formerly a 
champion of textual and intentionalist canons of interpretation, in this case used a contextual 
approach to give greater effect to the changing values, objectives and expectations associated 
with the treaty in question.56
More recently, the court in Baker v. Canada (Minister o f Citizenship and Immigration) 
used the Convention on the Rights o f  the Child57 to inform its interpretation of the content of a 
claimant’s rights to procedural fairness and the appropriate standard of judicial review to be 
applied to the Minister’s exercise of her discretionary decision-making authority. Although 
L’Heureux-Dube J., speaking for the majority, recognized the principle that international
50 Arrow River, supra note 30 at 263-265.
51 Ibid. at 259-260.
52 [1978] 2 S.C.R. 141
53 Ibid. at 188.
54 Post Office v. Estuary Radio L td  [1968] 2 Q.B. 740
55 Capital Cities Communication, supra note 52 at 189.
56 Ibid. at 190.
57 20 November 1989, United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 1577, p. 3.
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“treaties and conventions are not part of Canadian law unless they have been implemented by 
statute”, she subsequently stated that “the values reflected in international human rights law may 
help inform the contextual approach to statutory interpretation and judicial review”.58 
L’Heureux-Dube cited paragraphs in Sullivan and Driedger on the Construction o f Statutes that 
justified the use of contextual cannons of interpretation but ignored paragraphs that dealt with the 
presumption of conformity doctrine.59 As others have observed, this clearly indicated the court’s 
preference for a contextual, comparative law approach over classic doctrine.60 In the subsequent 
case of R. v. //ape, however, the Supreme Court ruled that judges should “avoid a (statutory) 
construction that would place Canada in breach of those obligations” when judges are “deciding 
between possible interpretations” each of which is supported by the values and principles that 
inform the context of a legislative provision.61 But does this apply to constitutional provisions? If 
the Court was applying this principle to the interpretation of Charter provisions, then we may 
infer that the presumption of conformity doctrine not only has survived: it authorizes the use of 
binding international law to interpret the scope and applicability of the Charter. It also suggests 
that judges’ use of a contextual approach to statutory interpretation should be constrained by the 
value of compliance with binding international law, which is more in keeping with classic 
iterations of the presumption of conformity doctrine; binding international law should be 
preferred over other normative and “contextual” resources.
Importantly, the majority’s use of international law in Bakervias sharply criticized by 
Iacobucci J. on the grounds that the contextual approach is inconsistent with precedent, which
58 Baker, supra note 29 at paras 69-70.
59 Sullivan, supra note 40 at 330.
60 Beaulac, supra note 40; William Schabas & Stephane Beaulac, International Human Rights and Canadian Law, 
(Thomson Canada Limited. 2007) at 98-99.
61 /tape, supra note 23 at para. 53.
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has contributed to confusion about the full scope of the doctrine in contemporary jurisprudence. 
It is worth quoting Iacobucci J. in full:
It is a matter o f well-settled law that an international convention ratified by the executive 
branch o f government is o f no force or effect within the Canadian legal system until such time as its 
provisions have been incorporated into domestic law by way o f  implementing legislation... I do not agree 
with the approach adopted by my colleague, wherein reference is made to the underlying values of an 
unimplemented international treaty in the course o f the contextual approach to statutory interpretation and 
administrative law, because such an approach is not in accordance with the Court's jurisprudence 
concerning the status o f international law within the domestic legal system .62
How is one to make sense of both Baker and Hape 'm light of these comments? Some 
lawyers and academics have hypothesized that international law can be “passively” incorporated, 
which is to say that its domestic legal status does not depend on Parliament expressly encoding it 
into legislation.63 Now, some legislative acts clearly and formally implement international 
treaties. Examples include: the Migratory Birds Convention Act™ the Immigration and Refugee 
Protection A c tf Part II of the Criminal Code,66 and the Crimes Against Humanity and War 
Crimes Act.™ However, some pieces of legislation only imply implementation. Most often, these 
implications come in the form of preambular statements, such as those that appear in the 
Emergencies Act68 and Part V of An Act to amend the Canada Labour Code,69 Finally, some 
argue that any statute or regulation which existed before an international treaty obligation was 
assumed and which secures compliance with such obligations can be considered implementing
62 Baker, supra note 29 at para 79.
63 Beaulac, supra note 40; Irit Weiser, “Effect in Domestic Law o f International Human Rights Treaties Ratified 
without Implementing Legislation”, in The Impact o f  International Law on the Practice o f  Law in Canada. 
Proceedings o f  the 27lh Annual Conference o f  the Canadian Council on International Law, Ottawa October 15-17, 
1998 (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 1999) 132; Gibran Van Ert, Using International Law in Canadian 
Courts, (The Hauge, London, New York: Kluwer Law International, 2002) at 185, 207-214, 227-229.
64 R.S.C 1994, c .  22.
65 R.S.C. 2001, c. 27
“ R.S.C. 1985, c .  C-46.
67 R.S.C. 2000, c. 24.
6S R.S.C. 1985, c. 22 (4,h Supp.).
69 R.S.C. 2008, c. 15.
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legislation, insofar as its provisions may be interpreted in light of relevant treaties.70
Passive incorporation has often been invoked with respect to the Charter, as was 
arguably the case in //ape. In this case the Court seemed to say that the presumption of 
conformity doctrine justified its use of customary and conventional international law to interpret 
provisions of the Charter. Among the most forceful, academic proponents of this view is Anne 
Bayefsky, who argues that the Charter implemented international human rights by virtue of the 
fact that international human rights norms were extensively relied upon during the drafting of the 
content of particular Charter provisions and that numerous Canadian officials have represented 
the Charter to various international human rights bodies as having implementing Canada’s 
international human rights obligations.71 While some see the “special” nature of international 
human rights as justifying this view of the domestic legal status of international human rights, 
others argue that passive incorporation either is fundamentally flawed in principle,72 or that it 
should not be extended to the Charter since this would be to constitutionalize legal norms 
sourced in the activities of the federal executive in concert with foreign political authorities -  a 
practice that runs counter to values of parliamentary sovereignty, federalism, and arguably 
constitutional supremacy.73 In any case, it is not clear that this was the position of the Supreme 
Court in Hape, since it justified its use of international law by reference both to the presumption 
of conformity doctrine and to a parallel, “relevant and persuasive” doctrine, the latter of which, 
we will see, tends to conflate or at least blur distinctions between binding and non-biding 
international law and, indeed, international and comparative human rights. It is unclear upon
70 Anne F. Bayefsky, International Human Rights Law: Use in Canadian Charter o f  Rights and Freedoms Litigation 
(Toronto and Vancouver: Butterworths, 1992) at 62-63; Maxwell Cohen & Anne Bayefsky, “The Canadian Charter 
o f Rights and Freedoms and International Law”, (1983) 61 Canadian Bar Review 265.
71 Bayefsky, supra note 70 at 62-63; Cohen & Bayefsky, supra note 70; Weiser, supra note 63.
72 Stephane Beaulac, “National Application o f International Law: The Statutory Interpretation Perspective” (2003)
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which of these doctrines, if either, the Court’s judgment rested.
C. III. Bindingness and Compliance
The final two operational elements of the presumption of conformity doctrine -  
bindingness and compliance — fare no better than the first two in terms of internal and 
jurisprudential consistency. As mentioned, bindingness refers to Canada’s obligation to not 
defeat the objects or purposes of a treaty or custom in its international affairs and to implement 
into or otherwise give effect to an international norm within domestic law. Also as noted, one’s 
conception of law drives one’s understanding of compliance. It is reasonable to argue that the 
presumption of conformity doctrine relies, expressly or implicitly, on a rule-based conception of 
law, in which the meaning of particular rules either is manifestly clear or is discemable by 
reference to the “core” meaning of more fundamental rules. As Iacobucci J. stated in Baker, the 
judiciary’s job is not to create rules or to destabilize well-settled meanings with extraneous 
normative materials. The judiciary’s job is to resolve any ambiguities that arise when parliament 
attempts to transplant international legal rules directly into domestic law.
This approach explains historical and contemporary resistance to contextual canons of 
interpretation in which principles, rather than positive rules, underpin judicial decision-making. 
There are international parallels to this kind of debate. Historically, textual or plain meaning 
cannons of treaty interpretation required courts and other bodies to consider only the intentions 
of states parties at the moment they signed and ratified a treaty; recourse to contextual materials 
was forbidden on the grounds that it violated the sovereign right of states to decide precisely 
when and how to obligate themselves under international law. However, contemporary canons of 
treaty interpretation recognize the importance of contextual factors in determining the intent of
41 Canadian Yearbook o f  International Law  225, at 237-241.
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states parties and, more broadly, in realizing autonomous values of international law74. For 
instance, treaties may not be constructed or interpreted in such a way as to contravene 
peremptory norms of international law, which include laws against torture, slavery, apartheid, 
genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity, and so on. This is to say that ascertaining the 
intent of states parties is not the only object of treaty interpretation and that even clear intent may 
in fact be overridden by the legal and moral principles that underpin international human rights.
This more recent approach has a bearing on what we have to include in our conceptions 
of bindingness and compliance. To say an international legal norm is binding means that Canada 
must respect not only the rules and standards attendant to the norm, but also its spirit, purposes 
and objectives. Compliance must therefore mean more than conformity to rules. This is not just 
because the content of those rules is often unclear, but because judges may be obligated to alter 
the meaning and/or application of even clear rules in consideration of higher order rules and 
principles, whether or not parliament or the executive have turned their minds to the issue when 
producing domestic or international law respectively. This expanded conception of compliance 
causes tension with the basic concepts and categories used in the presumption of conformity 
doctrine, since indicia of the unfolding spirit of international law and, indeed, of autonomous 
international legal values are to be found in the formally non-binding views of monitoring, 
reporting, and standard-setting bodies, international courts whose judgments may not be binding 
on Canada, and perhaps even foreign law; the meaning of international law changes long after 
treaties or customs are created. Assuming that Iacobucci J. is right that courts can only engage
73 Weiser, supra note 63 at 138-139.
74 Richard Gardiner, Treaty Interpretation (Oxford University Press, 2008); Duncan French, “Treaty Interpretation 
And The Incorporation O f Extraneous Legal Rules” (2006) 55:2 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 281; 
Ian Johnstone, “Treaty Interpretation: The Authority o f  Interpretive Communities” (1990-19921)12 Mich. J. Int'l L.
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with implemented international law, judges will still have to employ the very kind of contextual 
interpretation he is concerned about to identify the full meaning of the international law being 
implemented and, more fundamentally, to ensure compliance as it is normally understood within 
the international human rights community e.g. consistency with both the objective qualities and 
the dynamic, unfolding spirit of a treaty or custom. Judicial reliance on sources of law outside of 
parliamentary and executive intent cannot be avoided if we are to comply with contemporary 
international law in a meaningful sense.
The Supreme Court has done little to guide lower courts through this dilemma and has 
arguably made matters more complicated by changing the conditions under which specifically 
international human rights in particular may be judicially received. In Baker, for example, the 
Court expressly recognized that international treaty law is of no force or effect unless 
implemented by statute, but also ruled that “the values reflected in international human rights 
law may help inform the contextual approach to statutory interpretation and judicial review”.75 
Obviously, “values reflected in international human rights law” are quite different from those 
norms that are codified'xn the terms of binding and implemented international treaties or 
concretized through customary international law. The former describe at least principles, 
interests, and objectives that transcend the text of particular treaties or customs, capturing a wide 
range of legal, quasi-legal, and moral perspectives — sources of insight classically irrelevant to 
treaty, customary, and statutory interpretation. Lower court judges and lawyers are left 
wondering which set of directives to follow and whether exceptions to the presumption of 
conformity doctrine are reserved for international human rights or extend to other fields.
371; Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Community v. Nicaragua, August 31, 2001, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., (Ser. C) No. 79 
(20 0 1 ).
75 Baker, supra note 29 at paras 69-70.
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D. International Law in Canadian Courts: The Relevant and Persuasive
Doctrine
The judiciary’s growing willingness to operate outside the ambits of the presumption of 
conformity doctrine has created a body of jurisprudence which one highly respected 
commentator has described as “an appalling mess”.76 At the heart of the matter is the question of 
what, if anything, determines decision-making. Revisiting legal realist perspectives canvassed in 
Chapter 1, there are at least two possibilities. The first, radical view is that decision-making is 
driven by judicial idiosyncrasies and ideology.77 As in any field of adjudication, judges’ use or 
non-use of international law depends on their personal orientation towards the facts and issues of 
a case and not on pre-existing law. This explanation denies the possibility of imposing some 
level of order on decision-making such that practitioners and observers may predict with some 
level of accuracy what a decision will be. In this sense, “law” is rendered conceptually 
meaningless other than as an instrument of politics.
A second, moderate or “sociological” realist perspective suggests that decision-making is 
systematically or at least predictably influenced by informal normative frameworks which help 
judicial reasoning.78 The idea here is that adjudication involves the use of social science data
76 Toope, “Keynote Address”, supra note 14 at 33
77 Brian Leiter, “American Legal Realism” The University o f Texas School o f Law: Public Law and Legal Theory 
Research Paper No. 042 (October 2002) at 9-10. This version has more recent incarnations, including the Critical 
Legal Studies movement: see, Duncan Kennedy, A Critique o f  Adjudication: Fin de Siecle (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1997); David Kairys, “ Law and Politics” (1984) 52 George Washington Law Review 243; 
Roberto Mangabeira Unger, The Critical Legal Studies Movement (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1983); 
Duncan Kennedy, “Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication” (1976) 89 Harvard Law Review 1685.
78 Leiter, supra note 77 at 9; Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., “The Path of the Law” (1897) 10 Harvard Law Review 
457; Herman Oliphant, “A Return to Stare Decisis” (1928) 14 American Bar Association Journal 71; Underhill 
Moore & Theodore Hope, “An Institutional Approach to the Law o f Commercial Banking” (1929) 38 Yale Law 
Journal; Karl Llewellyn, “A Realistic Jurisprudence: The Next Step” (1930) 30 Columbia Law Review 431; Karl 
Llewellyn, “Some Realism about Realism: Responding to Dean Pound” (1931) 44 Harvard Law Review 1222; 
Edward S. Robinson, “Law: An Unscientific Discipline” (1934) 44 Yale Law Journal 235
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(loosely defined) and informal norms to enhance the responsiveness of state law to, and its 
capacity to shape, the values, needs, interests, and customs of non-state actors. Baker provides a 
convenient illustration of this view. The Court in this case used the Convention on the Rights o f  
the Chi id  (CRC) — an unimplemented international treaty- to support its decision, not about the 
meaning of ambiguous statutory provisions, but about the scope of Ministerial discretion. For 
these two reasons, among others, the decision was not, strictly speaking, justified by the 
presumption of conformity doctrine. Yet, it chose to engage with unimplemented treaties on 
migration and the rights of children, which helped it to construct the ethical dimensions of 
discretionary decisions to separate a parent from his or her children through the act of 
deportation. As a treaty with its own monitoring and reporting body, the CRC has produced a • 
relatively stable body of publicly accessible, albeit formally non-binding norms. Judicial 
reasoning about these norms was, accordingly, at least somewhat constrained by clusters of 
relatively stable interpretations collaboratively constructed by a diverse discursive community. 
The Baker decision can be read as an attempt to use these informal norms to enhance the state’s 
responsiveness to the high priority values and interests of affected parties under conditions, and 
through methods, not recognized by the presumption of conformity doctrine.
This rough account falls well short of explaining precisely how decisions to use 
international human rights in this sort of why might be defended as non-arbitrary and legitimate. 
However, it suggests that the reception of international human rights need not be reduced to 
whimsy and caprice, and that international human rights can help to contextualize a legal 
problem and support the identification of alternative approaches to its resolution. That said, 
judges’ failure to articulate a justification for this kind of use of international human rights over 
the course of many decisions makes it difficult to avoid suspecting that their judgments are
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largely result-oriented. Fortunately, they have not failed completely in this task. Elements of a 
new doctrine may be found in jurisprudence concerned with the more narrow intersection 
between international human rights and the Charter o f  Rights and Freedoms. This parallel 
doctrine might help to explain seemingly deviant decisions, such as Baker.
D. I. The Relevant and Persuasive Doctrine: Nature and Origins 
The first principled engagement with international human rights/ Charter intersections 
occurred in Dickson C.J.‘s dissenting judgment in Re Public Service Employee Relations Act 
(PSERA) .79 Dickson C.J. stated that:
The various sources of international human rights law — declarations, covenants, conventions, 
judicial and quasi-judicial decisions of international tribunals, customary norms -- must, in my opinion, be 
relevant and persuasive sources for interpretation o f  the Charter's provisions... In particular, the similarity 
between the policies and provisions of the Charter and those o f international human rights documents 
attaches considerable relevance to interpretations o f those documents by adjudicative bodies, in much the 
same way that decisions o f the United States courts under the Bill of Rights, or decisions of the courts o f 
other jurisdictions are relevant and may be persuasive...
Furthermore, Canada is a party to a number o f international human rights Conventions which 
contain provisions similar or identical to those in the Charter. Canada has thus obliged itself internationally 
to ensure within its borders the protection o f certain fundamental rights and freedoms which are also 
contained in the Charter. The general principles o f constitutional interpretation require that these 
international obligations be a relevant and persuasive factor in Charter interpretation...
The content of Canada's international human rights obligations is, in my view, an important 
indicia o f the meaning o f "the full benefit o f the Charter's protection". I believe that the Charter should 
generally be presumed to provide protection at least as great as that afforded by similar provisions in 
international human rights documents which Canada has ratified.
In short, though 1 do not believe the judiciary is bound by the norms o f international law in 
interpreting the Charter, these norms provide a relevant and persuasive source for interpretation of the 
provisions o f the Charter, especially when they arise out o f Canada's international obligations under human 
rights conventions.80
Gibran Van Ert argues that there are two distinct sets of rules and principles in this 
passage.81 The first set falls under what he calls the “presumption of minimal protection” 
approach, in which judicial consideration of international human rights somewhat resembles that 
mandated by the presumption of conformity doctrine. If counsel establishes the existence of a
79 [1987] 1 S.C.R. 313.
80 Ibid. at paras 57-60.
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right at international law, then the presumption protects that right and can support the imposition 
of a correlative duty upon the government, which must rebut the presumption in order to justify 
limitations of the right.82 While judges are not obligated to proactively consider international 
law, they are obligated to protect binding international human rights once they are shown to be 
prima facie relevant. Dickson C.J.’s expressed concern with binding and ratified treaties suggests 
that compliance is a core animating principle within this approach.
The second set of rules falls under what I will call the relevant and persuasive doctrine. 
This doctrine authorizes judges to use both binding and non-binding international human rights 
law as an interpretive aid when deciding upon the content and scope of Charter provisions. 
Unlike the presumption of conformity doctrine, this doctrine is not directed towards ensuring 
substantive harmony between domestic law and international law. Rather, it is concerned with 
using international human rights as comparative law, namely, to attain a deeper knowledge of the 
Charter’s  potentialities, to improve Canadian law and adjudication, and, if possible, to enhance 
unity or interactions among Canadian, international, and other foreign legal orders. By blurring 
distinctions between binding/non-binding, implemented/unimplemented, and 
international/comparative law, the relevant and persuasive doctrine is somewhat anti-formalist; 
judges are encouraged to immerse themselves in the customs, traditions, and values of non-state 
normative orders in an effort to make formal law more responsive to an increasingly global and 
pluralistic society. This enhances the sense of communities that law works in their interest, that it 
is in some sense “their” law, while also allowing decision-makers to identify previously 
undetected flaws in state law and to learn how to correct them.
Of course, simply describing the relevant and persuasive doctrine does nothing to
81 Van Ert, supra note 63 at 253-254.
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demonstrate that judicial decision-making in fact operates in this way. First, it is exceedingly 
difficult to predict when and why judges will choose to receive international human rights, 
chiefly because it is unclear whether decision-making will be influenced by the presumption of 
conformity doctrine or the relevant and persuasive doctrine, or either. In R.v. Morgentaller,83 for 
instance, the Supreme Court refused to consider international human rights on the grounds that 
the right in question had not been legislatively implemented although, as noted, Dickson C.J. 
stated in PSERA that courts may have regard to non-binding, unimplemented international 
human rights law if it has interpretive value. Invoking the presumption of conformity doctrine, 
Jacques J. of the Quebec Court of Appeal refused to consider international human rights in Irwin 
Toy Ltd v. AG (Quebec), stating that it is not necessary to refer international, regional and foreign 
law when the “text of our constitution is clear”.84Even when it is clear that the relevant and 
persuasive doctrine governs, judges may legitimately refuse to apply international human rights 
because, in their opinion, such law is not relevant, persuasive, or authoritative, or because the 
existence of an international legal norm is not adequately proven.85
Second, there is considerable uncertainty concerning how international human rights will 
be used. In fact, judicial references to international human rights pursuant to the relevant and 
persuasive doctrine have been largely cursory. After reviewing ten years of international human 
rights/Charter jurisprudence, Anne Bayefsky concluded that the impact of international human 
rights on Canadian law depends “on the proclivities of a result-oriented decision-maker rather 
than their inherent usefulness to the interpretive problem at hand” and that the Supreme Court
82 Ibid. at 269.
83 [1988] 1 S.C.R. 30.
84 Irwin Toy Ltd., v. AG (Quebec), 32 D.L.R. (4th) 641 at 662.
85 William Schabas, International Human Rights Law and The Canadian Charter o f  Rights and Freedoms, 2nd 
edition (Carswell. 1996) at 47.
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considers “international law where it is supportive of a predetermined conclusion but ignores it 
when it is not”.86 William Schabas has similarly argued that there are few examples where 
international human rights have played a significant role in the determination of a Charter case 
and that its application is “often quite perfunctory”.87
Finally, the relevant and persuasive doctrine might undermine essential legal and 
political values even if it is applied consistently. Important normative questions include: does the 
doctrine apply only to international human rights, or, should judges have recourse to any and all 
international law? Should it be expanded to include all kinds of human rights, including those 
sourced in foreign legal orders? Should it be extended to include all kinds of foreign law or, 
more radically, all kinds of law (state and non-state)? How might we conceptualize compliance 
or bindingness if judges treat international law, comparative law, and non-state law as being 
similar in kind? In the interest of compliance, should judges begin with the presumption of 
minimal protection approach, using the relevant and persuasive doctrine only when dealing with 
non-binding international human rights and comparative law? If so, how do we account for the 
lingering problem of determining the content and scope of binding international human rights 
without relying extensively on non-binding, contextual factors sourced in normative frameworks 
to which Canada is not bound? If we do rely on some or all of these sources, in the context of 
Charter review, do international human rights and the views of (some) interpretive communities 
then stand as separate sources of Canadian constitutional law i.e. free-standing rights similar or 
equivalent to Charter rights? What would happen in the event of a conflict between Canada’s 
international human rights obligations and the Canadian constitution? What implications does 
this possibility have for principles of constitutional supremacy?
86 Bayefsky, supra note 70 at 89, 95.
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D. II The Vices of Relevant and Persuasive Doctrine 
Generally speaking, academic commentators have been highly critical of the judiciary’s 
approach to the reception of international law. Stephen Toope has argued that, despite elements 
of academic consensus concerning the law of reception, “courts have typically refused to address 
the question of international law within Canada” and, “when they have spoken.. ..the resulting 
hash has proven to be indigestible”.88 Anne Bayefsky, Irit Weiser, Ed Morgan, and Audrey 
Macklin also levy serious criticisms against the judiciary’s handling of this field of law.
Bayefsky and Weiser argue that jurisprudence is capricious and uncertain, largely because courts 
have never outlined a principled justification for their use of international law.89 Morgan and 
Macklin similarly argue that the authority of international legal norms depends upon a range of 
contextual factors that include instrumental utility, the surrounding political environment, and 
the rhetorical skill of individual lawyers.90
Some of these criticisms share affinities with radical legal realism, insofar as they express 
concern that judicial decision-making seems to be a product of judicial idiosyncrasies or 
ideologies. However, most scholars retain hope that a return to formal doctrine can remedy 
uncertainty and capriciousness. William Schabas, for instance, suspects that international human 
rights have had such a miniscule impact on judicial reasoning because it is not considered to be 
“real” law, impliedly the way domestic law is.91 Jutta Brunnee and Stephen Toope similarly 
argue that the treatment of international law as though it were no more authoritative than foreign
87 Schabas, supra note 85 at 47, 233.
88 Toope, “Keynote Address”, supra note 23 at 34-35.
89Bayefsky, supra note 70 at 95; Weiser, supra note 63.
90 Ed Morgan, International Law and the Canadian Courts (Toronto: Carswell. 1990); Audrey Macklin, “The State 
o f Law’s Borders and the Law o f State’s Borders” in David Dyzenhaus ed., The Unity o f  Public Law  (Oxford: Hart
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law has vastly reduced its ability to influence judicial reasoning.92 The problem seems to be with 
judges’ unfamiliarity with or undervaluing of international law and the absence of a firm, 
coherent doctrinal footing, rather than with the nature of judicial decision-making itself. For 
these scholars, the value of international law would be significantly improved if domestic law 
were used to encourage judges to make a lasting methodological distinction between binding and 
non-binding international law, treating the former with greater respect and commitment.93
This suggests that we need to change course and return to the formalism offered by the 
presumption of conformity doctrine. Gibran van Ert has advanced perhaps the most thorough 
argument for revitalizing formalist doctrine.94 He recognizes that, historically, many judges have 
used principles of respect for constitutional supremacy as a justification for conservatism in the 
reception of international law. For good or ill, they have disputed the validity of international 
legal norms in Canada, prioritized parliamentary intent over changing international and domestic 
contexts, values, and expectations, have used international law only following legislative 
implementation, and have routinely ignored formal criteria when the (non-) use of international 
law suited their purposes. However, van Ert believes that principles of respect for constitutional 
supremacy are, in today’s day and age, inextricably linked to principles of respect for 
international law qua law and accordingly less likely to justify judicial conservatism. More 
precisely, he thinks judges have steadily abandoned formalist conceptions of the separation of 
powers, federalism, and parliamentary sovereignty, using autonomous legal values as resources
Publishing. 2004) 173.
91 Schabas, supra note 85 at 233.
92 Jutta Brunnee & Stephen J. Toope, “A Hesitant Embrace: Baker and the Application o f International Law by 
Canadian Courts” in David Dyzenhaus, ed, The Unity of Public Law (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2004) 357 at 357- 
361.
93 Brunnee & Toope do not reject the judicial use o f non-binding international law as an interpretive aid. They 
simply suggest that judges should also work towards securing compliance with binding international law.
94 Van Ert, supra note 63 at 7-9.
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for holding legislatures and the executive accountable for violations of human dignity and the 
rule of law. Courts’ regular use of contextual canons of statutory interpretation might illustrate 
this point, as may the Charter. Van Ert believes that judges’ attitudes towards international law 
and its place in our courtrooms is likely to be equally more progressive.
To better reflect the global and multicultural context of Canadian law, van Ert proposes 
that principles of respect for constitutional supremacy should preclude the judicial reception of 
international law only when “the particular virtues of democratic assemblies- representation, 
public deliberation, participation, consent- are so great as to justify departures from international 
norms”.95 It should, in other words, recognize human dignity as a pillar of Canadian 
constitutionalism that justifies robust judicial review, whereby the demands of human dignity are 
to be found in various legal orders. He argues that the legislature’s “brute political power to 
violate international law” must be counter-balanced by the courts in their role as vindicators of 
the principle of respect for international (human rights) law, as part of their mandate to protect 
and promote Charter rights.96 While principles of respect for constitutional supremacy further 
the values o f federalism and parliamentary sovereignty, legitimate law and policy must be 
consistent with human dignity and the rule of law.97
Van Ert’s proposal helps us respond to changing frameworks of domestic and 
international law and the expectation that courts will assume a role greater than simply applying 
legislation and policing formal constitutional boundaries underpinning the division and 
separation (sic) of powers. Insofar as his refurbished principles of respect for international law
95 Van Ert, supra note 63 at 11.
96 Ibid. at 11; although van Ert refers most often to international law in general, his theory is best described as 
oriented towards enhancing judicial respect for international human rights as part o f the package o f legal values that 
underpin the rule of law.
97 Ibid. at 11.
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and for constitutional supremacy suffice to restate our law of reception in desirable ways, the 
relevant and persuasive doctrine is an unnecessary and confusing addition to the law of 
reception; we are better off staying with the presumption of minimal protection as a modified 
version of the presumption of conformity doctrine applicable to the special case of Charter 
review. But we have already seen that formal legal categories and concepts germane to the latter 
have failed to influence judicial decisions about the reception of international law. From where 
does van Ert derive his faith in judges’ supposed openness to international law or commitment to 
securing compliance (understood as conformity to rules), if he has already acknowledged that 
they regularly disrespect it under cover of the relevant and persuasive doctrine? Will judges’ 
respect for international human .rights improve simply because doctrine so directs, even though 
similar doctrine has failed to engender coherence and respect for international law qua 
international thus far? Perhaps van Ert believes this respect is nascent or dormant, and must be 
nourished to become fully effective. But, given the history of the law of reception, it is 
problematic to claim that revitalized formalism will produce different results this time around. 
Either judges have a new-found respect for international law by virtue of some newly envisioned 
global role, in which case there is no problem for formalism to fix, or they have as little respect 
for international law now as they did when they were operating under formalist doctrine, in 
which case the presumption of minimal protection will fail for the same reasons the presumption 
of conformity doctrine has failed.
Added to this, we must again question precisely how will litigants demonstrate the 
existence of a right to be presumptively protected, if not by resorting to non-binding normative 
frameworks to structure meaning. It is not the case that we can have one doctrine for binding 
international human rights and one for non-binding international and comparative human rights,
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since engagement with the latter are necessary to give workable meaning to the former; any 
theory of the former has to justify the use of non-binding international human rights norms. What 
is more, if human dignity serves as a foundation of Canadian law, thereby justifying treating 
binding international human rights as sufficient to impose constitutional obligations on Canadian 
actors and institutions, why not allow judicial recourse to any and all normative frameworks that 
help actualize human dignity? Is it compliance with binding international human rights or the 
protection and promotion of human dignity that is important? The presumption of minimal 
protection seems to be internally inconsistent in these respects, simultaneously blurring and 
defending boundaries between binding/non-binding and content/context; attention to the juristic 
bases of the relevant and persuasive doctrine, or the practices it encourages, is to a significant 
extent necessary even if we try and follow van Ert’s suggested approach.
D. Ill The Virtues of the Relevant and Persuasive Doctrine 
While sharing many of van Ert’s descriptive and normative claims, a number of scholars 
argue — contrary to his position-- that the indeterminacy laid bare in the relevant and persuasive 
doctrine should be embraced.98 Karen Knop helps us make sense of the contours of this debate 
by drawing a sharp distinction between traditional and transnational approaches to the reception 
of international law. The presumption of conformity doctrine falls within the traditional 
approach, or a caricature thereof. The judiciary’s job here is to serve as a “conveyor belt that 
delivers international law to the people” by simply enforcing international legal norms the
98 Glenn, supra note 24; Reem Bahdi “Gloablization o f Judgment: Transjudicialism and the Five Faces of 
International Law in Domestic Courts” (2006) 34:3 The George Washington International Law Review 555; Mayo 
Moran, “Authority, Influence and Persuasion: Baker, Charter Values and the Puzzle o f  Method”, in David 
Dyzenhaus, ed., The Unity o f  Public Law  (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2004); Craig Scott, Torture as Tort:
Comparative Perspectives on the Development o f  Transnational Human Rights Litigation, (Oxford: Hart. 2001); 
Karen Knop, “Here and There: International Law in Domestic Courts” (2000) 32 New  York University Journal o f 
International Law and Politics 501; Craig Scott & Phillip Alston, “Adjudicating Constitutional Priorities in a 
Transnational Context: A Comment on Soobramoney’s Legacy and Grootboom’s Promise”, (2000) South African
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content of which has already been established internationally by the executive and domestically 
by the legislatures." In stark positivist fashion, traditionalists consciously or unconsciously 
conceive of law in good part as a system of rules. While rules may be ambiguous from time to 
time, there is generally enough certainty to enable judges to determine when and how to decide 
an issue without resorting to extra-legal norms. Legislatures and judges collectively make 
international law effective when they ensure that domestic actors behave in accordance with its 
rules, with judges performing the distinctive role of resolving disputes about the content and 
applicability of implementing legislation.100
Transnational approaches, by contrast, are concerned first and foremost with improving 
the quality of adjudication, measured by such factors as openness to criticism, personal reflection 
and transformation, equality and freedom, and responsiveness to diverse social values, identities, 
and expectations.101 From this perspective, the judge’s primary obligation is to ensure that 
decisions serve the high priority values and interests of parties to a dispute, the public, and ideals 
of justice, rather than the dictates of international legal rules or formal doctrine alone. This view 
is part of the legacy of legal realism, in which law is dissociated from rules and instead identified 
with the (hopefully principled) social processes through which legal rules are created, 
interpreted, and applied. These legal processes are especially complicated in global and 
multicultural contexts where the genesis of legal rules is connected to the interactions of many 
domestic and international actors (legislators, administrative tribunals, local communities,
Journal o f Human Rights 206.
99 Knop, supra note 98 at 505.
100 M. Shah 11am, “ Enforcement o f International Human Rights Law by Domestic Courts: A Theoretical and 
Practical Study” (2006) 53:3 Netherlands International Law Review 399; Enforcing International Human Rights in 
Domestic Courts, Benedetto Conforti & Francesco Francioni, eds., (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1997); Benedtto 
Conforti, International Law and the Role o f  Domestic Legal Systems (Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1993);
101 Glenn, supra note 24; Knop, supra note 98; Bahdi, supra note 98; Moran, supra note 98; Scott, supra note 98; 
Brunnee & Toope, supra note 92.
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international tribunals and courts, etc.), where parties to a dispute are members of culturally and 
geographically diverse communities, and where there are manifold “publics” whose stake in a 
decision warrants recognition. In such situations, it may be hard to decide which norms, 
identities, and expectations to respect, what are the relevant barriers to access to justice, and how 
one’s own biases aggravate marginalization and inequality.102
The commitment to immerse oneself in this kind of legal process is not something that 
can be commanded through doctrine. Neither can doctrine insulate judges from the influences of 
ambient social processes. What doctrine can do is to help normalize the practice, illustrating that 
decision-making of this nature is neither unprecedented nor undesirable. This is why Dickson 
C.J.C. used American B ill ofRighls case law as an analogy for judicial recourse to international 
human rights; it renders the strange more familiar, the innovative more traditional. Picking up on 
this point, Knop rightly describes the relevant and persuasive doctrine as an exercise in 
comparative law or translation.103 The informal reception of international law is a 
communicative process whereby terminology is borrowed from “external” social and cultural 
contexts and then encoded in terms more familiar to those operating in domestic contexts. The 
purpose of this translation is to better unearth hidden meanings within domestic texts, to improve 
practical and normative deficiencies in Canadian law as illuminated by comparisons with other 
legal orders, and to integrate domestic law into international and global legal orders that are 
collectively immersed within a wide range of social settings. These tasks can help improve the 
ability of domestic law to respond to and redirect Canadian social interactions that are already in
102 Roderick A. MacDonald, “Access to Justice in Canada Today: Scope, Scale and Ambitions” in Julia Bass et al., 
eds.„ Access to Justice fo r  a New Century: The Way Forward (Toronto: The Law Society of Upper Canada, 2005);
Hon. Chief Justice Beverley McLachlin, P.C., “Judges in a Multicultural Society” (paper presented at the Chief 
Justice o f Ontario’s Advisory Committee on Professionalism, First Colloquium on the Legal Profession, October 
2003), online: <http://www.lsuc.on.ca/media/mclachlinjudges_multicuItura_society.pdf>.
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fairly advanced stages of global integration.
As judges engage with outside perspectives, institutions, and normative orders, they may 
be more willing to alter traditional legal rules and practices. Depending on the frequency, 
magnitude, and temporal length of these engagements, judges may become part of international 
and transnational social networks, taking on new social roles and identities and even producing 
entirely new bodies of law based on their mutually reconstituting interactions. Anne-Marie 
Slaughter uses the term “transjudicialism” to describe the process by which domestic, regional, 
and international courts create cross-jurisdictional linkages through the mutual referencing of 
decisions.104 Craig Scott adds a normative appraisal of this process, arguing that the principles 
that are embedded within transjudicial case law can constitute an autonomous body of law that 
cannot be reduced to the legal order of any one jurisdiction. It is a “new common law” that 
collects and reconfigures the principles that are sourced in separate legal orders but which hold 
new meanings as they are interpreted and applied in different situations; the meaning of these 
legal principles in turn imposes itself on ambient social values, facts, and events. Although 
nascent, this body of law might one day facilitate the emergence of a “pan-constitutional law of 
human rights” that furthers respect for democratic self-government and international law as 
mutually re-constituting principles; 105a vision shared by traditionalists, such as van Ert.
What is exciting about this narrative is that it makes use of the basic principles that 
organize thought about the law of reception. On the one hand, and contrary to common 
complaints, transnational legal theorists place a high premium on respect for international law. 
True, the legacies of legal realism do not permit one to regard international law as a body of
1031 will have much more to say about this in the next Chapter.
104 Anne-Marie Slaughter, “A Typology of Transjudicial Communication”, in, Thomas Franck & Gregory H. Fox 
eds., International Law Decisions in National Courts (Transnational Publishers, Inc., 1996) 37.
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rules that can and should be faithfully applied over and above countervailing policy concerns.
But it is recognized that international law serves a distinctive role in encouraging and 
maintaining social bonds among courts from various jurisdictions as well as in collecting and 
disseminating the values, beliefs, identities, and interests of social actors from around the world. 
What is often overlooked is that transnationalists go even further than traditionalists by 
encouraging judges to use the full range of normative materials that constitute and legitimate 
international human rights. By virtue of their obsession with hierarchically ordering binding and 
non-binding international law, traditionalist judges limit themselves to reliance on the few 
positive rules found in treaty provisions. But this is an embarrassingly slim set of norms, since 
international human rights treaties are aspirational and since specific rules tend to be encoded in 
the non-binding “views” or “recommendations” of poly-centric interpretive communities. 
Insistence on formalism means fewer international human rights enter Canadian courts, not 
more. Transnationalist judges, by contrast, may rely on any and all normative materials that give 
expression to values of human dignity. These materials include: customary international law; 
treaty provisions; the non-binding views of treaty bodies; United Nations resolutions; non­
binding decisions of regional courts such as the European Court of Human Rights; and, the 
discourse of comparative human rights.
A skeptic might see here an opportunity for courts to ignore binding and non-binding 
norms alike, but the transnationalist sees an opportunity for Canadian courts to forge links with 
human rights institutions across the world in order to share ideas, experiences and wisdom. 
Pushed to its limits, this process-based vision of decision-making means that judicial openness to 
international law should include openness to any and all normative resources that improve the
105 Scott & Alston, supra note 98 at 207.
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quality of judgment in particular cases. This is not to disrespect international law, but to equally 
respect the merits of any and all sources of wisdom and insight. It should also be noted that this 
narrative dove-tails nicely with our review of the functional characteristics of rights. 
Transnationalists reject conceptions of international human rights as determinate rules. Instead, 
they see such rights as a distinctive means of framing sustained interactions among globally- 
diffuse discursive communities who are concerned with the appropriate distribution of high- 
priority values. Viewed in this way, the relevant and persuasive doctrine facilitates the full 
functioning of international human rights and of human rights most generally.
Similarly, transnational legal theorists respect constitutional democracy, but add that 
human dignity and the rule of law require that judges accord less weight to federalism and 
parliamentary sovereignty than they historically have- at least in Charter cases. Most 
traditionalists do not dispute the reality or importance of changes to Canadian constitutionalism. 
What they fail to appreciate is that the presumption of conformity doctrine in its present form 
cannot incorporate these changes because it has long (and unjustifiably) demanded a strict 
separation of powers in Canada (sic), leaving judges the residual role of policing constitutional 
boundaries and applying pre-formed rules. This rigid formalism is most certainly not in keeping 
with the belief that the judiciary can and should use autonomous legal values to constrain 
parliamentary will, which is an essential precondition of Charter review. Nor is it reflective of 
the pervasive belief that constitutionalism should include a firm commitment to human dignity 
and the rule of law, a change that has followed the slow but steady recognition that 
majoritarianism is a seriously flawed political philosophy.106 Finally, it was never designed to 
govern the intersection of international human rights and the Charter ox legal problems
106 John Hart Ely, Democracy and Distrust: A Theory o f  Judicial Review (Cambridge: Harvard University Press,
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characteristic of a globalized society and legal system. It is quite simply out of touch with the 
nature, purposes, and functions of Charter review.
Traditionalists such as van Ert have made admirable efforts to save the presumption of 
conformity doctrine, most notably through the presumption of minimal protection. Van Ert’s 
most innovative idea here is that principles of respect for international law and for constitutional 
supremacy are mutually constitutive and not, as traditional doctrine would have it, mutually 
antagonistic. But this commitment finds no real traction in the operative elements of traditional 
doctrine that linger in his modem approach. The presumption of minimal protection continues to 
depend on a strict separation between categories such as law/non-law, binding/non-binding, and 
content/context. Even though accompanying categorical distinctions among legislative, 
executive, and judicial authority are relaxed, we are still left with unrealistic limits to judicial 
discretion regarding whether, how, and why to use international law.
First, according to traditional doctrine, judges can only use international law to resolve 
ambiguities in ordinary legislation and, what is more, Parliament can breach Canada’s 
international obligations simply by clearly expressing its intention to do so. The Charters not, 
strictly speaking, implementing legislation and, moreover, it is used to restrict Parliamentary 
authority to pursue certain objectives or utilize certain legislative measures. The presumption of 
minimal protection might serve to augment the presumption of conformity doctrine by relaxing 
the implementation and judicial deference requirements, which are altogether inconsistent with 
the nature of Charter review. Jurisprudential support for this novel approach might be found in 
the Court’s reliance on the presumption of conformity doctrine when interpreting the Charter 'm 
Hape. However, the Court also expressly cited PERSA in this case and, by extension, the
1980).
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relevant and persuasive doctrine.107 Just as Dickson C.J. did in PERSA, the Court conflated the 
two doctrines to the point that it is simply not clear what was the principled basis for its 
judgment. And of course normative issues remain, not the least of which is whether binding 
international human rights are to be considered as distinct sources of Canadian constitutional law 
that can override validly-enacted legislation (as van Ert suggests) or whether Parliament can 
break Canada’s international commitments by clearly expressing its intention to do so, as is the 
case pursuant to the presumption of conformity doctrine. How would a court resolve conflicts 
between a binding international human right and a constitutional provision, such as might be the 
case with respect to equality rights and s. 93 of the Constitution Act, 1982, which provides 
Protestants and Catholics, but not other religious groups, the right to separate schooling? In 
other words, are binding international human rights free-standing constitutional rights similar or 
equivalent to Charter for the purposes of imposing legal obligations on public actors and 
institutions, or, do they simply inform the interpretation of ambiguous Charter provisions and 
jurisprudence? The former suggests they stand as separate sources of Canadian constitutional 
law, while the latter suggests more modestly that they aid in the interpretation of Charter rights. 
Case law does not support the former proposition, although this does not on its own rule it out as 
a sound approach. It does require, though, a more robust justification than has hitherto been 
offered by academics.
Second, and more seriously, judges must prefer binding to non-binding law when 
interpreting implementing legislation and the Charter. This requirement drastically reduces the 
stock of norms available to judges because specifications of the content, scope, and applicability 
of international human rights are largely attributable to the work of non-state interpretive
107 Hape. supra  note 23 at para. 55.
communities, not sovereigns; these norms are quite simply not binding under international law, 
standing at best as “soft” law. This, of course, only aggravates democratic concerns about the 
constitutionalization of international law at the same time as it constructs untenable conceptions 
of compliance as conformity to rules. But, if boundaries between binding/non-binding and 
content/context are blurred, as they must be, are we not really dealing with the sorts of practices 
envisioned by proponents of the relevant and persuasive doctrine after all? Why retain the 
trappings of the presumption of conformity doctrine if what we want judges to do cannot be 
justified on the basis of its operative principles? Simply put, if we wish judges to more freely use 
those normative frameworks necessary to give formally binding international human rights 
practical meaning (i.e. to protect and promote human dignity), then we have to find or construct 
principles and standards that justify the practice.
For the same reasons, classic conceptions of compliance and bindingness must also fall to 
the wayside. In many ways, these conditions express the importance of respecting the decision of 
the federal executive to incur international obligations. Only once this is done are courts under a 
strict duty to give them domestic legal effect. But we have seen that van Ert wants judges to use 
international law to review the merits of valid law, policy, and practices on the grounds that it 
helps actualize autonomous legal values; compliance with binding international human rights is 
the means of achieving the end of actualizing these values rather than the more modest end of 
respecting the intent of the federal executive. But these same values are present within all human 
rights frameworks, whether or not they are formally binding or concretized and specified in 
international treaties or customs or, indeed, foreign legal orders. Again, international human 
rights norms, often expressed in the highly vague and abstract language of principles rather than 
rules, are given their fullest and most concrete meaning when applied to fact-situations by non­
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state interpretive communities and foreign legal institutions whose views are not formally 
binding on Canada. Why should the application of these values depend on executive action, most 
especially if van Ert has already stated that judges may use international law, in conjunction with 
core Canadian legal values, to constrain questionable parliamentary action? Should judges grant 
the executive, in its capacity as an international actor, greater deference than it grants to 
parliament? Should it prize respect for executive commitments more highly than parliamentary 
intent or even the protection and promotion of human dignity? This seems a strange position to 
take.
Neither the presumption of conformity doctrine nor the presumption of minimal 
protection contains the resources needed to account for these kinds of problems. They each 
impose hierarchical distinctions among classes of norms when, practically speaking, the 
realization of the spirit of international human rights requires that these distinctions be broken 
down. At the same time, they fail to address normative concerns about principles of 
constitutional supremacy or, more precisely, whether binding international human rights stand as 
separate sources of constitutional law simply because they have been produced by the federal 
executive in concert with foreign political authorities. Attempts to get around the inherent 
limitations of formalism transform the presumption of conformity doctrine into something it is 
not, cannot, and perhaps should not be. It would be, in my view, far easier to simply work 
towards a better understanding of, and justification for, the relevant and persuasive doctrine.
£ . Conclusion
The desire to attain order and coherence drives the attempt to revitalize formal legal 
categories and concepts. However, formalism can easily inhibit one’s appreciation of the 
inherent complexity of law and life. Worse still, categories and concepts that fail to reflect
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experience can generate disillusionment, skepticism, cynicism, and judicial resistance.108 This 
seems to be the case with our law of reception, where doctrine that was, perhaps, suitable for 
another time has fallen out of step with the contemporary frameworks of international and 
domestic law. The Supreme Court’s failure to clearly reconfigure the doctrinal basis of reception 
has exacerbated the pre-existing disarray, with jurisprudence bearing less and less resemblance 
to traditional doctrine. In PERSA, Dickson C.J. iterated and then conflated at least two separate 
doctrines; an action repeated by the Supreme Court in Baker md. in Hape. In Hape, the Court 
declined to justify its apparent conceptualization of the constitution as the functional equivalent 
of ordinary implementing legislation or whether and how the operative principles of the 
presumption of conformity doctrine should be modified to better reflect significant differences 
between statutory interpretation and judicial review; it raised more questions than it answered.
To be fair, judges have been inundated with unmanageably high volumes of unfamiliar 
norms, values and expectations. The increasingly global nature of legal issues, the sheer scale of 
norms relevant to the resolution of legal problems and the increased number and diversity of 
participants in legal proceedings have stretched judges’ capacity to abide by formal doctrine well 
beyond its already modest limits. Although there are grounds to be critical of judges’ approach to 
international law, a natural reaction to being exposed to high volumes of external stimuli is to 
disengage from one’s environment. Indeed, the filtration of irritants may be said to be one of 
primary functions of a formalist law of reception.
An obvious concern with the tendency to insist on formalism is that judges may end up 
receiving less international law, not more, while remaining exposed to a host of other extra-legal 
influences, such as political ideology. This is not to say that legal categories and concepts are
108 Stephen Waddams, Dimensions o f  Private Law: Categories and Concepts in Anglo-American Legal Reasoning
baseless or dysfunctional. To the contrary, they help organize the mess of reality into cognizable 
form. But about this, in relation to the law of reception, three distinct claims must be made. First, 
it is simply not the case that judges have, at any time, based their decisions on pre-existing 
categories and concepts alone. Instead, when deciding issues touching on global and 
international affairs, they have relied on a great mixture of materials, some legal and others non- 
legal, some expressly identified and others hidden from view. There is little merit in pretending 
that things are otherwise.
Second, there are few compelling reasons to think that this kind of order and coherence 
are goals for which we should be striving. Indeed, judges’ willingness to use materials other than 
those embedded in pre-existing legal categories and concepts can be a good thing, bearing in 
mind that this may in the end depend on whether one endorses the decision. Finally, knowledge 
of the conditions under which judges are receptive to international law can help one predict when 
international legal arguments are likely to be well-received, to engender appropriate underlying 
conditions if they are otherwise lacking, and generally to launch more effective advocacy 
campaigns. There is, in other words, practical merit in attaining a more complete understanding 
of all the factors that influence the judicial reception of international law. This is an advantage 
lost to those who would focus only upon formal doctrine.
Still, traditional ways of thinking are enormously hard to revise. Transnationalists offer a 
compelling alternative that is, as I have shown, largely consistent with the base descriptive and 
normative ambitions of many traditionalists. Not to underestimate the importance of theoretical 
differences between the two camps, transnationalists are able to work with the core principles 
that structure the law of reception in order to chart relatively new territory. These principles look
(Cambridge University Press, 2003) at 232.
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much the same in the hands of Knop and other transnationalists as in the hands of van Ert and 
like-minded traditionalists. Differences lie more in confusion as to what it means to say that a 
judge “respects” or “complies” with international human rights and constitutional supremacy 
than in his or her core normative commitments.
It has to be said that Knop has not adequately explained or justified the relevant and 
persuasive doctrine, although this was not her ambition. In particular, she has not explained what 
structures transjudicialism or what factors influence judges’ perceptions of the relevance and 
persuasiveness of international and comparative human rights. Knop admits this, noting that 
“transjudicialism’s account of persuasion neither responds to critics who equate persuasion with 
politics nor differentiates it from the spreading of the word, where the word is a liberal legal 
regime”.109 She also recognizes that persuasion’s “authority-creating role in the domestic 
interpretation of international law is thus left largely unexamined”.110 What this means is that we 
need to understand more precisely how transnational perspectives on law can support tenable 
conceptions of compliance with international law and constitutional law. For this, we must turn 
away from the descriptive and normative dimensions of the Canadian law of reception and delve 
more deeply into the theoretical optics that we may use to better appraise the processes through 
which international and comparative human rights acquire domestic legal effect.
109 Knop, supra 98 at 535.
110 Ibid. at 535.
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We have seen that we lack a compelling jurisprudential account of the relevant 
and persuasive doctrine. Although celebrated in some quarters, judges and theorists have 
done very little to justify its use.1 The purpose of this chapter is to take up this challenge 
by engaging with the following three questions: 1) what it means to say that international 
and comparative human rights exert “persuasive influence” 2) how the relevant and 
persuasive doctrine affects interactions among various discursive communities, and 3) 
how the doctrine may be defended in terms of traditional juristic principles, namely, 
principles of respect for international law and constitutional supremacy.
This chapter will not be descriptive in orientation, which is to say I will largely 
ignore case law. Instead, I will outline the theoretical bases for two hypotheses about the 
relevant and persuasive doctrine, which are: 1) specific rhetorical practices and dialogical 
structures constrain judicial decision-making about the relevance and persuasiveness of 
international and comparative human rights;2 and, 2) knowledge of argumentative
1 Stephen J. Toope, “Keynote Address: Canada and International Law” in The Impact o f  International Law 
on the Practice o f  Law in Canada. Proceedings o f the 27th Annual Conference o f the Canadian Council on 
International Law, Ottawa, October 15-17, 1998 (The Hague: Kluwar Law International, 1998) 33 at 34.
2 This hypothesis will be informed by the work o f  Canadian legal theorists, Stephen J. Toope and Jutta 
Brunnee; see, Jutta Brunnee & Stephen J. Toope “International Law and Constructivism: Elements o f an 
Interactional Theory o f International Law” (2000) 39:19 Columbia Journal o f Transnational Law 19 at 49. 
It will also be informed by broader perspectives on argumentation theory, which is an interdisciplinary 
approach to the study o f how conclusions are validly or justifiably reached through logical reasoning, how 
rhetorical practices influence the persuasiveness of arguments to others, and how arguments arise and are 
structured by various dialectical processes. For good overviews o f the nature and history o f argumentation 
theory (in legal and non-legal contexts), see Eveline T. Feteris, Fundamentals o f  Legal Argumentation: A 
Survey o f  Theories on the Justification o f  Judicial Decisions, (Kluwar Academic Publishers, 1999); 
Fundamentals o f  Argumentation Theory: A Handbook o f  Historical Backgrounds and Contemporary
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processes distinctive to law can enhance the effectiveness of transnational human rights 
advocacy.31 will use two theoretical perspectives to gradually construct and then 
synthesize these hypotheses. The latter hypothesis will be derived from the core 
assumptions, values, and conceptual framework associated with Transnational Legal 
Process (TLP); an interdisciplinary perspective on the social processes by which 
international human rights are collaboratively produced, interpreted, and applied by 
diffuse discursive communities.4 In Harold Koh’s words, TLP “provides the key...to 
understanding the critical issue of compliance with international law”, by providing 
knowledge of the conditions under which authoritative decision-makers are most likely to 
receive international (and comparative) human rights.5 One of Koh’s key insights is that • 
immersion in structured argumentative interactions about how to resolve problems leads 
to the cultivation of shared understandings among disputants. These understandings, in 
turn, lead to the collaborative production of legal rules, the “internalization” of these 
rules into participants’ internal value sets, and their subsequent diffusion throughout 
various social, political, and legal communities. Koh asserts that norm-intemalization is 
most likely to occur under a narrow set of social conditions and that the cultivation and/or 
strategic exploitation of these conditions enhances judges’ (and other state officials’)
Developments, F. H. van Eemeren, R. Grootendorst, & Francisca Snoeck Henkemans Eds., (Routledge, 
1996).
3 This hypothesis is informed explicitly by Harold Koh's “Transnational Legal Process” scholarship;
Harold Hongju Koh, “Is There a “New” New Haven School o f International Law?” (2007) 32 Yale Law 
Journal 559; Harold Hongju Koh, “Internalization Through Socialization” (2005) 54 Duke L.J. 975; Harold 
Hongju Koh, “Transnational Legal Process” (1996) 75 Nebraska Law Review 181. It is also indirectly 
informed by human-rights based scholarship that employs “law and society” methods and that have 
affinities with sociological legal realism; see generally : International Law and Society: Empirical 
Approaches to Human Rights, Laura A. Dickinson Ed., (Aldershot, England: Ashgate, 2007); Martha 
Fennimore & Kathryn Sikkink, “International Norm Dynamics and Political Change” (1998) 52:4 
International Organization 887; The Power o f  Human Rights: International Norms and Domestic Change, 
Thomas Risse, Steve C. Ropp & Kathryn Sikkink, eds., (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999).
4 Koh, “Transnational Legal Process”, supra note 3.
5 Ibid. at 183.
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receptivity to international and comparative human rights arguments.6 As we will see, 
this perspective shares many affinities with sociological legal realism and the supposition 
that even indeterminate judicial decision-making is predictable and (hopefully) 
principled.
The hypothesis concerning the existence of normative constrains on judicial 
discretion will be derived from the “interactional theory of law” advanced by Canadian 
scholars Stephen Toope and Jutta Brunnee. Although similar to TLP, Toope and 
Brunnee’s interactional theory of law is more concerned with distinguishing persuasion 
from political and ideological power.7 They hypothesize that the projection of such power 
is constrained by formal and informal institutions of interpretation that ensure that 
disputes are resolved on their merits and in such a way as to generate shared 
understanding among disputants. From these claims they construct an ideal model against 
which the reasonableness of legal arguments may be appraised.81 will argue that this 
theoretical perspective is useful for understanding the criteria judges might use when 
deciding about the relevance and persuasiveness of international and comparative human 
rights. In combination with TLP, it will help us to begin investigating how judges might 
decide about international and comparative human rights and how these decisions 
influence broader social and political interactions.
6 This commitment is characteristic o f much “socialization” or “strategic social construction” literature; see, 
Dickinson, supra note 3; Koh, “Internalization Through Socialization” supra note 3; Ryan Goodman & 
Derek Jinks, “International Law and State Socialization: Conceptual, Empirical, and Normative 
Challenges,” (2005) 54 Duke Law Journal 983; Ryan Goodman & Derek Jinks, “How to Influence States: 
Socialization and International Human Rights Law” (2004) 54 Duke Law Journal 621.
7 Brunnee & Toope, supra note 2 at 25.
8 Models o f this sort are characteristic of idealized, “dialectical” approaches to argumentation that are often 
applied to the study o f legal interaction; see, Advances in Pragma-Dialectics, Franz H. van Eemeren, Ed., 
(Amsterdam: Vale Press, 2002); Franz H. Eemeren & Rob Grootendorst, Speech Acts in Argumentative 
Discussions: A Theoretical Model fo r  the Analysis o f  Discussions Directed Towards Solving Conflicts o f  
Opinion, (Dordrecht: Floris Publications, 1984).
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To repeat, I will most certainly not attempt to describe all the factors and 
meanings that construct decisions about the relevance and persuasiveness of international 
and comparative human rights.9 The objectives of this chapter are more modest. I am 
interested only in identifying the core purposes and functions of the relevant and 
persuasive doctrine and, from these, a prima facie rationale for its form.101 will insist that 
the relevant and persuasive doctrine performs a function quite distinct from classical 
doctrine and that the performance of this function requires that it be fairly informal in 
nature.
The chapter will begin with a brief account of the purposes and functions of the 
relevant and persuasive doctrine. I will relate these to a recurring concept associated with 
the law of reception in general: compliance, with both binding international law and the 
Canadian constitution. 1 will argue that we must replace classical, rule-based conceptions 
of compliance with a process-based conception of compliance if we are to make sense of 
the relevant and persuasive doctrine in terms of its distinctive purposes and functions.
The second section will propose TLP as a strong candidate for just such a conception of 
law and compliance. This section will outline the analytical frameworks, methods, and 
programs of action associated with TLP. It will also suggest that TLP can, with some 
modifications, advance our understanding of how dynamic interactions among multiple
9 1 recognized this to be an impossible and anyway unfruitful endeavor in earlier chapters.
10 Patrick Capps calls this kind of approach “focal analysis”, which “describes the tradition by which 
various social practices are conceived of as purposive phenomena” . This kind of approach allows us to 
infer law’s essential, distinctive features (its form, content, etc.) from the ends towards which it works. 
Focal analysis is to be distinguished from “conceptual analysis”, whereby law is defined by reference to 
official “language-use as well as the conventional conceptual distinctions which are embodied in our social 
practices”; Patrick Capps, Human Dignity and the Foundations o f  International Law, (Oxford & Portland: 
Hart Publishing, 2009) at 39-40. In like kind, 1 will argue that the relevant and persuasive doctrine ought to 
be conceived of in terms of social processes, given its fundamental purposes and functions.
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discursive communities facilitate the persuasive influence of international and 
comparative human rights across a range of domestic settings, including courts.
Third, I will outline Brunnee and Toope’s model for rational argumentation that 
will help us to distinguish “material capabilities and interests” from “normativity” and, 
more precisely, to identify the “constraining and facilitating (formal and informal) 
institutions of legal interpretation” that minimize the occurrence of judicial 
instrumentalism in the reception of international law.11 This will help us build upon 
Knop’s nascent theoretical work, filling in gaps concerning how persuasion differs from 
(normative) coercion. Finally, then, I will reflect on how these theoretical reflections 
advance our understanding of the relevant and persuasive doctrine. I will also address 
some unresolved normative and methodological problems.
B. The Relevant and Persuasive Doctrine: Purposes and Functions 
In the last chapter, we observed that the place of international law in Canadian 
courts has been profoundly influenced by judges’ consideration of informal criteria that 
percolate from multiple dynamic, interconnected social processes. This was observed 
clearly in judges’ practice of ignoring aspects of formal doctrine in order to interpret 
indeterminate statutory provisions in instrumental ways, a practice Ann Bayefsky 
pejoratively termed “result-orientation”.12 Despite the fact that judicial decision-making 
has never wholly conformed to doctrine, the relevant and persuasive doctrine has been 
singled out for especially pointed criticism; largely on the grounds that it leads to the 
constitutionalization of judges’ personal political or ideological values and to insulating
"  Brunnee & Toope, supra note 2 at 25.
12 Anne F. Bayefsky, International Human Rights Law: Use in Canadian Charter o f  Rights and Freedoms 
Litigation (Toronto and Vancouver: Butterworths, 1992) at 89, 95.
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their decisions against democratic debate and change. 13This is a problem that 
traditionalists manage to convince themselves arises less frequently in case law 
associated with the presumption of conformity doctrine.
A recurring theme running through this debate is whether and how we may ensure 
that judicial decision-making enhances compliance with international law, within the 
bounds of constitutional rules, principles, and conventions. The issue of compliance is 
central, capturing judges’ dual role of giving domestic legal effect to binding 
international law and policing constitutional boundaries separating executive and 
legislative functions as well as federal and provincial powers. Only if we conceive of 
compliance as conformity to rules, or insist on doctrinal distinctions between 
binding/non-binding, can we appreciate the poor fit between the form and the function of 
the relevant and persuasive doctrine. But these are, I think, unwarranted assumptions. The 
relevant and persuasive doctrine is directed towards other ends entirely and should not be 
expected to perform the same functions as the presumption of conformity doctrine nor 
should it be revised to assume the same or similar form.
Recalling Dickson C.J.’s statements in PERSA, we can identify three functions 
associated with the relevant and persuasive doctrine. First, the doctrine helps protect and 
promote human rights. That much should be uncontroversial, considering that the 
doctrine informs reviews of laws, policies, and practices for consistency with 
constitutional rights. Insofar as we define human rights as discursive mechanisms that
n  For critical perspectives on the dangers o f constitutionalism in the era of globalization, see Harry 
Arthurs, “Governing the Canadian State: The Constitution in an Era o f Globalization, Neo-Liberalism, 
Populism, Decentralization and Judicial Activism” (2003) 13:1 Constitutional Forum 16. For broader 
criticisms of links between constitutionalism and democracy, see Allan Hutchinson & Joel Colon-Rios, 
’W hat’s Democracy Got to Do With It? A Critique o f Liberal Constitutionalism’ (September 2007) CLPE 
Research Paper No. 29. These criticisms can equally be applied to the presumption o f conformity doctrine, 
as was noted last chapter.
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structure communication around the distribution of high priority values and interests, the 
relevant and persuasive doctrine is concerned with enhancing communicative 
interactions among rights-holders and duty-bearers so that state law may better respond to 
and redirect background social values, interests, and expectations. Since all human rights 
discourse facilitates the performance of this function, the relevant and persuasive doctrine 
wisely relaxes rigid, hierarchical distinctions between binding/non-binding international 
human rights as well as between international/comparative human rights, although of 
course priority is given to Charter rights should there be a an irreconcilable conflict.14
Secondly, the relevant and persuasive doctrine is supposed to enhance judges’ 
ability to establish some level of congruence between state law/policy and ambient social 
values, beliefs, and expectations that have global and multicultural dimensions.15 
Whether or not it achieves material change, constitutional rights adjudication offers 
rights-holders who have been excluded from processes of law- and policy-formation and 
implementation the promise of securing the political recognition of their identities and 
interests.16 The politics of recognition is considerably challenging in general, but it is
141 will address this issue in the last chapter, when 1 consolidate the observations o f this dissertation and 
address how the relevant and persuasive doctrine can be construed as consistent with certain conceptions of 
constitutional supremacy.
15 On the importance o f this sort o f  congruence to the “legitimacy” o f law, see Brunnee & Toope, supra 
note 2 at 49; Gerald J. Postema, “Implicit Law” (1994) 13 Law and Philosophy 361; Friedrich V. 
Kratochwil, Rules, Norms, and Decisions: On the Conditions o f  Practical and Legal Reasoning in 
International Relations and Domestic Affairs (Cambridge University Press, 1989).
16 John Hart Ely, Democracy and Distrust: A Theory o f  Judicial Review (Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press, 1980); Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously, (London: Duckworth, 1978); Alexander M.
Bickel, The Least Dangerous Branch: The Supreme Court at the Bar o f  Politics, (Indianapolis: Bobbs- 
Merrill, 1962). For critical views of this position in the Canadian context, see Arthurs, supra note 9; Gavin 
Anderson," Social Democracy and the Limits o f Rights Constitutionalism” (2004) 17 Canadian Journal of 
Law and Jurisprudence 31; Joel Bakan, Just Words: Constitutional Rights and Social Wrongs, (Toronto: 
University of Toronto Press, 1997); Michael Mandel, The Charter o f  Rights and the Legalization o f  Politics 
in Canada, (Toronto: Thompson Educational Publishing, 1994).
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complicated further when situated in global and multicultural contexts.17 As societies 
intersect and collide, individuals accumulate multiple identities and interests, some of 
which challenge the authority, appropriateness, and effectiveness of centralized, state 
law. In place of or alongside state law are pre-existing or newly-created normative 
frameworks that help constitute semi-autonomous social, political, and economic 
communities. State law must recognize the inherent limitations of its power to regulate 
behaviour and find new, more creative ways of working with poly-centric foreign, 
international, and/or non-state political communities in the protection and promotion of 
public values.18 This requires a partial or full breakdown of hierarchical distinctions 
between international and domestic law and, more broadly, between state law and non­
state normative orders.19 Breakdowns of this nature can encourage judges to make use of 
all the normative resources at their disposal to craft sustainable solutions to novel and 
complex problems.20 In the context of constitutional adjudication, they can use their
17 Multiculturalism and the Canadian Constitution, Stephen Tierney, ed., (Vancouver, Toronto: UBC Press,
2007); Aeyelet Schachar, Multicultural Jurisdictions: Cultural Differences and Women’s Rights, 
(Cambridge University Press, 2001); Will Kymlicka & Wayne Norman, Citizenship in Diverse Societies, 
(Oxford University Press, 2001); Richard J.F. Day, Multiculturalism and the History o f  Canadian Diversity 
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2000); Charles Taylor, “The Politics o f Multiculturalism”, in 
Multiculturalism, Amy Gutman, ed., (Princeton University Press, 1994) 25; K. Anthony Appiah, “Identity, 
Authenticity, Survival: Multicultural Societies and Social Reproduction” in Multiculturalism, Amy 
Gutman, ed., (Princeton University Press, 1994) 149.
18 Paul Schiff Berman, “Global Legal Pluralism” (2007) 80 Southern California Review 1155; A. Fischer- 
Lescano & Gunther Teubner, ’Regime-Collisions: The Vain Search for Unity in the Fragmentation of 
Global Law’ (2004) 25 Michigan Journal o f International Law 999; Gunther Teubner, “The Two Faces of 
Janus: Rethinking Legal Pluralism” (1992) 13 Cardozo Law Review 1443; Gunther Teubner, “After Legal 
Instrumentalism? Strategic Models o f Post-Regulatory Law” in Dilemmas o f Law in the Welfare State 
Gunther Teubner, ed., (DeGruyter, 1985).
19 Craig Scott outlines a spectrum of options available here, ranging from slight modifications to state law 
that retains exclusive authority to alter rights and obligations, to breaking faith entirely with state-centered 
conceptions o f law; see, Craig Scott ‘“ Transnational Law’ as Proto-Concept: Three Conceptions” (2009) 10 
German Law Journal 859, 862.
20 For one o f the earliest calls for enhanced judicial flexibility in using diverse normative resources in the 
construction and resolution of legal problems, see; Philip Jessup, Transnational Law, (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1956)
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power to force the state to refrain from exercising its power, or, to exercise it in ways that 
protect and promote the autonomy of individuals and non-state communities.
At the same time, our collective integration in multiple international and 
transnational social, economic, and political networks requires us to be more conscious of 
how our (in)actions can impact the rights of persons living abroad. Security intelligence 
and police officers’ involvement in the joint investigation of international and 
transnational crime, for example, might raise questions about the content, scope, and 
extra-territorial application of Charter provisions.21 This occurred in Canada (Justice) v. 
Khadr}2 where the Supreme Court of Canada ruled that Canada violated international 
human rights by interviewing a Canadian citizen detained in Guantanamo Bay. This 
finding was supported by its interpretation of the four Geneva Conventions o f /W ^ 3as 
well as recent U.S. Supreme Court decisions whereby military commissions established 
to try detainees at Guantanamo Bay were expressly held to be inconsistent with 
international human rights.24 The Supreme Court of Canada found that Canadian 
officials’ participation in processes associated with these military commissions violated 
Canada’s international legal obligations, and that this violation in turn activated the extra­
territorial application of s. 7 of the Charter:25
21 R, v. Hape, [2007] 2 S.C.R. 292; Graham Hudson, “Transnational Human Rights Advocacy and the 
Judicial Review o f Global Intelligence Agency Cooperation in Canada”, in, Terrorism, Law and 
Democracy: 10 Years After 9/11 (Canadian Institute for the Administration of Justice, 2012).
22 [2008] 2 S.C.R. 125
23 Geneva Convention fo r  the Amelioration o f  the Condition o f  the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in 
the Field, 75 U.N.T.S. 31, Can. T.S. 1965 No. 20, p. 25; Geneva Convention fo r  the Amelioration o f  the 
Condition o f  Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members ojArm edForces a t Sea, 75 U.N.T.S. 85, Can. T.S. 
1965 No. 20, p. 55; Geneva Convention Re la  live to the Protection o f  Civilian Persons in Time o f  War, 75 
U.N.T.S. 287, Can. T.S. 1965 No. 20, p. 163; Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment o f  Prisoners o f  
War, 75 U.N.T.S. 135, Can. T.S. 1965 No. 20, p. 84.
24 Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749 (2006); Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004).
25 Khadr, supra note 22 at paras. 19,27.
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Third, the relevant and persuasive doctrine is designed to operate in conjunction 
with similar doctrines and practices in other countries, such that domestic and 
international courts and administrative tribunals can collaboratively cultivate a “pan­
constitutional law of human rights”.26 Globalized social, political and economic 
interactions raise serious regulatory challenges in such areas as anti-terrorism,27 
transnational corporate activity,28 and environmental protection.29 Even if Canadian 
courts do their part by placing Canadian law in its global context, there may be serious 
jurisdictional gaps that arise when state and non-state actors interact in transnational 
spaces. The effective regulation of transnational activities requires, among other things, 
the collaborative efforts of legal institutions from multiple jurisdictions.30
26 Craig Scott & Phillip Alston, “Adjudicating Constitutional Priorities in a Transnational Context: A 
Comment on Soobramoney’s Legacy and Grootboom Promise” (2000) 16 South African Journal o f 
Human Rights 206 at 213.
27 Hudson, supra note 21; Kent Roach, The 9/11 Effect: Comparative Counter-Terrorism (Cambridge 
University Press, 2011); Richard J. Aldrich, '"Global Intelligence Co-operation versus Accountability: New 
Facets to an Old Problem." (2009) 24:1 Intelligence and National Security 26; Stephane Lefebvre, “The 
Difficulties and Dilemmas o f International Intelligence Cooperation” (2003) 16:4 International Journal of 
Intelligence and Counterintelligence 527
28 David Kinley, Civilizing Globalization: Human Rights and the Global Economy, (Cambridge and New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 2009); John Ruggie, Embedding Global Markets: An Enduring 
Challenge, (Aldershot, Burlington: Ashgate, 2008); Harry Arthurs, “Corporate Self-Regulation: Political 
Economy, State Regulation and Reflexive Labour Law” in Brian Bercusson & Cynthia Estlund, eds., 
Regulating Labour in the Wake o f  Globalisation—New Challenges, New Institutions (Hart Publishing,
2008) 19; John Ruggie, “Business and Human Rights: Mapping International Standards o f  Responsibility 
and Accountability for Corporate Acts” U.N. Doc. A/HRC/4/35(19 February 2007); Peer Zumbansen, 
“Transnational Law” in Encyclopedia o f  Comparative Law, J. Smits Ed., (Edward Eiger Publishing, 2006) 
738 at 740-743.
29 Climate Change Liability: Transnational Law and Practice, Jutta Brunnee et a!., eds.,(Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2012); Jutta Brunnee, “From Bali to Copenhagen: Towards a Shared Vision 
for a Post-2012 Climate Regime?" (2010) 25 Maryland Journal o f  International Law 86.
30 Some advocate breaking faith with state-centric conceptions o f law and the embrace o f law that is 
coupled with poly-centric, non-state social, economic, and cultural structures; see, Graff Peter Callies & 
Peer Zumbansen, Rough Consensus and Running Code: A Theory o f  Transnational Private Law, (Hart, 
2010); Hans-Joachim Mertens, “Lex Mercatoria: A Self-Applying System Beyond National Law?’, in 
Global Law Without the State, Gunther Teubner, ed., (Dartmouth: 1997) 31; Gunther Teubner, “‘Global 
Bukovina’: Legal Pluralism in the World Society”, in Global Law Without the State, Gunther Teubner, ed., 
(Dartmouth: 1997) 3; Gunther Teubner, “Breaking Frames: The Global Interplay of Legal and Social 
Systems”, (1997) 45:1 American Journal o f Comparative Law 145. Others insist on maintaining and even 
strengthening the control o f centralized state institutions; see Capps, supra note 10 at 227-228.
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We may conclude that the relevant and persuasive doctrine is primarily concerned 
with engendering congruence between state law and background social values, beliefs, 
and practices that have strong global and multicultural dimensions.31 It reflects the view 
that state law is, or should be, produced, interpreted, and applied by both state and non­
state actors who interact in relative autonomy from political and ideological power. 
Canadian courts are just one of these fora, but they remain an institution distinctively 
well-suited to securing the recognition of rights and the protection of high priority values 
when groups have been excluded from state political processes.32
With these basic normative goals in mind, we can now reflect on what conception 
of compliance is most appropriate for the relevant and persuasive doctrine. As discussed, 
traditionalists believe that compliance arises when the content of domestic legal rules 
conforms to the content of international legal rules. On this view, judges are expected to 
neutrally identify, interpret, and apply the rules produced by parliament (statutes) and the 
federal executive (international treaties) and strive to harmonize the two, subject to 
parliament’s authority to legislate contrary to international law, if it so desires.33 
Compliance therefore speaks at once to Canadian legal and political institutions’ 
conformity to our international legal obligations, and, to judges’ conformity to 
constitutional rules that limit their authority to alter domestic rights and obligations.
Such a conception of compliance cannot be harmonized with the purposes and 
functions of the relevant and persuasive doctrine or with the nature of human rights.
31 Brunnee & Toope, supra note 2 at 49; Gerald J. Postema, “Implicit Law” (1994) 13 Law and Philosophy 
361; Friedrich V. Kratochwil, Rules, Norms, and Decisions: On the Conditions o f  Practical and Legal 
Reasoning in International Relations and Domestic Affairs, (Cambridge University Press, 1989).
32 Ely, supra note 16; Dworkin, supra note 16; Bickel, supra note 16.
33 For a similar view in the American context, see Robert Bork, Coercing Virtue: The Worldwide Rule o f  
Judges, (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute Press, 2003).
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Binding international human rights documents and the Charter axe highly abstract and do 
not convey precise rules that may be mechanically identified and neutrally applied by 
domestic courts. As a result, various formal and informal interpretive communities 
participate in the specification and concretization of both domestic and international 
human rights. Further, human rights are supposed to enhance the congruence of law with 
background social values, beliefs, and practices. Charter enthusiasts argue that it, along 
with the Canadian constitution in general, is a “living tree”34 that grows in response to 
shifting normative environments, principally by facilitating and constraining discursive 
interactions among state and non-state communities about the just distribution of value, a 
practice that arguably is a part of the theory and practice of the .common law.35 The same 
is true of international human rights. Excessive reliance on the exclusivity of positive law 
and a suspicion of non-state normative frameworks is anathema to human rights and, 
indeed, to sober appraisals of state law’s inherent functional and normative limitations.
Finally, even if human rights documents presented judges with a robust body of 
legal rules, there are few coercive mechanisms of enforcement that could be applied to 
domestic courts. We clearly lack international institutions of coercive enforcement, while 
the law of reception, as a common law doctrine, has to be self-enforced. As we learned in 
the last chapter, judges have not been consistent in their interpretation and application of 
criteria about whether, how, and why international law may be used. It is hard to imagine
34 Edwards v. Canada (Attorney General), [1930] A.C. 124 (P.C.) at 136; Reference re Same-Sex 
Marriage, 2004 SCC 79, [2004] 3 S.C.R. 698 at para. 22.
35 Kent Roach, The Supreme Court on Trial: Judicial Activism or Democratic Dialogue (Irwin Law, Inc., 
2001) at 12, 253-288. O f course, many would object to this romantic narrative, arguing that judges’ use 
their constitutional and common law power to rationalize relations o f domination; see, David Kairys, “ Law 
and Politics” (1984) 52 George Washington Law Review 243; Allan Hutchinson & Patrick J. Monahan, “ 
Law, Politics, and the Critical Legal Scholars; The Unfolding Drama of American Legal Thought” (1984)
36 Stanford Law Review 199; Roberto Mangabeira Unger, The Critical Legal Studies Movement, (Harvard 
University Press, 1983); Duncan Kennedy, “Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication," (1976) 89 
Harvard Law Review 1685.
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how greater uniformity can be achieved absent a surprising and fundamental change in 
judicial conventions.
An alternative conception of compliance is clearly needed. Such a conception 
should have the following features. First, it should explain the wisdom behind reducing, 
if not altogether disregarding, hierarchical distinctions between binding/non-binding 
international human rights as well as between international/comparative human rights. 
Again, this is because all classes of human rights perform the same essential function and 
because the relevant and persuasive doctrine is designed to, inter alia, protect and 
promote values of human dignity. It does not matter what is the pedigree of a legal rule or 
principle, so long as decisions enhance rights-holders’ wellbeing.
Second, it should explain how the relevant and persuasive doctrine facilitates 
interactions among multiple discursive communities and how this enhances the protection 
and promotion of human rights. This is important partly because authoritative interpretive 
communities are a necessary part of the international human rights enterprise and so 
should be included in efforts to give treaty or customary norms meaning and practical 
effect. But it is also important because human rights are designed to foster 
communicative interactions between rights-holders and duty-bearers, in many instances 
forcing the latter to bear witness to the suffering they cause or fail to end.36 In the context 
of constitutional adjudication, interactions of this sort can cultivate congruence between 
state law and background social values, beliefs, and expectations. At the very least, it 
contributes to gradual recognition of the problems raised by state (in)activity and can 
bolster pressure for change.
36 For an interesting stance on human rights’ discursive functions, see, Gunther Teubner, “The Anonymous 
Matrix: Human Rights Violations by ‘Private’ Transnational Actors” (2006) 69 Modem Law Review 327.
Third, an alternative conception of compliance should help us better understand 
the juristic bases of the relevant and persuasive doctrine. Ironically, moving away from a 
rule-based approach can help us respond to concern about instrumentalism. If the relevant 
and persuasive doctrine is concerned with promoting structured discourses about the 
distribution of high priority values and interests, and not with transplanting international 
legal rules into domestic law, it may be viewed as similar in kind to contextual 
approaches to statutory interpretation. The values and interests associated with 
international, domestic, and foreign human rights are used simply to help judges frame 
the nature and context of a legal problem and to identify and appraise the values that 
should inform solutions. Given the vague and aspirational language used in Charter 
provisions, the widely recognized legitimacy of contextual approaches to statutory 
interpretation, and the long-standing maxim that any constitutional provision ought to be 
interpreted in light of shifting social values and contexts, the judicial consideration of 
extra-constitutional materials as heuristic devices is neither avoidable nor should it be 
particularly controversial.
C. Toward a New Understanding of Compliance: Transnational Legal
Process
Harold Koh is one of the most well known advocates of process-based 
conceptions of law and compliance. His theory of TLP has roots in international and 
domestic legal scholarship that utilizes social science methods to study and advocate for 
human rights.37Koh and other scholars38 offer a set of analytical frameworks,
37 Harold Hongju Koh, “Why Do Nations Obey International Law?”, (1997) 106 Yale Law J 2599.
38 Koh identifies “two schools of legal process theory” that merit special attention; Koh, “Why Do Nations 
Obey International Law?”, supra note 38 at 2618. The first is “international legal process”, which 
originated with the works of Abram Chayes, Thomas Ehrlich, and Andreas F. Lowenfeld; see, Abram
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methodologies, and recommended juristic tasks that can help us make sense of law’s 
intersections with various normative orders. They assert that TLP provides “the key” to 
compliance by outlining the processes by which states are socialized into observing their 
international human rights obligations.39 In the right hands, this knowledge can be used to 
improve the effectiveness of “transnational human rights advocacy”.40
Given that one of the most significant criticisms of the relevant and persuasive 
doctrine is that it leads to capricious decision-making, TLP can be useful in 
demonstrating that there is order to the processes by which international and comparative 
human rights influence domestic law and life. This section will survey the means by 
which this order may be glimpsed and the extent to which TLP advances the challenging 
objective of discerning institutional, in contrast to material or instrumental, constraints on 
judicial discretion. We are, after all, looking for order of a specific kind i.e. a doctrinal 
order distinctively well suited to the protection and promotion of human rights.
C. I. What is Transnational Legal Process?
TLP may be defined as the process by which state and non-state actors “interact in 
a variety of public and private, domestic and international fora to make, interpret,
Chayes, Thomas Ehrlich, & Andreas F. Lowenfeld, International Legal Process: Materials fo r  an 
Introductory Course, Vol. I  & II, (Boston: Little Brown, 1968). The second was the “New Haven School” 
on international law, which was founded by Myres S. McDougal and Harold D. Lasswell (and, later, W. 
Michael Reisman); see Michael Reisman, Siegfried Wiessner & Andrew R. Willard, “The New Haven 
School: A Brief Introduction” (2007) 32:2 Yale Journal o f International Law 575; Myres S. McDougal, 
Harold D. Lasswell & W. Michael Reisman, “World Constitutive Process Authoritative Decision” (1967) 
19:3 Journal of Legal Education 253; Harold D. Lasswell & Myres S. McDougal, “Legal Education and 
Public Policy” (1943) 52:2 Yale Law Journal 203
39 Koh, “Transnational Legal Process”, supra note 3 at 183; Goodman & Jinks, supra note 3.
40I borrow the term “transnational human rights advocacy” from Hans Peter Schmitz; see Hans Peter 
Schmitz, “Transnational Human Rights Networks: Significance and Challenges” (2010) 11 The 
International Studies Encyclopedia 7189.
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enforce, and ultimately, internalize” international norms.41 Functionally, TLP may be 
divided into the following three stages: interaction; interpretation; and internalization 42 
During the interaction stage, state and non-state actors from different jurisdictions engage 
in argumentative interactions about how best to resolve commonly experienced problems. 
These interactions may occur in any number of fora, some of which are exclusive to state 
officials. Examples of relatively exclusive fora include cabinet committees, parliament, 
and some international and regional organizations. Other fora are more inclusive, such as 
human rights tribunals, educational institutions, civil society, some courts, some 
parliamentary committees, and international and regional human rights monitoring 
bodies.
Interactions are structured by a host of dialectical rules governing such matters as: 
who may participate, who is authorized to decide an issue and on what basis, when 
arguments may be made and with what normative and empirical support, whether and 
how participants may employ social, economic, and political power to influence 
interactions to their advantage, and whether interactions will include interested but non­
participating individuals and groups. The form, functions, and results of TLP will 
accordingly vary with the institutional contexts within which arguments take place. 
Arguments in the context of litigation, for instance, will be highly formal, adversarial, 
structured by pre-existing rules of general application, presided over by a judge, and 
typically reproduced in public reports. Depending on the facts and issues of the case, 
proceedings may be open to the public as well as amicus curae. Arbitration, by contrast, 
is typically more informal, presided over by experts on the social or economic issues at
41 Koh, “Transnational Legal Process”, supra note 3 atl 84.
42 Harold Hongju Koh, “Bringing International Law Home” (1998) 35 Houston Law Review 623 at 626
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hand, concerned more with evolving customs and informal normative frameworks than 
state law, and governed by different rules of standing, precedent, and evidence (if there 
are any rules of evidence).43 Standing is particularly important from the perspective of 
inclusiveness, as non-state actors lack full international legal personality and would have 
to pursue claims in the national courts of defendant states to secure justice. Relative gains 
in accessibility are somewhat offset by the fact that arbitration is considerably less 
transparent to, and inclusive of, non-parties than curial adjudication. 44 Finally, 
international disputes may be approached by way of negotiation or mediation.
Interactions of this sort are typically structured by ad hoc rules that may tend more 
towards compromise and the identification of common values and interests than securing 
compliance with formal law.45 States are under a general obligation to conduct 
negotiations in good faith, and certain treaties may require the use of mediation.46 
However, negotiation and mediation can be quite ineffective at constraining struggles for
47power.
All interactions, arguably excepting negotiation and mediation, are oriented 
towards the interpretation of substantive legal rules in relation to the background goals, 
expectations, interests, and understandings held by participants to legal processes. 
Participants will use a wide range of rhetorical techniques to recommend or discredit
43 Susan D. Franck, “The Legitimacy Crisis in Investment Treaty Arbitration: Privatizing Public 
International Law Through Inconsistent Decisions”(2005) 73 Fordham Law Review 1521.
44 Arbitration is typical highly confidential and resolutions are typically not publicized; see, Olivier Oakley- 
White, “Confidentiality Revisited: Is International Arbitration Losing One of Its Major Benefits?” (2003) 6 
International Arbitration Law Review 29.
45 Nadja Alexander, International Comparative Mediation: Legal Perspectives, (New York: Kluwer Law,
2009); Peter Malanczuk, Akehurst's Modern Introduction to International Law, 7'h edition, (New York:
Routledge, 1997) at 275-277.
46 North Sea Continental Shelf Cases (Federal Republic o f  Germany v. Denmark; Federal Republic o f  
Germany v. Netherlands), International Court o f Justice (ICJ), 20 February 1969
47MaIanczuk, supra note 45 at 277.
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proposed solutions to a problem. These techniques may be both normative and oratorical 
in nature. In law and other social contexts involving disputes about facts and values, 
persuasive arguments require far more than the simple logical deduction of valid or 
justified conclusions from stipulated premises.48 One must carefully select, interpret, 
arrange, and present premises with a targeted audience’s subjective values, attitudes and 
beliefs in mind49 This involves creativity in the interpretation of pre-existing legal rules, 
the construction of narratives through the careful selection and description of facts, and 
the strategic use of procedural rules germane to a given institutional setting. Reliance on 
non-rational tools, such as emotions, oration, and aesthetics is also important.50 
Participants may also enhance the rhetorical appeal of their position by mobilizing 
outside social and political pressure for a desired outcome. Overall, persuasive arguments 
should possess internal, logical soundness (i.e. reasoning that is valid or justified) and an 
external or empirical component, whereby one interprets, arranges, and presents 
arguments in consideration of what is most likely to be accepted by an audience.
Participants in TLP include “norm entrepreneurs”,51 governmental norm sponsors, 
and various interpretive communities. Norm entrepreneurs are non-governmental actors 
who mobilize domestic and global political support for particular standards of 
appropriateness, participate in the establishment of issue-specific institutions, proliferate
48 Although this seems obvious, classical argumentation theory eschewed consideration of factors external 
to formal logic in an effort to maintain scientific objectivity. This changed with Chaim Perelman’s revival 
o f Greco-Latin philosophies o f rhetoric in the 1950’s and 1960’s; see, Chaim Perelman & L. Olbrechts- 
Tyteca The New Rhetoric: A Treatise on Argumentation (University o f Notre Dame Press, 1969). See also, 
Stephen Toulmin, The Uses o f  Argument (Cambridge University Press, 1958).
49 Perelman, supra note 48 at 23-26; Douglas N. Walton, Informal Logic: A Handbook fo r  Critical 
Argumentation (Cambridge University Press, 1989) at 5-6.
50 Aaron Ben-Ze’ev, “Emotions and Argumentation” (1995) 17:2 Informal Logic 189; Michael A. Gilbert, 
“Multi-Modal Argumentation” (1994) 24:2 Philosophy of the Social Sciences 159; Douglas Walton, The 
Place o f  Emotion in Argument, (Pennsylvania University Press, 1992).
51 Finnemore & Sikkink, supra note 3; Cass Sunstein, Social Norms and Social Roles ( 1996) 96 Columbia 
Law Review 903 at 929.
base values beyond national boundaries so that standards o f appropriateness become 
shared by a wide array of actors and institutions, and use a host of social, political, and 
legal techniques to persuade recalcitrant states to adopt these standards.52 Governmental 
norm sponsors serve as gatekeepers of channels of authoritative decision-making, and 
help to transform background norms, values, and expectations generated by norm 
entrepreneurs into state law. They include courts, administrative tribunals, parliamentary 
committees, and various executive agencies. Interpretive communities assist in processes 
of norm-production, interpretation, and diffusion, in some cases serving to connect norm 
entrepreneurs and governmental sponsors by hosting interactions between the two. 
International human rights treaty bodies, for example, receive submissions from both 
governments and NGOs when reviewing levels of compliance, structuring the public 
exchange of information, ideas, and expectations about the human rights dimensions of 
specific laws and policies.53 When engaged in repeatedly, these sorts of interactions 
produce bodies of social science data and issue-specific law that offer guidance to 
decision-makers facing novel and complex legal problems.
The activities of these actors may be usefully sub-divided into the following four 
functions:
1) Intelligence: The acquisition, processing, and distribution of information, 
including social science data and case law. This information helps form the body of 
recognized law and facts upon which decisions are made.
2) Promotion: The generation of general awareness of a given issue or problem. 
This typically occurs prior to or in concert with the invocation stage, whereby
52 Ethan A. Nadelmann, “Global Prohibition Regimes: The Evolution o f Norms in International Society”, 
(1990) 44 International Organization 479 at 482; Christine Ingebritsen “Norm Entrepreneurs: Scandinavia’s 
Role in World Politics” (2002) 37 Conflict and Cooperation 11.
53 Jack Donnelly, “International Human Rights: A Regime Analysis” (1986) 40:3 International 
Organization 599.
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participants attempt to mobilize broad-based social, political, and economic support for a 
given perspective.
3) Prescription: The promulgation of general norms. Domestically, this occurs 
through legislative and constitutional provisions as well as judicial decisions. 
Internationally, prescriptions flow from such sources as treaties, customary law, and 
judicial decisions. Prescription also describes the crystallization of informal norms by 
interpretive communities, such as international treaty bodies. Cumulatively, these norms 
may be used to promote a range of possible, alternative decisions.
4) Invocation: Preliminary appeals to prescribed norms in order to influence 
decisions about how to resolve a problem. Participants here use various rhetorical 
techniques to persuade others to endorse a favoured norm or position.54
The third and final stage of TLP is that of norm-intemalization. Norm- 
intemalization describes the transformation of a legal rule from an inert logical 
proposition that wafts down from higher authorities and is promoted or invoked by norm- 
entrepreneurs, to something that forms part of participants’ internal value sets. It is 
important to distinguish norms from rules.55 Norms may be, and often are, expressed in 
terms of rules, but they cannot be described without also describing the attitudes that 
their subjects hold towards them. The very existence of a norm depends on the fact that 
people obey or observe them. Rules, by contrast, may be analytically separated from 
social context and viewed simply in terms of their logical or semantic components.
Norm-intemalization describes a transition across three continua.56First, there is a 
shift from external pressure or constraints to internal self-enforcement. Legal subjects' 
behaviour changes independently of even the threat of external enforcement, becoming a 
matter of habit. Second, there is a shift from the instrumental to the normative, whereby
54 McDougal, Lasswell & Reisman outline 7 functional phases o f TLP, but I have selected the four that are 
most directly relevant to the tasks at hand; see, McDougal, Lasswell, & Reisman, supra note 38 at 192; 
Harold D. Lasswell & Myres S. McDougal, “Jurisprudence in Policy-Oriented Perspective” (1966-1967) 
19:3 Florida Law Review 486.
ss For an extended analysis o f rules and norms, see Kratochwil, supra note 15.
56 Koh, supra note 42 at 628-629.
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compliant behaviour arises because a legal subject endorses the reasons for a rule as in 
keeping with her internal value set; compliance does not arise because a legal subject 
wishes to avoid punishment or gain rewards. Finally, there is a shift from the coercive to 
the constitutive, whereby one's engagement with the reasons for a rule transforms her 
"personal identity from lawless to law-abiding".57In many situations, compliant behaviour 
arises unconsciously or reflexively. In sum, norm-intemalization results in legal subjects 
taking the reason for a rule to be consistent with their moral identity, which would, in 
cases of conflict, override whatever alternative, self-interested reasons they may have for 
complying or not complying with the rule. After this initial, conscious act, future 
behaviour gradually becomes habitual, erasing the need to apply external enforcement 
mechanisms.
In the context of the relevant and persuasive doctrine, norm-intemalization would 
occur when a judge makes the high priority values and interests of identified or even 
hypothetical persons a moral reason for interpreting the Charter in a recommended way. 
This is because the reason for any human right would be to ensure that rights-holders' 
high priority values or interests are protected and promoted. So, for example, 
international human rights impose an explicit and absolute prohibition on the deportation 
of non-citizens to face the substantial risk of torture or similar abuse.58 The text of the 
Charter does not explicitly impose such an obligation (although it does protect life, 
liberty, and security of the person, among other rights) while Canadian immigration and 
refugee law has long restricted the protection of this human right to persons who are
57 Ibid. at 629.
58 Convention relating to the Status o f  Refugees, 28 July 1951, 189 U.N.T.S. 150, Can. T.S. 1969/6 (entered 
into force 22 April 1954, accession by Canada 2 September 1969), arts. 1(F), 33; Convention Against 
Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, 10 December 1984, 1465 
U.N.T.S. 85, Can. T.S. 1987 No. 36, arts. 2,3,16; United Nations. Committee against Torture. Conclusions 
and Recommendations of the Committee against Torture: Canada, UN Doc. CAT/C/XXV/Concl.4 (2000) 
at para. 6(a).
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deemed to be threats to national security.59 Norm-intemalization would describe a 
situation where the values underpinning the international human right against torture 
influenced a judge to interpret the Charter in such a way as to prevent the government 
absolutely from deporting persons to face torture.
Ideally, this judgment would motivate immigration officials and other human 
rights duty-bearers to subsequently internalize the human rights norm in question. This is 
to say that norm entrepreneurs are looking for more than superficial recognition of 
international and comparative human rights in formal law. Their priority is to alter the 
very values and beliefs of duty-bearers such that the wellbeing of rights-holders stands as 
a moral and not just a legal reason for altering a harmful policy or practice. Persuading a 
judge to internalize international and comparative human rights is just an initial step in 
the more complete internalization of a variety of norms across a range of social, political, 
and legal institutions.
C. II. Transnational Legal Process and Human Rights Advocacy 
In addition to being an empirical phenomenon, TLP is a theoretical perspective 
that helps jurists predict and explain the conditions under which norm-intemalization is 
most likely to occur. Supplemented with sound oratorical and intellectual skills 
associated with traditional lawyering, human rights advocates can use social-science 
knowledge to identify, alter and harness those factors that structure thinking about certain 
kinds of issues and legal problems. TLP accordingly recommends that lawyers and other 
jurists adopt interdisciplinary, social science-based methodologies when engaging in
59 Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, R.S.C. 2001, c. 27, s. 4 as am. by R.S.C. 2005, c.38, s. 118, 
R.S.C. 2008, c.3, supra note , s. 115; Suresh v. Canada (Minister o f  Citizenship and Immigration), [2002] 1 
S.C.R. 3.
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argumentative discourse. In particular, it recommends the adoption of the following 
approaches:60
1) Goal-orientation: the clarification of one’s base values and of the symbolic 
and/or material results one wishes to get out of a decision.
2) Trend Description: understanding the historical course and general direction of 
current thinking about issues relevant to this goal. This task requires attention to the 
perspectives of state officials (e.g. case law, statutes, parliamentary reports, policy briefs, 
etc.) as well as of non-state actors (e.g. scholarship, community knowledge and 
experiences, etc.). Just as importantly, it requires a good understanding of how the two 
interrelate.
3) Factor Analysis: identifying the background values, interests, ideologies, and 
other forces that have historically structured trends in decision-making about similar 
issues. This orients advocates to the deeper causes or influences that shape general 
attitudes, values, and beliefs, a task facilitated by the use of social science methodologies.
4) Projection of Future Decisions: the use of trend description and factor analysis 
to predict what future decisions about an issue would be if one were to stand aside and do 
nothing to influence decision-makers.
5) The Formulation of Alternatives: the construction of viable alternatives that 
may be simultaneously justified on the basis of pre-existing rules and one’s (and the 
audience’s) normative commitments.
These tasks suggest that (persuasive) arguments have internal/logical and 
external/empirical elements.61 Internally, proposed conclusions will have to be validly or
60 MacDougal & Lasswell, “Jurisprudence in Policy-Oriented Perspective”, supra note 54 at 508-511; 
McDougal, Lasswell & Reisman, supra note 38 at 358-259.
61 Perleman, supra note 48 at 1-10. There are wide and varied ways o f dissecting the various features or 
senses o f  “argument”, which may be generalized into three distinctive, theoretical perspectives: logical 
(formalist), rhetorical (pragmatic, process-based), and dialectical (critical, proceduralist); see, Feteris, supra 
not 2; van Eemeren, Grootendorst, & Henkemans, supra note 2; Joseph W. Wenzel, “Three Perspectives on 
Argumentation” in, Perspectives on Argumentation: Essays in Honour o f  Wayne Brockreide, Robert Trapp 
and Janice Scheutz, eds.,(Prospect Heights: Waveland Press, 1990) 9; Daniel J. O ’Keefe, “The Concepts o f 
Argument and Arguing”, in Advances in Argumentation Theory and Research, J. Robert Cox & Charles A. 
Willard, eds. (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1982) 3; Brant R. Burleson, “The senses o f 
Argument Revisited: Prolegomena to Future Characterizations o f  Argument” in Dimensions o f  Argument: 
Proceedings o f  the Second Summer Conference on Argumentation, George Ziegelmueller & Jack Rhodes, 
eds., (Annandale, Va: Speech Communication Association, 1981) 962; Charles A. Willard, “A 
Reformulation o f the Concept o f an Argument: The Constructivist/Interactionist Foundations of a 
Sociology o f Argument” (1978) 14 Journal o f the American Forensic Association 121; Daniel J. O ’Keefe, 
“Two Concepts o f Argument” (1977) 13 Journal o f the American Forensic Association 121; Wayne 
Brockriede, “Characteristics o f Arguments and Arguing” (1977) 13 Journal o f the American Forensic
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justifiably inferred from recognized facts and values. Sound reasoning in the context of 
adjudication will consist in drawing valid or justified inferences from authoritative laws 
and the recognized facts of a case. Given legal indeterminacy, jurists have the freedom to 
infer a limited set of alternative conclusions out of any given material. The external 
element of persuasion consists in invoking one of these alternatives as the best solution to 
a problem, a task that requires one to appeal to an audience’s values, beliefs, and 
expectations. This is a social process, by which advocates tailor a logical argument to 
resonate with various socio-cultural “fields” that are structured by distinctive criteria of 
rationality, truth, and beauty.62 At the same time, there may be a host of formal and 
informal rules, principles, and standards that structure dialogical interaction, limiting the 
sorts of rhetorical practices that a community deems appropriate.63 A community that 
strongly values mutual respect and decorum, for instance, may not be receptive to 
dramatic rhetorical practices that demean or degrade the integrity of other disputants. 
Together, the processes and procedures of argumentation simultaneously facilitate and 
constrain intersections between legal argumentation and ambient socio-cultural fields, as 
advocates have to tailor their arguments to fit an audience’s subjective values and beliefs 
while complying with formal and/or informal standards of conduct, reasoning, and 
interpretation.
One may adopt a descriptive or a normative perspective on the external elements 
of argumentation. Observations of rhetorical practices and social or communicative 
processes tend to be more descriptive and pragmatic, whereby theorists inquire into the
Association 129; Wayne Brockriede, “Where is Argument?” (1977) 11 Journal o f the American Forensic 
Association 179.
52 Toulmin, supra note 48 at 212.
63 Willard, supra note 61; Wenzel, supra note 61.
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means by which disputants secure adherence to their position in various social 
situations.64 This is not to say that rules structuring interaction are irrelevant, but they 
should be of concern to observers of argumentation only to the extent that they are 
actually observed in practice. Focus on dialogical rules, principles and standards as free­
standing objects of inquiry tend to be more normative and critical in orientation, 
facilitating the rational appraisal of arguments (e.g. logical reasoning, inter-personal 
conduct) against conventional or idealized standards of public reason, appropriateness, 
and interpretation.65 A dialogical approach to argument produces:
an abstract, normative model which should present a relatively simple but precise set of 
rules and procedures representing how reasoned dialogue ought to be. This abstract 
conception o f dialogue is, o f necessity, an idealization, but one that should be capable of 
being used to model a given, particular text o f discourse, and thereby aid in arriving at a n ' 
analysis o f whether the particular argument can be reasonably judged to be open to 
criticism.66
TLP is more descriptive than normative at this point, since it does not detail in 
any sustained way what or how dialogical rules, principles, and standards constrain the 
projection of political or ideological power. It produces analytical frameworks for the 
observation of legal interaction, and strongly implies a normative, critical orientation, but 
it does not make good on this ambition by offering precise rules and procedures 
specifying how reasoned dialogue ought to be conducted. Still, a descriptive focus helps 
us focus on the sources of international and comparative law’s persuasive influence, 
which include: the values and beliefs held by the target audience, orators’ use of literary
64 Willard, supra note 61 at 133, 137.
65 Frans H. Eemeren & Peter Houtlosser, “Strategic Maneuvering: A Synthetic Recapitulation” (2006) 20 
Argumentation 381; Advances in Pragma-Dialecticx, Franz H. van Eemeren, Ed., (Amsterdam: Vale Press, 
2002); Douglas N. Walton, “Dialogue Theory for Critical Thinking” (1989) 3 Argumentation 169; Franz H. 
Eemeren & Rob Grootendorst, Speech Acts in Argumentative Discussions: A Theoretical Model for the 
Analysis o f Discussions Directed Towards Solving Conflicts o f Opinion, (Dordrecht: Floris Publications, 
1984).
66 Walton, supra note 65 at 170.
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tropes (i.e. “/opof') to rework familiar stories and commonly accepted propositions in 
such a way as to lower an audience’s resistance to contested concepts and claims, and 
methods of presentation (e.g. stylistic and oratorical devices).67
While downplaying the latter, TLP deals more extensively with the concept of 
topoi. Persuasive legal arguments involve more than the simple presentation of facts and 
law in logical order. Advocacy requires careful thought about what sort of narrative to 
construct about the actors, issues, and events at play, what facts to highlight and which to 
obscure, what legal principles to use, and how these principles should be interpreted and 
presented. This requires knowledge of trends in thinking about an issue, what is common 
knowledge about that issue within a given community, which propositions are generally 
accepted and which are disputed, and what methods of presentation have tended to be 
effective in the past. Applied knowledge of this sort will allow orators gradually to build 
up an audience’s willingness to accept conclusions that may otherwise be resisted. Trend 
and factor analysis accordingly help jurists identify, appraise, and then use topoi to 
cumulatively generate a willingness among audience members to make inferential leaps 
from accepted legal and factual premises to the speaker’s recommended conclusion. Far 
from simply generating intellectual agreement, strategic use of these rhetorical techniques 
can facilitate norm-intemalization, as members of an audience see how a proposed 
prescription resonates with their own internal value sets.
67 Topoi are especially important here, serving as rhetorical bridges from the familiar to the contested. I will 
build upon this concept below. See also: Perelman, supra note 48 at 83; Kratochwil, supra note 15; F. 
Kaufield, “ Pivotal issues and norms in rhetorical theories o f argumentation” in Dialectic and Rhetoric: The 
Warp and Woof o f  Argumentation Analysis, Frans H. van Eemeren & Peter Houtlosser, eds. ( Kluwer 




Effective engagement with TLP requires jurists to be clear about what it is they 
want to get out of a legal decision, to understand the general course or direction of 
thinking about issues relevant to this goal (among both state and non-state actors), to 
understand in detail the social, political, economic, and ideological factors that have 
historically influenced decision-making in this issue-area, to estimate how likely a 
favorable decision would be were one to do nothing to alter the course of these trends, 
and to decide what normative, material, and rhetorical resources can best help actualize 
one’s goal.
TLP is clearly relevant to questions of compliance since it may be directed 
towards facilitating judges’ internalization of human rights norms, absent the use of 
external enforcement mechanisms (if and when they exist). It is normatively compelling 
because it recommends the construction of inclusive interactions among rights-holders 
and duty-bearers towards the end of protecting and promoting human rights. This 
obviously resonates with conceptions of human rights as discursive mechanisms that give 
agency to individuals and groups who have been excluded from channels of authoritative 
decision-making. As an empiricist theoretical perspective, TLP is descriptively apt and 
strategically useful. A legal argument’s persuasiveness depends in large part on its 
intersections with various socio-cultural fields, so reliance on doctrine, precedent and 
other formal legal arguments is insufficient for understanding whether, how and why 
arguments based on international and comparative human rights have been persuasive. 
Attention must also be paid to the social processes through which disputants use values, 
topoi, and other rhetorical strategies to persuade judges (and others) to adhere to their
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recommended solution to a legal problem i.e. to internalize an international and/or 
comparative human rights norm. The analytical frameworks and recommended juristic 
tasks associated with TLP are designed to produce knowledge of the factors and 
conditions conducive to norm-intemalization. If adroitly used, these tools can improve 
the effectiveness of transnational human rights advocacy.
Yet TLP in some ways overshoots the mark. Its focus on the influence of dynamic 
and interlocking social processes on the production of law leaves us with the question of 
what, if anything, constrains the distorting effects of political and ideological power. The 
rhetorical practices and social processes that TLP describes are not intrinsically oriented 
towards the protection and promotion of human dignity.68 Disputants are likely to be 
primarily concerned with winning, and will use whatever material and rhetorical 
resources they have at their disposal to weaken or discredit their opponent’s position.
This kind of argumentative free-for-all is hardly conducive to critical and reasoned 
engagement with the merits of an argument. Indeed, unconstrained struggles for power 
will in most cases work to the disadvantage of human rights advocates, who typically 
contest the privilege of dominant members of society.
Working against transnational human rights advocates will also be a range of 
“epistemic communities” or “network(s) of professionals with recognized expertise and 
competence in a particular domain and an authoritative claim to policy-relevant 
knowledge within that domain or issue-area”.69 These professionals will be members of 
powerful communities that possess or claim expertise over a complex issue-area and have
68 Some even question the link between human rights and human dignity; see, David Kennedy, “The 
International Human Rights Movement: Part o f the Problem?” (2001) 15 Harvard Human Rights Journal 
99.
69 Peter M. Haas, “Regimes and Epistemic Communities”, (1989) 44 International Organization 377, at 
386.
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direct links to policy-makers. The security intelligence community, for example, 
acquires, condenses, and translates high volumes of technical information into 
manageable form relevant to the making of policy-choices. Experts within this 
community have acquired significant influence over centralized political bodies, as high- 
ranking decision-makers rely on their interpretations of (what is) relevant information, 
what policy-objectives are feasible, and how to achieve these objectives.70 Unless legal 
interaction is carefully designed to require adherence to certain principles of reason, 
fairness and inclusiveness, TLP can very quickly degenerate into lop-sided struggles for 
political power that are highly unlikely to result in norm-intemalization.
D. Power, Persuasion, and the Spectre of Compliance: An Interactional
Theory of Law
A common way out of this problem is to outline a set of procedural rules, 
principles, and standards that help guarantee the resolution of disagreements on their 
merits.71 Moving beyond both formal logic and rhetoric, some theorists view 
argumentation as a dialogical practice that develops according to its own, internal logic 
and which is, as a discursive enterprise, oriented towards the generation of 
understanding.72 As an empirical matter, arguments will usually consist in “strategic 
maneuvering”,73whereby interlocutors employ an assortment of rhetorical techniques to 
enhance their competitive advantage. However, the distorting influence of these
70 Hudson, supra note 21.1 will examine these issues in great detail in Chapter 4.
71 Advances in Pragma-Dia/edics, supra  note 8; Speech Acts in Argumentative Discussions, supra note 8; 
Frans H. van Eemeren & Peter Houtlosser, “Strategic Maneuvering: A Synthetic Recapitulation” (2006) 20 
Argumentation 381.
72 Brant B. Burleson & Susan L. Kline, “Habermas’ Theory o f Communication: A Critical Explication”, 
(1979) 65 The Quarterly Journal o f Speech 412 at 421.
77 van Eemeren & Houtlosser, “Strategic Maneuvering”, supra note 71. Van Eemeren and Houtlosser argue 
that rhetorical and dialogical conceptions o f argumentation are mutually reinforcing rather than 
antagonistic. For a related view, see David Zarefsky, “Strategic Maneuvering through Persuasive 
Definitions: Implications for Dialectic and Rhetoric” (2006) 20 Argumentation 399.
119
techniques can be constrained by formal and informal standards of appropriate conduct, 
etiquette, and reasoning that make communication possible. If an audience takes 
compliance with these standards to be of fundamental importance, disputants’ non- 
compliance can undermine a position that is otherwise logically sound and appealing to 
audience members’ subjective values and beliefs. These points suggest that the 
persuasiveness of an argument depends, not simply on its logical strength and its 
coherence with subjective values and beliefs, but also on inter-subjective rules, principles 
and standards of communication that inhere within particular, discursive communities.
This sort of perspective obviously has immediate appeal to one interested in how 
juristic engagement with international and comparative human rights helps structure 
meaningful interactions among various discursive communities. Indeed, Stephen Toope 
and Jutta Brunnee apply this sort of perspective to the process by which multiple 
discursive communities collaboratively construct, interpret and apply international legal 
obligations. Toope and Brunnee’s primary hypothesis is that international legal 
interaction is distinct from politics as well as all other forms of social normativity by 
virtue of procedural and substantive norms that are internal to law and that make the 
imposition and non-coerced observance of legal obligation possible.74 These norms 
distinguish law from other discursive practices by helping to constrain state and other 
politically powerful actors’ capacity to unilaterally impose obligations upon legal 
subjects.
Toope and Brunnee also adopt a distinctive methodology that eschews positivist 
conceptions of law, expressly distinguishing between formal or positive law and
74 Brunnee & Toope, supra note 2.
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“legitimate” law.75 The former consists in state-produced rules, principles, and standards 
that may be analyzed independently of their intersections with various socio-cultural 
fields.76 An oft-recognized consequence of positivist methodologies is that law’s 
influence on behaviour tends to be presumed, ignored, or correlated with coercion, a 
standpoint from which law as well as non-state normative orders are rendered 
“epiphenomenal”.77 Toope and Brunnee counter that “law’s existence is best measured by 
the influence it exerts”, and that this influence is to be found in intersections between 
state law and non-state normative orders at various stages of legal process, including 
norm-production, -interpretation, and -application.78 More precisely, law’s influence has 
to be distinguished from state-led coercion as well as political and ideological domination 
intrinsic to “culturally specific” forms of social normativity.79
Before delving more deeply into the strengths and limitations of their theory, and 
its applicability to the Canadian law of reception, we should note that Toope and Brunnee
75 Ibid. at 51-52, 70; Jutta Brunnee & Stephen J. Toope, Legitimacy a n d  Legality in International Law: An  
Interactional Account (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010). Toope and Brunnee do 
not fully define the term “legitimacy”, other than to say it is the product o f processes by which legal 
authors and legal subjects participate in the mutual construction o f legal rules, principles, and standards. 
Legitimacy further describes the non-coercive, moral influence legal norms have over behaviour, which is 
manifested through norm-intemalization or the congruence o f a legal rule, principle, or standard and legal 
subjects; internal value sets. For critical views on the concept o f legitimacy and its use in legal theory and 
practice, see Dennis R. Fox, “A Critical-Psychology Approach to Law’s Legitimacy” (2001) 25 Legal 
Studies Forum 519; Craig Haney, “The Fourteenth Amendment and Symbolic Legality: Let Them Eat Due 
Process” (1991) 15 Law and Human Behavior 183.
76 H.L.A. Hart, The Concept o f  Law (Claerendon Press, 1980) at 104.
77 For an overview o f how this perspective has affected the study of international law, see: Anne-Marie 
Slaughter, “International Law and International Relations Theory: A Dual Agenda” (1993) 87 The 
American Journal o f  International Law 205; Robert O. Keohane, “International Institutions: Two 
Approaches” (1988) 32 International Studies Quarterly 379; International Regimes, Stephen D. Krasner, 
ed., (Ithaca : Cornell University Press, 1983); Kenneth Neal Waltz, Theory o f  International Politics (New 
York: McGraw-Hill, 1979); Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle fo r  Power and  
Peace, 4,h edition, (New York: Knopf, 1967); Hans J. Morgenthau, “Positivism, Functionalism, and 
International Law” (1940) 34 The American Journal o f International Law 260.
78 Brunnee & Toope, supra note 2 at 65.
79 Ibid. at 69. The clear and highly contestable implication here is that law is not a culturally specific form 
o f social normativity or, at least, that is not as amenable to the distorting influences o f  political and 
ideological power. 1 will criticize Toope and Brunnee on this point below. In the meantime, I will 
concentrate on describing their position on this issue.
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share several affinities with Koh and other process-oriented scholars. For instance, they 
share Koh’s belief that legal norms “typically emerge from the interaction of participants 
(subjects), and an increasingly fixed pattern of expectations about appropriate behavior”, 
suggesting that there is an underlying, systematic nature or recurring pattern to law’s 
intersections with ambient social values, norms, and processes.80 They also share an 
attraction to the normative ambitions and some of the methods associated with 
sociological legal realism, insisting that jurists should use knowledge of how social 
processes contribute to norm-production in order to pursue social justice objectives.81 
Despite these affinities, Toope and Brunnee explicitly distinguish their theory from TLP 
in two important respects. First, they spend more time outlining the conceptual and 
functional differences between “material capabilities and interests, and normativity”.82 
Toope and Brunnee accept that legal norm-production is sensitive to the vicissitudes of 
politics. However, they argue that law operates according to a distinctive internal logic 
and set of principles that impede the capacity of participants to dominate, intimidate, or 
otherwise coerce others into altering their behavior. Second, they provide a far more 
nuanced account of the “constraining and facilitating (formal and informal) institutions of 
legal interpretation” that insulate participants to legal interaction from coercion.83 As 
mentioned, this is because Koh focuses more on the rhetorical dimensions of legal 
argumentation, while Toope and Brunnee focus on its dialogical dimensions.
With these caveats, Toope and Brunnee proceed to argue that the source of law’s 
persuasive influence is to be found in the procedures by which legal authors address legal
80 Ibid. at 24.
81 Ibid. at 67-68.
82 Ibid. at 25.
83 Ibid. at 25.
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subjects with the reasons for a specific rule. These reasons, in turn, are to be correlated 
with enduring legal values and principles, entities which remain relatively stable even 
while discrete rules are produced, amended, and extinguished. Rule-production is to be 
considered a rhetorical activity in which legal authors try to demonstrate a “fit” or 
congruence between the more abstract, enduring reasons for imposing legal obligations 
on the one hand, and on the other legal subjects’ deeply held values and beliefs. These 
latter values and beliefs, in turn, have their provenance in the various socio-cultural 
communities to which disputants belong. The production of discrete legal rules is 
therefore very much a social process that responds to law’s prior, manifold intersections 
with other forms of social normativity; legal rules should flow from legal principles that 
are congruent with, or at least analogous to, principles that are also found within other 
normative orders.
Toope and Brunnee distinguish themselves from TLP, however, by moving 
beyond even this sort of rhetorical activity. As a public institution, law should be 
supported or justified on the basis of public reason and not its occasional, instrumental 
accommodation of agent-relative values and beliefs. This requires that participants to 
legal interaction encode their values, beliefs, and experiences in language that can be 
understood, not just by other participants to an immediate dispute, but by all members of 
a given legal community. This implies that rhetoric should be directed towards a 
“universal” audience the members of which possess a common identity as rational and/or 
moral agents,84 qualities that inhere in everyone regardless of what may be their other,
84 Pereleman, supra note at 48 at 31 -35.
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more personalized identities and interests.85 From this common identity it is possible to 
construct a series of roles and responsibilities with regards to the morality of the conduct 
which is the subject of dispute. But more importantly, the very idea of a universal 
audience alerts orators to the kinds of reasons that would best justify the imposition of 
legal obligation in any given context. Arguments that are aimed exclusively at a 
particular group of individuals, while persuasive to this audience, will commit an orator 
to fixed beliefs and values that may be unacceptable to those who are not personally 
addressed. Arguments of this nature would also lose force if the values and beliefs held 
by the targeted audience subsequently change. In either case, non-congruence between 
legal obligation and subjective values and beliefs will increase the need for coercive or 
external measures of enforcement to secure compliance, factors authoritative decision­
makers may take into account in deciding whether and how to produce, interpret, or apply 
a legal rule.
It is, of course, highly debatable whether there is in fact a universal audience 
united by values and beliefs that are, or logically must be, shared by all rational beings.86 
Discourses about the imposition of legal obligation will often centre around activities the
85 There is a distinctly Kantian flavour to this argument. For a similar perspective in the context o f 
international law, see Capps, supra note at 119-124, 153-154. Capps relies on the neo-Kantian moral theory 
o f Alan Gewirth to support his arguments; see, Alan Gewirth, Reason and Morality, (University of Chicago 
Press, 1978); Alan Gewirth, The Community o f  Rights, (University o f Chicago Press, 1996). For a critical 
review o f Capps’ arguments, see Graham Hudson, “Learning From Our Mistakes? Legal-Moral Philosophy 
and the Constitution of International Law- A Review o f  Patrick Capps’ Human Dignity and the 
Foundations o f  International Law" (2011) 2 Transnational Legal Theory 145
86Christopher William Tindale, “Chapter 6” in, Rhetorical Argumentation: Principles o f  Theory and 
Practice (Sage Publications 2004); James Crosswhite, “Universalities” (2010) 43 Philosophy and Rhetoric 
430; Scott Aikin, “Perelmanian Universal Audience and the Epistemic Aspirations o f Argument” (2008) 41 
Philosophy and Rhetoric 238; Antonio Raul de Velasco, “Rethinking Perelman's Universal Audience: 
Political Dimensions o f a Controversial Concept” (2005) 35 Rhetoric Society Quarterly 47; Frans H. van 
Eemeren & Rob Grootendorst, “Perelman and the Fallacies” (1995) 28 Philosophy and Rhetoric 122; Lisa 
S. Ede, “Rhetoric Versus Philosophy: The Role o f the Universal Audience in Chaim Perelman's The New 
Rhetoric” (1981) 32 Communication Studies 118; John W. Ray, “Perelman’s Universal Audience” (1978) 
64 Quarterly Journal o f Speech 361.
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wrongfulness of which is precisely what is debated. Still, disputes of this nature will have 
to be ended at some point; someone will have a final say. Toope and Brunnee think that 
that our concern should be with the conditions under which debates may justifiably be 
terminated, an issue that relates to the fairness and inclusiveness of debate. If participants 
are able to participate meaningfully in debate, which is to say that their values and beliefs 
play a significant role in the construction of legal obligation, they should be able to 
endorse the process by which legal obligations are produced, even if they cannot fully 
endorse the content of the decision.
Toope and Brunnee are somewhat unspecific about what are the rules that 
structure fair and reasonable debate of this kind. This leaves us uncertain about such 
important matters as: who decides how legal interaction will be structured, who gets to 
invoke procedural rules and, accordingly, exclude putatively “unreasonable” arguments 
and “unfair” rhetorical techniques, and to what extent do dialogical rules inhibit the 
articulation of internal or personalized viewpoints on matters with significant public 
dimensions. Toope and Brunnee seem to have simply displaced confusion about the 
projection of power in the resolution of debates about substantive matters to debates 
about procedural matters. Other scholars, however, offer some thoughts on these matters. 
The following is an example of rules that may be essential to fair and reasonable 
debate:87
1) Parties must not prevent each other from advancing standpoints or from 
casting doubt on standpoints;
2) A party that advances a standpoint is obliged to defend it if challenged byan 
opponent;
87 These rales were derived from Frans H. van Eemeren, Rob Grootendorst, & A. Francisca Snoeck 
llenkemans, Argumentation: Analysis, Evaluation, Presentation (Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum 
Associates, 2002) at 182-183.
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3) A party’s attack on a standpoint must relate to the standpoint that has indeed 
been advanced by the other party;
4) A party may defend a standpoint only by advancing argumentation relating to 
that standpoint;
5) A party may not deny a premise that he or she has left implicit or falsely 
present something as a premise that has been left unexpressed by the other 
party;
6) A party may not falsely present a premise as an accepted starting point nor 
deny a premise representing an accepted starting point;
7) A party may not regard a standpoint as conclusively defended if the defense 
does not take place by means of an appropriate argumentation scheme that is 
correctly applied;
8) A party may only use arguments in its argumentation that are logically valid 
or capable of being made logically valid by making explicit one or more 
unexpressed premises;
9) A failed defense of a standpoint must result in the party that put forward the 
standpoint retracting it and a conclusive defense of the standpoint must result 
in the other party retracting its doubt about the standpoint;
10) A party must not use formulations that are insufficiently clear or confusingly 
ambiguous and a party must interpret the other party’s formulations as 
carefully and accurately as possible.
Rules of this nature are designed to ensure that each participant to an argument 
has an equal opportunity to initiate and perpetuate discourse, forward challenges, 
criticisms, interpretations and explanations, express their internal values, attitudes, 
feelings and other features of their personal identities, and share in the invocation and 
application of the regulatory rules that structure power relations.88 Notice that these four
SB Burleson & Kline, supra note 72 at 421, 423.
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conditions of equality are essentially procedural in orientation emphasizing, not what is 
argued, but how it is argued. These conditions, and the relatively stable, enduring rules 
that are used to secure them, frame an ideal speech situation within which personalized 
arguments are both permissible and encouraged, but which are nonetheless appraised 
relative to standards of public reason and their capacity to resist challenge. In this respect, 
there is a constant mediation or translation between the languages specific to disputants’ 
personal, pre-legal identities and the language used to structure reasonable discourses 
about the distribution of value. The latter offers hope of helping disputants identify 
common meaning, knowledge, identities, and interests and to work with these materials 
towards a mutually satisfying solution.
Toope and Brunnee believe that law gives expression to these four conditions of 
equality through professional and ethical norms that protect a “morality of aspiration” 
and a “morality of duty”.89 A morality of aspiration describes one’s ethical duty to make 
the most of one’s time and resources to fully realize her personal and civic potential, 
whereas a morality of duty is concerned with the “minimum standards of appropriate 
conduct that make life in society possible” 90A morality of duty corresponds to formal, 
legal rules and obligations that forbid conduct and, for our purposes, may be correlated 
with “primary rules” that are applied to legal subjects and with “secondary rules” 
concerning how state officials are to interpret and apply primary rules.91 A morality of 
aspiration, by contrast, for our purposes consists in principles and values that direct state 
officials to produce, interpret and apply primary and secondary rules in such a way as to
89 Brunnee and Toope, supra note 2 at 54.
90 Ibid. at 54.
91 Hart, supra note at 76 at 87-90.
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protect and promote individuals’ capacity to form and realize personal life projects.92 
These principles may be expressed as formal features of law (e.g. constitutional rights 
provisions, precedent) or they may be more informal in nature.
Viewed in terms of a morality of duty, legal argumentation is structured by 
professional rules and principles germane to the specific institutional settings within 
which legal interactions occur. These rules ensure a level of “path-dependency”93 which 
informs the timing, source and substance of permissible arguments. A dispute in an 
adjudicative setting, for instance, will be structured by rules and principles that govern 
such matters as: what field of law a dispute falls under (e.g. contracts, constitutional, 
property, etc.), the relevance and admissibility of evidence, who has standing, when they 
may speak and for how long, what statutes, cases and other legal materials are considered 
authoritative, and decorum, etiquette, etc.94Rules of this nature are supposed to ensure 
logical and historical consistency in the resolution of similar disputes. A dispute over 
damaged goods, for instance, may give rise to a contractual or a tort dispute. In filing and 
responding to statements of claim, parties to the dispute will have to employ concepts and 
categories of thought germane to one (or both) of these fields e.g. offer and acceptance, 
negligence. This will affect what facts and values are relevant, the substantive laws to 
which one may appeal, and the range of remedies that are available. In theory, dialogical 
rules of this nature are elements of a common language that disputants may use to encode 
their subjective values and beliefs in terms meaningful to anyone who has experience
92 Jurgen Habermas, “Struggles for Recognition in the Democratic Constitutional State” in Amy Gutmann, 
ed., Multiculluralism (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994) 107.
93 For a sound overview of the meaning of this term and its applicability to common legal systems, see 
Oona Hathaway, “Path Dependence in the Law: The Course and Pattern o f Legal Change in a Common 
Law System” (2001) 86 The Iowa Law Review 101. See also, Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr., “The Path o f  the 
Law” (1897) 10 Harvard Law Review 457.
94 Kratochwil, supra note 15 at 174-185.
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with the legal field in question. Disputes that are moral, ethical, economic, political, or 
religious in nature become legal disputes, carrying the debate into a new domain of 
discourse that provides, according to Toope and Brunnee, neutral, a-political criteria for 
appraising the merits of argumentative positions.
Rules that structure legal argumentation help establish the four conditions of 
equality outlined above by granting each participant the freedom to advance and criticize 
positions, requiring participants to be explicit about their premises and conclusions, and 
establishing, in advance, standards concerning relevancy, onus of proof, and burden of 
proof. Standards concerning what count as valid or justifiable arguments in a given legal 
field are extrinsic to formal logic per se, but germane to the institutional setting within 
which arguments occur; this gives legal arguments a public, dialogical structure. Even 
while participants may use substantive rules in combination with rhetorical narratives 
(/opoi) to support their position, they must comply with procedural rules that establish 
additional criteria of validity or justifiability.
A morality of duty can, however, interfere with a morality of aspiration. As an 
aspirational enterprise, legal argumentation is a perpetual process by which multiple, 
discursive communities cooperatively arrive at shared understandings about the 
imposition of legal obligations. Toope and Brunnee define shared understandings as 
inter-subjective structures and institutions “that help in specifying the interests that 
motivate action: norms, identity, knowledge, and culture”.95 Shared understandings 
structure social roles and responsibilities, enabling members of particular communities to 
access traditional knowledge and to subsequently participate in meaningful socio-cultural
95 Brunnee & Toope, supra note 2 at 29; Peter J. Katzenstein, “International Organization and the Study of 
World Politics” (1998) 52 International Organization 670 at 679.
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practices. They are not, however, static or uniformly experienced; they shift and change 
as new actors introduce different forms of knowledge and practices into a community. 
Often, these changes occur as members of a community interact with members of outside 
communities or environments, with alternative practices and different forms of 
knowledge straining the utility or appeal of tradition. However, changes also occur 
internally, as members contest tradition and introduce alternative values and beliefs.
Excessive reliance on formal legal procedures interferes with law’s aspirational 
qualities by forcing participants to deconstruct and then re-configure their personal values 
and beliefs in terms of public rules, principles and standards. Inevitably, the full meaning 
or significance of the original values and beliefs -the original language and culture- will 
be lost. Indigenous peoples seeking constitutional recognition of a customary practice, for 
instance, have to encode their legal traditions and knowledge in terms of common law 
concepts if they wish to be heard by judges. Although necessary to reach jurists familiar 
with Anglo-American legal reasoning, coding can distort the full cultural significance of 
the practice. More to the point, the language of law is hardly a-political or a-cultural. 
Anglo-American concepts and rules, even of a procedural character, cannot properly be 
described as elements of a “common” or “universal” language.
Feminist perspectives on the law of sexual assault support similar criticisms. In 
any criminal trial, rules of disclosure require Crown prosecutors to provide the defence 
with all information in its possession that is relevant to the subject matter of a charge.96 
The principle behind this rule is that disclosure enhances courts’ truth-seeking function 
by enabling an accused to more effectively challenge the credibility and sufficiency of 
the prosecutor’s allegations. Normally, these rules apply only to information in the
% R. v. Stinchcombe, [1995] 1 S.C.R. 754.
government’s possession. Criminal defence lawyers have recently persuaded courts to 
expand the scope of this rule to force third parties to produce and possibly disclose 
complainants’ private medical, therapeutic, and counseling records.97 The rationale has 
been that these records may be relevant to credibility and, in particular, they can help 
facilitate the discovery of truth by exposing fabricated allegations, “false memory 
syndrome”, or other indicators of a complainant’s unreasonableness.98 In truth, disclosure 
of these records violates complainants’ rights to dignity and privacy, reduces their 
willingness to report sexual assaults, and helps defence attorneys discredit complainants 
who do not satisfy gendered standards of consistency and coherence. Ostensibly designed 
to facilitate the resolution of a case on its merits — to protect fairness, reasonableness, and 
truth- rules like this can and frequently are used to intimidate, demoralize, and 
fallaciously discredit participants."
But although judges, lawyers and others may use legal rules to replicate relations 
of domination, there is still value in constructing an ideal standard against which 
unethical behaviour may be more readily identified and criticized as inconsistent with the 
values of a legal community. The principle behind disclosure, for instance, is that 
criminal prosecutions are concerned with the discovery of truth. Rules of disclosure 
ought to actualize this principle by enhancing the circulation of, and critical engagement 
with, information. The principle of disclosure —and the ten postulated rules of rational 
argumentation outlined above— can be used to criticize the ethics of using rules of 
disclosure to rationalize the distortion of truth through intimidation and stereotyping. This
91R. v. O ’Connor, [1995] 4 S.C.R. 411;/?. v. Mills, [1999] 3 S.C.R. 668.
98 Lise Gotell, “The Ideal Victim, the Hysterical Complainant, and the Disclosure of Confidential Records: 
The Implications o f  the Charter for Sexual Assault Law” (2002) Osgoode Hall Law Journal 255 at 280-281.
99 Laura Hengehold,”An Immodest Proposal: Focault, Hysterization, and the ‘Second Rape”’ (1994) 9 
Hypatia 88 at 95.
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is to say that the interpretation and application of legal rules should at all times be 
constrained by a morality of aspiration, respect for other disputants, and concern for 
maintaining the integrity, fairness, and reasonableness of proceedings.
Coming full circle, we see why Toope and Brunnee consider the provision of 
reasons to be an important part of constructing persuasive or legitimate law; this ensures 
that rules are interpreted and applied towards the actualization of public values and not 
the private, egoistic interests of dominant actors. We also see how the inclusion of 
diverse discursive communities in the production, interpretation, and application of legal 
obligation is crucial, this helps to ensure that guiding legal principles are constructively 
related to the identities, interests, knowledge, and aspirations of all who are subject to 
legal obligation. Without these features, law can too easily be used to replicate relations 
of domination. But what are the mechanisms through which the perspectives of multiple 
discursive communities constrain the interpretation and application of legal rules 
consistently with moral and ethical principles? Further, how do these considerations bear 
on the law of reception?
The key to these questions is analogy.100 For our purposes, analogical reasoning 
occurs whenever a court “draws on similarities or dissimilarities between the present case 
and previous cases which are not binding precedents applying to the present case”.101 It is 
important to recognize that analogies draw our attention to similarities between 
relationships and not between the inherent qualities of objects themselves.102 In the 
context of a legal case, for example, analogies are used to demonstrate that the 
relationship between the facts and law in one case or situation is similar in kind to the
100 Brunnee & Toope, supra note 2 at 56.
101 Toulmin, supra note 48 at 202.
102 Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca, supra note 48 at 372-374
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relationship between the facts and law in another. The “law” that is the subject of an 
analogy includes both rules and principles. In fact, analogies typically involve the 
examination of the different rules by which commonly held principles are actualized in 
similar contexts. Analogical reasoning therefore helps decision-makers use others’ past 
experiences in giving effect to common principles in order to identify and appraise the 
comparative merits of possible solutions to a recurring problem.
There should be nothing controversial about analogical reasoning of this sort. 
Jurists have long used comparative law to better understand and improve domestic law 
and, on occasion, to pursue the unification of various legal orders.103 For example, 
Canadian courts frequently rely on American Bill of Rights’ jurisprudence when 
determining the content and scope of Charter rights.104 In R. v. Keegstra, the Supreme 
Court of Canada stated that:
In the United States, a collection o f fundamental rights has been constitutionally protected 
for over two hundred years. The resulting practical and theoretical experience is immense, 
and should not be overlooked by Canadian courts. 105
The Court then considered a wealth of American jurisprudence and academic 
commentary on content-based restrictions of speech in addressing the constitutional 
dimensions of Canadian anti-hate speech laws.106 Although it found these resources 
useful in elucidating the values and principles that structure freedom of expression, it also
103 Peter De Cruz, Comparative Law in a Changing World, 3rd edition (London: Routledge-Cavendish, 
2007); Werner Menski, Comparative Law in a Global Context: The Legal Traditions o f  Asia and Africa 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006); Comparative Legal Studies: Traditions and Transitions, 
Pierre Legrand & Roderick Munday, eds., (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003); Kai 
Schadbach, “The Benefits o f Comparative Law: A Continental European View” (1998) 16 B.U. lnt'l L. J. 
331.
104 R. v. Keegstra, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 697.
105Ibid. at 711.
106 American Booksellers Ass'n, Inc. v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d 323 (7th Cir. 1985); Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 
(1971); Anti-Defamation League o f  B'nai B'rith v. Federal Communications Commission, 403 F.2d 169 (D.C. 
Cir. 1968); Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250 (1952).
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recognized that comparative constitutionalism is limited by differences in the legal and 
political culture of comparison states as well as in the values, content, and overall 
structure of comparison constitutions. Dickson C.J. put it this way:
Canada and the United States are not alike in every way, nor have the documents 
entrenching human rights in our two countries arisen in the same context. It is only common 
sense to recognize that, just as similarities will justify borrowing from the American 
experience, differences may require that Canada’s constitutional vision depart from that 
endorsed in the United States.107
So, comparative constitutionalism or analogical reasoning in general does not lead 
to extra-legal rules being “transplanted” into Canadian law. Judges are generally not 
interested in integrating Canadian law into broader regional or international legal orders. 
They are typically concerned with using foreign experiences as empirical and normative 
indicia of the constitutional (de)merits of Canadian laws, policies, or practices that are 
under judicial review. Moreover, interest in foreign legal rules is limited to what they 
reveal about the content, scope and applicability of principles a commitment to which is 
shared by the two countries.
By rejecting hierarchical distinctions between (positive) law and non-law, Toope 
and Brunnee recommend that legal actors be open in similar ways to those non-state 
normative orders that structure the values, beliefs, identities, and interests of participants 
to legal interaction. This recommendation flows from their vision of legal interaction as 
concerned with the generation of shared understandings and the fullest expression and 
recognition of participants’ personal identities and interests. Recalling the four conditions 
of equality in argumentation, discourses centred around a postulated (and contestable) 
common legal language must still permit speakers to express their personal identities and
107 Keegstra, supra note 104 at 712.
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interests; if this condition does not obtain, the language of law will not work from or 
generate shared understandings. Toope and Brunnee are fully aware that not all 
participants will share an enthusiasm for the kinds of rationality valued by judges, 
lawyers, or state officials and that some will probably believe that legal rules have no 
intrinsically superior merit relative to non-law. They think, though, that many of the 
principles that inform legal rules are congruent with the principles embedded within 
many non-state normative orders or, at least, with foundational moral principles, such as 
fairness, equality, autonomy, etc. Analogical reasoning consists in exploring the different 
ways in which these common values and principles are actualized in legal and non-legal 
rules that are authoritative within their respective normative orders. There is no a priori 
hierarchical distinction to be made between the values and beliefs of non-state 
communities and those of, say, the United States Supreme Court.
Thus, reference to past practices and future aspirations, mediated by analogy and 
structured by procedural rules of an ethical character, helps disputants collaboratively 
identify and generate shared understandings. These understandings form the principled 
basis for legal obligation and help constrain the interpretation of discrete legal rules.
When disputants carry new or newly-discovered understandings back to their respective 
communities, there is an increased likelihood that corresponding legal obligations will be 
observed independently of external enforcement. Recalling Rnop’s metaphors, we might 
reconsider law as a process of translation whereby diverse inter-subjective perspectives 
rooted in the values, beliefs, and practices of local communities are converted into 
knowledge and values that are shared by members of an over-arching legal community. 
This process changes the participants and the communities to which they return, as their
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prior values and beliefs will have been reconstituted through mediated encounters with 
“outsiders”. But law is also translated, as the production, interpretation, and application 
of legal rules occurs in close proximity to shifting normative environments and a morality 
of aspiration. Changes in legal culture will occur incrementally, collaboratively and from 
the bottom-up rather than episodically and unilaterally from the top-down,108 as 
participants use their distinctive knowledge and experiences to collaboratively inform the 
construction, interpretation and application of those enduring values and principles upon 
which a given legal rule rests. Law is an enterprise, a dialectic through which actors and 
institutions in opposition converge around mutually reconstituted identities and interests.
E. Transnational Legal Process, Interactional Law, and the Relevant and
Persuasive Doctrine
We may now consolidate these thoughts in terms of the relevant and persuasive 
doctrine. My claim has been that an informal approach to the reception of international 
and comparative human rights is sensible, when we consider the distinctive functions of 
the relevant and persuasive doctrine. This claim runs counter to traditional views, which 
decry the deconstruction of hierarchical distinctions between binding/non-binding 
international human rights and between international/comparative human rights: the 
absence of formal criteria governing the relevance and persuasiveness of international 
and comparative law means that judges can and will do whatever they please. Taken to its 
limits — so the argument runs -- normative indeterminacy will lead to the instrumental 
use of law to replicate relations of social, political, and ideological domination.
To counter these worries, I have investigated theoretical perspectives that support 
two, inter-related hypotheses: 1) specific rhetorical practices and dialogical structures
108 Janet Koven Levit, “Bottom-Up International Lawmaking: Reflections on the New Haven School o f 
International Law” (2007) 32 Yale Journal o f International Law 393.
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constrain judicial decision-making about the relevance and persuasiveness of 
international and comparative human rights and 2) applied knowledge of these practices 
and structures can enhance the effectiveness of transnational human rights advocacy. 
Although I have not submitted them to sustained empirical tests, these hypotheses do 
draw our attention to a logical fit between the form and the functions of the relevant and 
persuasive doctrine, which are to protect and promote human rights i.e. the high priority 
values and interests of the beneficiaries of Charter rights, to enhance the congruence 
between state law and ambient social values, beliefs and expectations that have global 
and multicultural dimensions, and to facilitate institutional linkages among Canadian, 
international, and foreign jurists.
How does informalism perform these functions better than something akin to the 
presumption of conformity doctrine? We should begin by reminding ourselves that 
binding international human rights are highly vague, abstract, and aspirational in nature; 
they contain principles and values that should guide the appraisal of, among other things, 
specific legal rules that have been produced by domestic legal institutions. This 
interpretive enterprise is facilitated by interactions among a plurality of discursive 
communities with differing perspectives on the human rights dimensions of state law. 
These communities lack the legal authority and political power to produce binding 
judgments, so their influence must be related either to their political power or their 
persuasive appeal. Consequently, persuasion is the only reliable means of influence. It 
follows that hierarchical distinctions between binding and non-binding international 
human rights norms which require judges to look only to the terminology of treaty
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provisions, is likely to distort the spirit and obscure the full, contextualized meaning of 
treaty provisions.
However, we can see the appeal of making conceptual distinctions between the 
two classes of international human rights. Binding international treaties are the product of 
sustained negotiations and are designed to structure responses to recurring social 
problems; the time, energy, and resources that have gone into the construction of 
international legal obligation should count for something. TLP and Toope and Brunnee’s 
interactional theory of law explain how these types of norms will have presumptively 
stronger persuasive influence, even absent formal doctrinal direction to this effect. 
Recalling the importance of topoiand working with an audience’s prior values and - 
beliefs, binding international human rights will be uniquely persuasive to both judges and 
representatives of the government because governmental bodies will have publicly 
expressed their commitment to the values and principles underpinning these types of 
norms. Unless this happens with little or no thought or consultation -  an unlikely event— 
the acceptance of international legal obligations represents the construction of shared 
understandings among governmental bodies and other domestic and international actors. 
Through public statements, opinio juris, records of treaty negotiations, submissions to 
monitoring and reporting bodies, official reports, and other expressions of the 
government’s factual and normative positions, observers will be able to construct a body 
of values and beliefs held by governmental actors with respect to an international treaty 
or custom. This is not the case with comparative human rights or international norms the 
production of which has occurred with little to no involvement by the Canadian 
government. The government’s choice to bind itself to international legal obligations also
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signals its intent to engage in continued interaction with interpretive communities 
concerning the interpretation and application of norms in increasingly specific contexts. 
The process of international norm production will accordingly provide appreciable 
textual and discursive resources that constrain the government’s capacity distort 
argumentative interactions about the scope and meaning of binding international norms. 
This suggests that binding international human rights norms as well as the non-binding 
interpretive views of attendant treaty-monitoring and reporting agencies are more likely 
to be internalized by judges than comparative human rights or other norms produced 
independently of the involvement of the Canadian government.
This account of persuasive influence has the added advantage of countering 
complaints that the informal reception of international human rights contravenes respect 
for constitutional supremacy (e.g. federalism, parliamentary supremacy). First, courts are 
not transplanting external legal rules into Canadian law. Through analogical reasoning 
characteristic of all comparative law, they use these rules to appraise the comparative 
practical and normative merits of possible rule-formulations that are grounded in 
Canadian legal sources. Second, when dealing with binding international human rights, 
courts make use of rules and principles that are increasingly produced or at least endorsed 
by representative institutions. Provinces, for instance, play significant roles in the 
negotiation of international treaties touching upon matters falling within their sphere of 
constitutional authority.109 The federal government also ensures that most treaties are
109 David Cook, The Millennium Round o f  Multilateral Trade Negotiations: The Provinces and Treaty 
Making - A Submission to the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade, 25 April 
1999; Federal - Provincial Relations in the International Domain. Innovative Ways o f  Working 
Domestically with Provincial Governments on Matters where Canada's International Interests are 
Engaged, Research Report 4 (1998), Global Challenges and Opportunities Network; Douglas M. Brown, 
“The Evolving Role of the Provinces in Canada-US Trade Relations” in S tates and P rovinces in the
139
submitted to parliament for commentary before it undertakes new international legal 
obligations.110 Governments at all levels more frequently consent to international treaty 
obligations knowing that this requires them to interact with treaty monitoring and 
reporting bodies by submitting evidence of their compliance. To the extent that this is so, 
respect for parliamentary sovereignty and federalism will be less persuasive as a reason 
to not receive or give domestic effect to binding international human rights and the non­
binding views of attendant monitoring and reporting bodies.
Now this account of the relevance and persuasiveness of international and 
comparative human rights is not inconsistent with the presumption of minimal protection 
articulated by van Ert, if we also allow for the generous judicial use of non-binding or 
unimplemented international human rights law and comparative human rights. We might 
say that judges should use the presumption of minimal protection when Canada’s 
international obligations are at issue, and use the relevant and persuasive doctrine when 
dealing with non-binding international human rights or comparative human rights as 
interpretive aids; importantly, this is the position that Brunnee and Toope adopt.
However, the foregoing, in combination with our observations that judges have failed to 
abide by or properly apply the presumption of conformity doctrine, has the advantage of 
explaining what (informal) factors affect judges’ choices to (not) give domestic effect to 
binding international human rights; fidelity to doctrine cannot be added to this list, if we 
take into account judges’ inability or unwillingness to correctly apply the presumption of 
conformity doctrine. If accurate, this account means that there is no practical reason to
International Econom y, Douglas M. Brown and Earl H. Fry, eds., (Berkeley: Institute o f Governmental 
Studies Press, 1993).
110 See, Canada’s Policy on Tabling of Treaties in Parliament, Online: http://www.treaty- 
aecord.gc.ca/procedures.aspx (date accessed: 13 April 2012).
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insist on doctrinal distinctions between binding and non-binding international human 
rights, as the former will typically be found more relevant and persuasive by virtue of the 
comparative logical and rhetorical strengths of arguments within which they are 
employed. The foregoing account does not oppose doctrinal changes, but instead 
considers them to be unnecessary and ultimately ineffectual.
At the same time, the ultimate end of Charter litigation is, from the complainant’s 
perspective, always the actualization of human dignity. If this, rather than compliance per 
se, is the primary objective, there is again little reason to insist on doctrinal distinctions 
between binding/non-binding norms; all classes of human rights help us realize this end 
and should be used on this basis. Indeed, comparative human rights will be distinctively 
relevant and persuasive in certain contexts, a practice we should again recall is part and 
parcel of courts’ long-standing engagement in comparative law. Among the more 
important classes of problems to which comparative human rights are distinctively useful 
are those related to transnational social, political, and economic interactions. Following 
9/11, for example, the Canadian intelligence community immersed itself in a wide range 
of formal and informal global intelligence networks in order to improve its capacity to 
identify and respond to transnational terrorist threats.111 Given the nature and geographic 
distribution of transnational terrorist groups, the Canadian intelligence community has 
necessarily networked with non-traditional partners with poor human rights records, such 
as Morocco, Egypt, and Afghanistan. The intelligence acquired from these foreign 
agencies has been used to rationalize the detention of alleged terrorists residing in 
Canada. Using this intelligence as evidence, the government initiates deportation 
proceedings in order to return alleged terrorists to the very countries that supplied the
111 Hudson, supra note 21.
141
intelligence, exposing affected persons to the substantial risk of torture and abuse. 
Ostensibly designed to protect the Canadian public, proceedings of this nature may in 
certain situations be linked to “extraordinary rendition” or “torture by proxy”, whereby 
alleged terrorists are sent to jurisdictions where information may be extracted through 
means that are legally prohibited in Canada.112
In situations such as these, comparative human rights analysis is necessary for an 
adequate understanding of the nature and context of the problem as well as for the 
construction of effective solutions. They are not being “transplanted” into Canadian law; 
rather, they serve as empirical data. In the context of global intelligence agency 
cooperation, the human rights records of foreign states are invaluable for assessing what 
Canadian officials know or ought to know about the consequences of the intelligence and 
security relationships they form. Although not directly relevant to Canada’s international 
human rights obligations, other countries’ human rights records serve as data that 
engender shared understandings about the facts of a case and the normative dimensions 
of Canada’s domestic and international practices. But comparative human rights can also 
further the relevant and persuasive doctrine’s function of facilitating institutional linkages 
among courts in various jurisdictions in order to strengthen the review of 
unrepresentative transgovemmental practices. Global intelligence and security 
relationships among executive agencies typically span multiple jurisdictions, which helps 
to insulate them from meaningful parliamentary and judicial review. Judges’ reliance on 
each others’ rulings can help them cultivate a “pan-constitutional law of human rights”,
112 Stephen Grey, Ghost Plane: The True Story o f  the CIA Torture Program  (New York: St. Martin’s Press,
2006); “Torture by Proxy: International Law Applicable to ‘Extraordinary Renditions’” (The Centre for 
Human Rights and Global Justice) December 2005.
142
whereby persons harmed by governmental practices in one jurisdiction may more 
successfully pursue remedies in another.113
All of this is to say that the relevance and persuasiveness of international and 
comparative human rights should not be linked to the form that a norm assumes or to its 
pedigree but rather its place in lines of reasoning that are constrained by formal and 
informal interpretive institutions. Ideally, judicial decision-making about the reception of 
international and comparative human rights norms is conditioned by the (government- 
initiated) congruence of international and Canadian constitutional legal principles, 
government institutions’ express commitment to use these principles to guide decision­
making, and judges’ willingness to exercise their interpretive latitude in accordance with 
a morality of aspiration. Since the government is directly involved in the production and 
diffusion of binding international human rights, the judicial reception of norms of this 
nature should presumptively be easier to justify and, as importantly, will often be 
comparatively useful as topoi i.e. in building off of and generating shared understandings. 
However, the nature of a legal problem may be such that other kinds of human rights 
norms will be equally or even more useful for framing and resolving an issue. 
Comparative human rights are especially useful for contending with problems raised by 
transgovemmentalism, helping domestic courts in various jurisdictions fill in regulatory 
gaps within transnational regimes.
Although the foregoing helps us conceptualize how international and comparative 
human rights might exert a distinctive, persuasive influence if they can be (and are) 
accessed without formal doctrinal constraints, several outstanding issues remain. First,
113 Craig Scott & Phillip Alston, “Adjudicating Constitutional Priorities in a Transnational Context: A 
Comment on Soobramoney’s Legacy and Grootboom Promise” (2000) 16 South African Journal of 
Human Rights 206 at 213.
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we might inquire into the process by which legal arguments are to be identified and 
appraised against specified legal and ethical criteria. Arguments are, as we have learned, 
constructed out of a set of indeterminate formal norms, pertinent facts, and informal 
logical devices; they are composed of both explicit and implicit premises. Given the 
absence of a logically complete and clearly stated argument, observers will have to 
reconstruct them out of a set of discursive practices. In the context of case law, for 
instance, we might be inclined to construct arguments out of, inter alia, recorded 
judgments and associated formal documents, such as facta. But recorded judgments 
obviously do not fully convey judges’ actual lines of reasoning and, for some, they serve 
the contrary purpose, namely, to conceal or mystify the political or ideological bases of 
decision-making.114
Since TLP is concerned with the perspectives of non-state actors, this interpretive 
problem extends well beyond the good or bad faith of judicial reasoning. The law and 
literature movement, for instance, convincingly establishes that legal meaning is 
constructed, both consciously and otherwise, through the interaction of text, interpreter, 
and larger social structures.1 l5Each participant in a legal interaction and each observer 
thereafter will interpret legal judgements differently, even if the text of a decision does 
bear an approximate relation to a judge’s reasoning. Toope and Brunnee insist that legal 
interaction is structured by shared understandings, but these relate, at best, to a small set
1 l4Duncan Kennedy, A Critique o f  Adjudication: Fin de Siecle (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 
1997); David Kairys, “ Law and Politics” (1984) 52 George Washington Law Review 243; Roberto 
Mangabeira Unger, The Critical Legal Studies Movement (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1983); 
Duncan Kennedy, “Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication” (1976) 89 Harvard Law Review 
1685.
115 Kieran Dolin, A Critical Introduction to Law and Literature (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press,
2007); Ian Ward, “From Literature to Ethics: The Strategies and Ambitions o f Law and Literature” (1994) 
14 Oxford Journal o f Legal Studies 389; Richard Weisberg, Poethics and Other Strategies o f  Law and  
Literature (New York: Columbia University Press, 1992); James Boyd White, The Legal Imagination 
(Boston: Little, Brown, 1973).
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of conventions about legal interaction. They do not, and cannot, assign one settled “core” 
or universal meaning to a given legal text. Although conscious of these sorts of issues,116 
Toope and Brunnee offer no conclusive standpoint from which analysts may reconstruct 
particular arguments out of a plethora of potential meanings. Consequently, the political 
and ideological power Toope and Brunnee wish to exclude from legal interaction may 
resurface at this analytical stage, when observers privilege some meanings over others. 
The arguments we reconstruct and analyze may bear little relationship to disputants’ 
values, beliefs, and positions.
Second, there are methodological difficulties associated with isolating the distinctive 
influence that international and comparative human rights have had on judicial reasoning 
and the broader meanings associated with a decision. The more we appreciate law’s 
intersections with multiple normative orders, the more challenging it is to disaggregate 
the former from the latter for the purpose of tracing the influence of specific norms.117 
TLP certainly can and should be applied to the study of law’s intersections with 
normative orders other than international and comparative human rights. But it is hard to 
see why we should presumptively privilege international and comparative human rights 
over other classes of legal norms. If we are able to justify such a focus, how are we to 
assess their influence? Are we to correlate influence with explicit citations in recorded 
judgments? Alternatively, should we explore indirect and implicit influence through such
116 As is clear from their extended discussion of, and commitment to, social constructivism; Brunnee & 
Toope, supra note 2; Brunnee & Toope, supra mAe 75. See also, John Gerard Ruggie, “What Makes the 
World Hang Together? Neo-utilitarianism and the Social Constructivist Challenge” (1998) 52 International 
Organization 855; Alexander Wendt, “Anarchy is What States Make o f It: the Social Construction o f 
Power Politics” (1992) 46 International Organization 391; Peter Berger & Thomas Luckman, The Social 
Construction o f  Reality: A Treatise in the Sociology o f  Knowledge (Garden City, NY: Anchor Books, 
1966).
1,7 William A. Bogart, Consequences: The Impact o f  Law and its Complexity (Toronto, Buffalo: University 
o f Toronto Press, 2002).
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channels as legal education118 or judges’ personal histories, experiences and independent 
research? If so, are we still discussing something in the order of a distinctively “legal” 
influence tied to specific argumentative contexts?
Third, as suggested above, Toope and Brunnee have not altogether accounted for 
political and ideological power imbalances, even from an elevated theoretical plane. They 
place a lot of stock in the equalizing power of rationality, but this comes at the cost of 
devaluing classically non-rational components of argumentation, such as emotion and 
oratory. Surely these are essential features of persuasive argumentation, yet they are 
almost after-thoughts, as if their relevance depends on whether or not they are cognizable 
in terms of legal concepts and categories of thought. This raises all sorts of problems for 
those who hold different conceptions of rationality or who do not regard law as the 
quintessential form of rationality. Many feminists, for instance, would take issue with 
rigid distinctions between reason/emotion and the historical baggage that comes with 
reifying reason and rationality as the source of moral agency.119
Finally, we must consider the implications of TLP for the second pillar of the law of 
reception: the principle of respect for constitutional supremacy. How can the relevant and 
persuasive doctrine? 1 will address this issue in the concluding chapter.
F. Conclusion
In sum, a process-based conception of law helps us to appreciate the form and 
functions of the relevant and persuasive doctrine and, indeed, the informal factors that
118 For a small sampling on how legal education shapes legal practice in global and multicultural contexts, 
see: Harry Arthurs,’’Law and Learning in an Era o f Globalization” (2009) 10 German Law Journal 639; 
Peter Strauss, “Transsystem ia- Are We Approaching a New Legal Langdellian Moment? Is McGill 
Leading The Way?” (2006) 24 Penn State International Law Review 763; Roderick MacDonald & Jason 
MacLean, “No Toilets in Park” (2005) 50 McGill Law Journal 721; H. Patrick Glenn,"Doin’ the 
Transsystemic: Legal Systems and Legal Traditions” (2005) 50 McGill Law Journal 863
119 Karen J. Warren, “Critical Thinking and Feminism” (1988) 10 Informal Logic 31.
influence judges’ decisions to (not) use international law generally. The doctrine has been 
appropriately designed to reduce hierarchical distinctions between binding/non-binding 
international human rights as well as between international/comparative human rights. 
Lingering concerns about the uses to which judges may put this doctrine have been 
provisionally met on theoretical grounds. To recapitulate, I have hypothesized that the 
distinctive logical form to persuasive arguments involving international and comparative 
human rights and the distinctive dialogical structure to legal argumentation both serve to 
constrain the projection of raw political and ideological power. 1 have also argued that the 
importance of actualizing human dingity and the fact that judges have consistently failed 
to abide by or correctly apply the presumption of confomrity doctrine suggests that there 
is no good reason to insist on traditional doctimal disctinctions between binding and non­
binding international human rights. This does not reduce the imprtance of conceptual and 
normative distinctions between binding and non-binding international human rights as 
well as between international and comparative human rights. To the contrary, there are a 
number of non-doctrinal factors that increase the persuasiveness of arguments that rely on 
binding international human rights and non-binding views of interpretive communities 
attendnat to authoritative international regimes. However, the persuasive appeal of such 
arguments is unliekly to be improved by the doctrinl mandates akin to the presumption of 
conformity doctrine. It may even obscure the informal bases of judicial reasoning about 
these issues, thereby reducing the effectiveness of advocacy.
These arguments have been supported by a reading of Brunnee and Toope’s 
interactional theory of international law. Brunnee and Toope provide a model for the 
rational analysis and appraisal of legal arguments and argumentation against a set of
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ethical standards. These standards direct participants to make the generation of shared 
understandings their primary motive for engaging in legal interaction. When 
supplemented with professional rules and a range of recommended juristic tasks and roles 
such as trend description and factor analysis, Brunnee and Toope’s ethical code of 
conduct enhances rational, fair, and inclusive interactions among a wide range of 
discursive communities. This has the dual effect of generating shared understandings 
among participants (and the broader discursive communities of which they are a part), 
and, making state law more responsive to non-state normative orders.
This theoretical framework is a heuristic device only; it is not supposed to describe 
actual decision-making. This on its own is a significant problem for a theoretical 
perspective that is supposed to help us actualize high priority values and interests in 
concrete contexts. But there is also a wide range of conceptual, normative, and 
methodological issues that have yet to be adequately addressed. It may be possible to 
address these issues, but I will not assume responsibility for defending Brunnee and 
Toope’s theory. My interest is in applying their model, flawed as it is, to a set of 
decisions about the international and comparative human rights dimensions of Canadian 
national security law and policy. Hopefully, this will help us draw some conclusions 
about the nature and quality of decisions about the reception of international and 
comparative human rights. It may even be that we may use these conclusions to revise 
features of TLP and Brunnee and Toope’s theoretical perspective.
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Although problematic, TLP and associated theoretical perspectives are useful in 
the study of the Canadian law of reception as both heuristic and critical devices. 
Heuristically, they offer analytical frameworks that help us bring order to the processes 
by which international and comparative law shape norm-production injudicial settings. 
As critical devices, they allow us to evaluate the uses to which judges put international 
and comparative human rights relative to ethical and professional standards. Of course, 
case law will not correspond perfectly with theoretical or normative ambitions. This may 
be because international and comparative human rights simply have not had a significant 
impact on judicial reasoning, or because juridical discourses have been distorted by 
projections of ideological and political power. However, even (or especially) here, an 
idealized conception of the relevant and persuasive doctrine allows us to criticize 
divergent case law for failing to abide by core ethical standards and principles.
The purpose of this chapter is to test TLP’s heuristic and critical utility by 
applying it to a case study, namely, how international and comparative human rights have 
influenced the judicial review of security certificate provisions and associated security 
intelligence practices. In existence since 1976, security certificates permit the government 
to name, detain, and deport non-citizens who pose a threat to, inter alia, national security. 
Long-considered to be “ordinary” — or at least constitutionally permissible— components
of immigration and refugee law,1 certificates have become key components of an 
alternate legal system functionally oriented around the administration of post-9/11 
national security policy. In this context, it is arguable that security certificates have 
become “extraordinary”, which is to say they fall outside the ambits of autonomous legal 
values, such as the rule of law and respect for rights.2 Indicia of their extraordinary nature 
include: their functional connections with largely unregulated global security intelligence 
networks; the enhanced risk of torture and similar abuses faced by persons named in 
certificates post-9/11; the reduction of basic procedural rights circa 9/11, despite the 
likely grave consequences of deportation; and, links between security certificates and the 
human rights abuses suffered by Maher Arar, Abdullah Almalki, Ahmed El Maati, and 
other victims of extraordinary rendition.
This case study bears upon the law of reception because judicial review of 
security certificates and security intelligence practices has been facilitated by two, 
distinct juridical regimes: domestic law and policy, and, international and comparative 
human rights. Historically courts, administrative bodies and other legal institutions have 
relied on domestic norms when reviewing and regulating national security practices. 
However, these normative resources have become less effective in the context of security 
intelligence due to the executive’s invocation of a continuing or indefinite state of 
emergency following 9/11, the subsequent use of national security discourse to 
rationalize extraordinary measures, deep-rooted assumptions about the formal nature of 
certificate proceedings as well as the rights to which non-citizens are entitled, and threats
1 Canada (Minister o f  Employment and Immigration) v. Chiarelli, [ 1992] I S.C.R.711.
2 Graham Hudson, “Transnational Human Rights Advocacy and the Regulation of Global Intelligence 
Agency Cooperation in Canada” in Craig Forcese & Francois Crepeau, eds., Terrorism, Law and  
Democracy: 10 Years After 9/11 (Canadian Institute for the Administration of Justice, 2012).
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that have required Canada to integrate itself in global security networks that transcend the 
jurisdictional reach of domestic law and policy.
International human rights are arguably important resources in this context 
because they can help us fill up semantic and functional gaps in domestic law and policy. 
For instance, international human rights documents contain relatively clear criteria 
concerning when a nation may declare a state of emergency and when (and what) human 
rights may be curtailed to respond to that emergency. They also provide a fairly clear 
statement of the rights to which all human beings are entitled, regardless of citizenship. In 
fact, there is some evidence to suggest that Canadian courts have been using international 
human rights when reviewing Canadian national security law and policy. The Supreme 
Court of Canada, for instance, has regularly cited decisions by the Supreme Court of the 
United States, the United Kingdom House of Lords, the European Court of Human 
Rights, and other judicial bodies when reviewing such issues as the constitutionality of 
security certificate proceedings,3 the constitutionality of global security intelligence 
gathering and sharing,4 and the rights of Canadian citizens detained in Guantanamo Bay.5 
Reviewing these cases, TLP theorists would predict that international and comparative 
human rights will have helped Canadian courts to better understand the full nature and 
global context of Canadian national security law and policy, to fill in semantic gaps in 
domestic normative materials that have not kept pace with changing contexts and 
practices, and to cooperate with international and foreign courts to fill in jurisdictional 
gaps that lie in the transnational space occupied by global intelligence networks.
3 Charkaoui v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), [2007] 1 S.C.R. 350 ("Charkaoui F')
4 Charkaoui v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) (2008), 294 D.L.R. (4th) 478 ( “Charkaoui IT')
“Charkaoui / /”)
5 Canada (Justice) v. Khadr, [2008] 2 S.C.R. 125.
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Using TLP and associated perspectives, I will show how international and 
comparative human rights norms were infused into court proceedings, namely, through 
the factual and legal submissions of parties to proceedings, judicial notice of official 
documents, international and foreign judgments and academic scholarship, and oral 
arguments as evidenced by video recordings of Supreme Court proceedings. I will argue 
that international and comparative human rights norms played a modest role in 
contextualizing the problems posed by security certificates as well as in motivating the 
Supreme Court to require changes in the ways in which security intelligence is collected, 
shared, retained and disclosed. 1 will qualify the normative significance of this claim, 
however, by making a distinction between international and comparative human rights 
perspectives, which are sourced in the typically critical views of non-state transnational 
human rights networks, and international and comparative human rights case law, about 
which courts have been somewhat “apologetic”6 and which they have sourced in positive 
law produced by foreign and regional courts. I will argue that recent international and 
comparative human rights case law grants the executive too much discretion in defining 
states of emergency and that this is likely to facilitate the normalization of extraordinary 
practices associated with security certificates. 1 will accordingly suggest that 
transnational human rights advocates would be well-advised to more fully exploit 
domestic experiences, institutional histories and wisdom.
it should be noted that the case study is significantly limited in numerous respects. 
Most importantly, it does not include a full empirical record of judicial reasoning nor all 
of the ways in which international and comparative human rights entered proceedings.
6 Martti Koskenniemi, From Apology to Utopia: The Structure o f  International Legal Argument 
(Cambridge University Press, 2006).
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Part of the reason for this has to do with the absence of direct empirical data about 
judges’ actual reasoning, other than recorded judgments from which judicial reasoning 
may be inferred. As noted earlier, many, if not all, idealized argumentative models 
require analysts to reconstruct arguments out of discourses that unfold according to 
informal logic, assumptions and other directly unobservable factors. This carries with it a 
host of interpretive problems. There are also significant impediments to data collection in 
cases concerned with national security where, for obvious reasons, many facts and 
submissions are not made publicly available. When submissions were accessible, 1 found 
that international and comparative human rights were referenced only sporadically, 
although they played a much more prominent role in the oral arguments of many litigants 
and interveners. Finally, international and comparative human rights influenced the 
construction of many documents upon which litigants and judges relied, suggesting an 
indirect influence. The case study will for these reasons be fairly schematic in orientation, 
lacking compelling evidence for whether judicial attitudes towards security certificates 
have changed, the precise causes or influence of any such changes, the intended and 
actual effects of the Supreme Court’s judgments and the extents to which international 
and comparative human rights have influenced the attitudes of lower court judges and 
other state officials. Despite these limitations, however, I maintain that the case study 
highlights the heuristic and critical merits of TLP and lays the groundwork for a future 
research agenda.
This chapter is divided into three sections. The first will review the changing 
nature of Canadian security intelligence practices and the implications these changes 
have for the constitutionality of security certificates. This section will also introduce us to
the various discursive communities that are engaged in debates about the human rights 
dimensions of security certificate provisions and practices and help us to firmly identify 
the base values that characterize their divergent positions. In the second section, I will 
reflect on how international and comparative human rights might help structure fair and 
reasoned debate about these issues. I will specifically suggest that international and 
comparative human rights can help minimize the distorting effects of national security 
language on rational argumentation about certificates by increasing state officials’ 
adherence to professional rules relating to fairness, equality and adversarial challenge in 
the context of certificate proceedings. Finally, I will use a case study on disclosure in 
security certificate proceedings to test the hypothesis that Canadian courts have used 
international and comparative human rights to better protect the procedural and 
substantive rights of named persons. This case study will involve a loose comparative 
analysis of interconnected case law from Canadian courts, UK courts, and the European 
Court of Human Rights (ECtHR).
B. 9/11, Canadian Security Intelligence Practices, and the Constitutional 
Dimensions of Security Certificates
It is axiomatic that the terrorist attacks of 9/11 contributed to fundamental 
revisions in thinking about how to address the threats posed by transnational terrorism. 
To be sure, international terrorism had been a subject of domestic and international 
concern since at least the 1960’s. However, technological advances, changes in global 
power dynamics, the fall of the Soviet Union, the subsequent proliferation of nuclear,
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chemical, and biological weapons, greater mobility of people and goods across borders, 
enhanced communication capacities, and the aggravation of colonial and cold war-based 
regional conflicts have contributed to a fundamental change in the nature and gravity of 
terrorist threats.7 By the 1990’s, non-state terrorist groups had become extremely well- 
funded, well-resourced, and well-organized, while forces of globalization had enhanced 
the capacity of these groups to deploy their resources to inflict large-scale damage across 
great distances.
Despite these obvious developments, and the warnings issued by certain members 
of the intelligence community, Western governments did little to adapt intelligence 
agencies’ policies, priorities and practices to the new situation. In fact, many 
governments cut funding during this period, contributing to internecine competition 
between agencies struggling to justify their existence in a post-Cold War world.8 One of 
the 9/11 Commission’s central conclusions on this point was that inefficiency, 
competition, and fragmentation within the intelligence community inhibited the 
American government’s capacity to quickly identify and respond to the terrorist attacks 
of 9/11.9 Bob Rae made similar observations in his 2005 report on the bombing of Air 
India Flight 182 in 1985, noting that competition between the then-new Canadian 
Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) and the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP)
7 For a range o f critical commentaries on the changing nature o f terrorism in the post-Cold War era, see 
Gabe Mythen & Sandra Walklate, “Terrorism, Risk and International Security: The Perils o f Asking ‘What 
if?’” (2008) 39:2 Security Dialogue 221; T. Copeland, “Is the ‘New terrorism’ Really New?” (Winter: 
2001) The Journal of Conflict Studies 7.
8 Richard J. Aldrich, “Beyond the Vigilant State: Globalisation and Intelligence” (2009) 35 Review of 
International Studies 889.
9 Thomas H. Kean, et al., The 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report o f  the National Commission on 
Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, (Washington D.C.: National Commission on Terrorist Attacks 
upon the United States. 2004) at 401-406; see also, Adam D. Svendsen,, “The Globalization o f Intelligence 
Since 9/11: Frameworks and Operational Parameters” (2008) 21:1 Cambridge Review of International 
Affairs; Michael Smith, “Intelligence-Sharing Failures Hamper War on Terrorism,’’(July 2005) Jane’s 
Intelligence Review.
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obstructed the flow of essential intelligence to requisite departments, agencies, and front­
line workers.10
Influenced by these sorts of observations, Canada’s post-9/11 national security policy 
has been designed to facilitate the performance of three sometimes inconsistent functions. 
First, it has helped government construct a tightly integrated security system that is 
notionally organized and directed by a range of centralized political and bureaucratic 
bodies." A hallmark of this approach has been the blurring of the functional mandates 
assigned to civilian, law-enforcement, and military intelligence agencies, and a 
strengthening of their aggregate linkages to Cabinet through such institutions as the 
Cabinet Committee on National Security (chaired by the Prime Minister), the National 
Security Advisor to the Prime Minister (who is mandated to “improve co-ordination and 
integration of security efforts among governmental departments”),12 and an “Integrated 
Terrorism Assessment Centre” (ITAC), which is located within Public Safety Canada and 
tasked with the intake, processing, and dissemination of intelligence from and to 
peripheral departments and agencies.13
Although in many ways successful, centralization has been limited by a second 
priority of post-9/11 national security policy -  enhancing domestic intelligence agencies’ 
integration into a number of poly-centric global intelligence networks. Of course, Canada 
has long been a member of various international intelligence regimes. However, post- 
9/1 1, global intelligence agency cooperation has followed the contours of multiple,
10 Bob Rae, Lessons to be Learned: The Report o f  the Honourable Bob Rae, Independent Advisor to the 
Minister o f  Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness, on Outstanding Questions with Respect to the 
Bombing o f  Air India Flight 182, (Ottawa: Air India Review Secretariat, 2005) at 16-17.
11 Canada. Privy Council Office. Securing an Open Society: Canada’s National Security (2004) at 9.
12 Ibid. at 9.
11 Online: Integrated Terrorism Assessment Centre at http://www.itac.gc.ca/index-eng.asp (date accessed: 
20 August 2011).
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informal “liaisons” with non-traditional allies, such as Pakistan, Morocco, and 
Afghanistan,14 sometimes in ways that suggest the absence of political control. For 
example, seemingly unauthorized cooperation between Canadian intelligence and law- 
enforcement officers and United States and Syrian counterparts outside formal 
intelligence and diplomatic channels contributed to the detention, deportation, and torture 
of Canadian citizen Maher Arar in 2002-2003. A commission of inquiry concluded that 
Canadian agencies had facilitated grave human rights abuses by sharing false or grossly 
inaccurate intelligence in violation of clear domestic and international laws as well as 
internal policies and guidelines.15 It also noted that these liaisons frustrated consular 
efforts by-the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade’s to have Mr. Arar 
repatriated. This may be viewed as part of a larger trend towards “transgovemmentalism” 
which, as noted, describes formal and informal joint-govemance initiatives between 
functionally differentiated institutions of two or more states, often with little input or 
oversight by non-participating institutions. In the Arar case, the intelligence and 
diplomatic communities’ performance of their respective roles and responsibilities vis-a- 
vis Syrian agencies frustrated the realization of goals common to all interested Canadian 
departments and agencies.
A third feature of post-9/11 national security law and policy in Canada has been the 
use of emergency discourse to justify heavy reliance on extraordinary measures, such as 
preventative detention, intrusive surveillance and extraordinary rendition.16 Legal and
14 D.S. Reveron, “Old Allies, New Friends: Intelligence-Sharing in the War on Terror”, (2006) 50:3 Orbis 
453.
151 will provide a more detailed review o f the circumstances and implications of this example below.
15 For an excellent analysis o f the nature and rhetorical uses of national security language, see Barry Buzan, 
Ole Waever & Jaap de Wilde, Security: A New Framework for Analysis (Boulder: Lynne Rienner. 1998) at 
21-47
157
political theorists have long noted how executive agencies employ national security 
language to rationalize extraordinary measures that operate outside the confines of pre­
existing legal rules and/or enduring legal values.17 Typically, invocations of 
exceptionality are persuasive because pre-existing rules have not been explicitly designed 
to address the novel and complex problems posed by emergencies, or because the 
government’s responsibility to secure public safety and security may on occasion 
outweigh its duty to comply with clear but unduly restrictive laws.18 In such situations, 
legal institutions must decide whether a political community is indeed facing a public 
emergency and, if so, whether the extraordinary measures used to address this emergency 
are constitutionally permissible.
The purpose of this section is to provide a rough empirical account of how processes 
of intelligence gathering and sharing in Canada have changed post-9/11 and how this 
raises novel human rights issues in the context of security certificates. It will begin with a 
survey of Cabinet-led improvements to domestic intelligence agency cooperation, 
followed by a discussion of the nature and regulatory challenges posed by global 
intelligence agency cooperation. Particular attention will be paid to links between global 
intelligence practices and the experiences of Maher Arar. It will conclude with a look at 
the use of global intelligence as secret evidence in security certificate proceedings, which 
I connect to the experiences of Mr. Arar and the practice of extraordinary rendition.
17 David Dyzenhaus, “The State o f Emergency in Legal Theory” in Victor V. Ramraj, Michael Hor & Kent 
Roach, eds., Global Anti-Terrorism Law and Policy (Cambridge; New York : Cambridge University Press. 
2005 ) 65; Oren Gross, “Chaos and Rules: Should Responses to Violent Crises Always be Constitutional?” 
(2003) 112 Yale Law Journal 1011.
18 For a good example of this line o f reasoning, see Richard A. Posner, Not a Suicide Pact: The 
Constitution in a Time o f  National Emergency (Oxford University Press, 2006).
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B. I. Domestic Intellifience Agency Cooperation 
Historically, military and police agencies conducted the lion’s share of Canada’s 
intelligence work, growing in size, complexity, and political influence post-WWII.19 
This remained the case until the early 1980s, when the RCMP’s Security Service was 
investigated by the Royal Commission of Inquiry into Certain Activities of the RCMP 
(the Macdonald Commission) for engaging in a litany of illegal acts designed to curb 
radical Quebecois separatism and other supposed threats to national security.20 Among 
the recommendations of the MacDonald Commission was that the Security Service be 
dismantled and replaced with an entirely civilian intelligence agency trained in 
intelligence acquisition, processing, and analysis, regulated by robust legal frameworks, 
and submitted to strong, centralized oversight by political bodies.
In 1984, the government followed this recommendation, creating CSIS. Since then, 
CSIS has been the agency with primary responsibility for domestic security intelligence 
work, with Communications Security Establishment Canada remaining a primary source 
of foreign signals intelligence. One of the comparative advantages of a civilian 
intelligence service is that it is held to lower standard of evidentiary disclosure and less 
stringent privacy standards than conventional law-enforcement agencies.21 Whereas law- 
enforcement agencies must demonstrate the “credibly-based probability” of past or future
19 Wesley K. Wark, “Canada and the Intelligence Revolution”, in Secret Intelligence in the 21st Century, 
Heike Bengert et al., eds., (Frank Cass, 2003) 170.
20 Freedom and Security Under the Law: Second Report (Ottawa: The Commission o f Inquiry Concerning 
Certain Activities o f the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, 1981).
21 Atwal v. Canada (Solicitor General), [1988] 1 FC 107 at 133-134; Corporation o f  the Canadian Civil 
Liberties Association v. Canada (AG) (1992), 8 O.R.(3d) 289 (Ont. Ct. (Gen. Div.) at para. 116. Part o f  the 
principle behind these cases is that information collected by CSIS is unlikely to be submitted as evidence 
against an accused in criminal trials, so affected persons’ interest in liberty and privacy is lower.
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criminal conduct in order to justify significant intrusions on privacy,22 CSIS must merely 
show reasonable suspicion that an individual or group is engaged in activities which pose 
a threat to Canadian national security.23 Similarly, CSIS has been accorded wide 
discretion to deny to the public or affected individuals personal information collected 
during the course of its national security investigations.24
Subsequent to 1984, CSIS’ enabling legislation and policies underwent numerous 
changes to improve the regulation of its activities. First, the government created the 
Security Intelligence Review Committee (SIRC), an independent, external review body 
that reports directly to Parliament on the performance of CSIS.25 Among other things, it 
is authorized to hear complaints against CSIS as well to review CSIS’ activities.26 SIRC’s 
functions are supported by its entitlement to:
have access to any information under the control of the Service or of the Inspector General that 
relates to the performance of the duties and functions of the Committee and to receive from the 
Inspector General, Director and employees such information, reports and explanations as the 
Committee deems necessary for the performance of its duties and functions.
Second, Parliament amended the CSIS Act to require CSIS officers to acquire judicial 
authorization for certain, intrusive investigative techniques, following “stringent 
criticism” of the original CSIS bill that was lacking in this respect.28 Finally, perhaps
22 Although the lower standard o f “reasonable suspicion” justifies investigative stops and detentions, this 
does not expand powers o f  search and seizure beyond pat-downs to ensure the safety o f officers and 
persons in the immediate area; R. v. Mann, [2004] 3 SCR 59; R. v. Simpson, [1993] 12 OR (3d) 182; 79 
CCC (3d) 482.
23 Canadian Security Intelligence Services Act, R.S.C, 1985, c. C-23, s. 12.
24 Sections 19 and 21 o f  the Privacy Act mandate heads o f  governmental institutions to refuse to disclose 
personal information that is received in confidence from foreign nations and permit them to refuse to 
disclose information the disclosure o f  which would, in their estimation, be injurious to, inter alia, counter­
terrorist activities; Privacy Act, R.S.C. 1985 c. P-21. The constitutionality o f these provisions was upheld in 
Ruby v. Canada (Solicitor General), [2002] 4 S.C.R. 3. Similar provisions may be found in ss. 13, 15, and 
20 o f the Access to Information Act R.S.C., 1985, c. A-.
25 The legislative framework for SIRC includes s. 6 and ss.34-46 o f the CSIS Act.
26 For a full list o f its powers and duties, see CSIS Act, supra note 23, s. 38.
27 Ibid. s. 39.
28 Ian Leigh, “Secret Proceedings in Canada” (1996) 34:1 Osgoode Hall Law Journal 113 at 133; CSIS Act, 
supra note 23, ss. 21-28.
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anticipating Charter challenges that had succeeded in the context of law-enforcement 
officers’ powers of search and seizure,29 but most directly due to specific controversies 
and recurring criticisms regarding warrant applications and surveillance practices,30 CSIS 
created and then revised an internal review process with respect to the use of intrusive 
investigative techniques. Officers must now secure permission from a Warrant Review 
Committee before applying to the Federal Court for a warrant permitting the use of 
designated investigative techniques.3'However, these reviews only occur during the 
course of domestic intelligence activities; no similar reviews are required regarding the 
acquisition of intelligence received from foreign agencies. Officers must also seek 
approval from the Target Approval and Review Committee in order to target individuals 
and organizations for investigation, using standards outlined in s. 2 of the CSIS Act.32
Although dividing security intelligence and policing functions no doubt is sensible, 
many observers believed that functional distinctions of this sort were “artificial, and that 
in fact the lines between the two were frequently blurred”. 33 In an attempt to remedy this 
problem, the RCMP and CSIS signed a Memorandum of Understanding in 1984 that 
outlined the conditions under which the agencies would share intelligence and other 
information.34 However, this agreement failed to ensure cooperation. For example, the 
Rae Report indicated that CSIS had deliberately failed to share essential information with 
the RCMP with respect to the Air India bombing and, what is more, it had even destroyed
29 Hunter et at. v. Southam Inc., [1984] 2 S.C.R. 145; R. v. Collins, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 265.
30 Leigh, supra note 28 at 134.
31 Security Intelligence Review Committee, Annual Report, 1987-88; Canada. House o f  Commons, In Flux 
but Not a Crisis: Report o f  the Special Committee on the Review o f  the Canadian Security Intelligence 
Service Act and Security Offences Act (Queen’s Printer, September 1990) at 14.
32 Security Intelligence Review Committee, Annual Report, 1986-87 at 36.
33 Rae, supra note 10 at 12.
34 Ibid., at 12. CSIS is also authorized to disclose intelligence and other information to law-enforcement 
agencies for the purposes of facilitating an investigation and/or prosecution; see CSIS Act, supra note 22, s. 
19.
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crucial pieces of evidence, pursuant to internal policy.35
The government reduced incentives for competition post-9/11 by increasing the 
funding and enlarging the responsibilities of both agencies and by trying to engender 
parallel or cooperative national security investigations.36 The creation of ITAC, the 
Cabinet Committee on National Security, and a National Security Advisor contribute to 
the realization of this latter objective. It is reasonable to conclude that information 
exchange between CSIS and the RCMP has improved at least partly due to post-9/11 
shifts in priorities. For example, in the aftermath of 9/11, CSIS and the RCMP were 
placed under enormous pressure to contribute to the identification of suspects and 
detection of possible future attacks.37 Lacking the capacity to conduct full and effective 
investigations on its own, and recognizing that the identification and capture of persons 
involved in the 9/11 attacks was largely a law-enforcement matter, CSIS transferred files 
on suspected terrorists of note to the RCMP, along with primary (though not exclusive) 
responsibility for future investigations.38 However, since anti-terrorism is directed 
towards both the prevention and punishment of terrorist acts, CSIS and the RCMP agreed 
to coordinate their efforts. Coordination was facilitated through periodic briefings and 
meetings as well as the provision of situation reports.39
At first glance, parallel investigations and enhanced cooperation between CSIS and 
the RCMP appear to run counter to the fundamental recommendation of the MacDonald
35Rae, supra note 10 at 16-17.
36 Securing an Open Society, supra note 11 at 16-17; Martin Rudner, “The Globalization o f Terrorism: 
Canada's Intelligence Response to the Post-September 11 Threat Environment” (September 2002) Canadian 
Issues 24.
37 Canada, Parliament, Report o f  the Events Relating to Maher Arar: Analysis and Recommendations 
(Ottawa: The Commission of Inquiry into the Actions o f  Canadian Officials in Relation to Maher Arar, 
2006) [hereinafter the “O’Connor Report”] at 66.
38 Ibid. at 66-67.
39 Ibid. at 69.
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Commission, namely, to maintain clear separations between security intelligence work 
and policing.40 In 2008, the Supreme Court of Canada noted that, the “division of work 
between CSIS and the RCMP in the investigation of terrorist activities is tending to 
become less clear than the authors of the (MacDonald) reports...originally envisioned”.41 
Should we therefore revise the regulatory frameworks applicable to CSIS and the RCMP 
in the context of national security investigations?
On the one hand, CSIS’ increasing role in furnishing Crown prosecutors with 
evidence to be used in trials suggests that it should be subject to more exacting rules 
governing privacy and disclosure in the context of criminal investigations and 
prosecutions. It follows that cases such as Atwal, which presumed clear functional 
distinctions between CSIS and law enforcement agencies, should be reconsidered.42 In 
addition to its direct involvement in criminal investigations and prosecutions, CSIS has 
been the primary source of evidence used in security certificate proceedings.43 Security 
certificates are used to indefinitely detain suspected terrorists and submit them to 
extended secret trials in their absence. If a judge finds the certificate to be reasonable, the 
government may deport named persons to face persecution abroad and, in some 
instances, a substantial risk of torture or similar abuse. Although not formally criminal 
proceedings, the Supreme Court of Canada has found that certificate proceedings are 
analogous to criminal prosecutions by virtue of the impact they can have on an accused’s 
dignity, life, liberty, and personal security.44
40 This, o f course, is not a necessary consequence. On this point, see R. v. Ahmad, [2009] O.J. No. 6153.
For a contrasting view and concern for maintaining clear functional distinctions, see the O ’Connor 
Report, supra note 37 at 312-315.
41 Charkaoui II, supra note 4 at para. 26.
42 These sorts o f issues are being raised; see Ahmad, supra note 40; R. v. Ahmad, [2011] 1 S.C.R. 110.
431 will provide a more detailed overview of security certificates below.
44 Charkaoui I, supra note 3.
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On the other hand, although the RCMP has assumed greater responsibilities in 
national security investigations, it is not subject to review mechanisms similar to those 
applicable to CSIS. This is somewhat surprising, since review mechanisms applicable to 
CSIS were designed precisely to prevent the re-occurrence of rights abuses committed by 
RCMP officers during the course of security intelligence work. Further, the RCMP has 
only recently begun adequately training its officers in security intelligence work. As the 
O’Connor report amply demonstrated, lack of training, minimal oversight and review and 
pressure to produce results all contributed to the sorts of illegalities and abuse of rights in 
the Arar affair that led to the creation of CSIS in the first place.45 If the RCMP is going to 
continue to engage in preventive national security investigations, there are good reasons 
to revise existing regulatory frameworks.
B. II. Global Intelligence Agency Cooperation 
Generally speaking, global intelligence agency coordination takes two forms: 
multilateral and bilateral46 Multilateral intelligence frameworks are formal regimes that 
host long-term interactions between the intelligence agencies of more than two states. 
They are often codified, setting out a range of governing rules and principles relating to 
such matters as burden-sharing, technology-sharing, targeting and coverage, operational 
collaboration, access to intelligence assets, and wholesale intelligence sharing 47 
Multilateral arrangements provide a range of benefits, including the enhancement of trust,
45 O ’Connor Report, supra note 37 at 23-25, 71-72, 107-111, 118, 323-324, 332-343.
46 For excellent pieces on multilateral and bilateral intelligence networks, see Aldrich, supra note 2; 
Reveron, supra note 14; Adam D. Svendsen, “Connecting Intelligence and Theory: Intelligence Liaison 
and International Relations” (2009) 24:5 Intelligence and National Security 700; Martin Rudner, “Hunters
and Gatherers: The Intelligence Coalition Against Islamic Terrorism” (2004) 17:2 International Journal of 
Intelligence and Counterintelligence 193; Glen M. Segell, “Intelligence Agency Relations Between the 
European Union and the U.S.” (2004) 17:1 International Journal o f Intelligence and Counterintelligence 81; 
Stephane Lefebvre, “The Difficulties and Dilemmas of International Intelligence Cooperation” ( 2003) 16:4 
International Journal o f Intelligence and Counterintelligence 527.
47 Rudner, supra note 46 at 195.
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increases in collective strength and resilience, and more effective pursuit of common 
interests. Regular, policy-oriented interactions among leaders within the intelligence 
communities of participating states also contribute to long-range planning and priority- 
setting. Finally, as international legal institutions, networks structured within multilateral 
frameworks are more amenable to direction and control by heads of government and/or 
state and their representatives.
However, multilateral arrangements also involve a number of distinct disadvantages. 
First, the operation of formal institutional arrangements can be hindered by extraneous 
variables, including the domestic laws and policies of participating states, international 
dynamics and “regime collisions” (e.g. between the demands of various multilateral 
arrangements or between multilateral arrangements and international human rights),48and 
differences in the internal culture of participating intelligence agencies.49 Second, 
although shrouded in secrecy, multilateral networks are designed to disseminate 
intelligence to a wide range of recipients, thus reducing individual intelligence agencies’ 
ability to control the precise locations to which their intelligence is sent. Shared 
intelligence may accordingly be kept generic by contributing agencies and, therefore, less 
useful, particularly with regard to ongoing operations.50
While multilateral arrangements are useful in many respects, intelligence agencies 
often prefer a “well-cultivated and closely monitored bilateral arrangement rather than 
exchanges within a group”.51 Bilateral frameworks arise when intelligence agencies enter
48 Gunther Teubner & Andreas Fischer-Lescano, “Regime-Collisions: The Vain Search for Legal Unity in 
the Fragmentation of Global Law” (2004) 25:4 Michigan Journal o f International Law 999.
49 Lefebvre, supra note 46 at 529.
50 Jennifer E. Sims, “Foreign Intelligence Liaison: Devils, Deals, and Details” (2006) 19:2 International 
Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 195 at 202.
5' Ibid. at 202.
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ad hoc relationships with agencies of a foreign country in relative autonomy from an 
over-arching international legal framework.52 Such relationships may be agency-wide, 
formally structured and set out in memorandums of understanding, or they may be 
informal, consisting in undocumented understandings between individuals or sub-groups 
within two or more agencies.53 In either case, bilateral arrangements tend to be structured 
by the “third-party rule”, in which any intelligence or other information sent to a 
requesting agency may not be disclosed to a third-party without the sending agencies’ 
express authorization. This rule helps maintain the bilateral nature of the relationship and 
maintains trust.
It is often said that a defining feature of bilateral intelligence relationships is that 
they “operate within the framework of each partner’s foreign and domestic policies and 
legal systems” rather than an international regime per se.54 Differences in domestic legal 
standards applicable within participating states may impede cooperation or, alternatively, 
it may incent agencies to find ways around accountability mechanisms. These issues have 
arisen more frequently post-9/11, as Canadian, US, and European agencies increasingly 
partner with Morocco, Syria, Afghanistan, and other non-traditional allies with poor 
human rights records.55
Canada has asserted some level of control over bilateral arrangements by
52Rudner, supra note 46 at 213; Lefebvre, supra note 46 at 533; Sims, supra note 50.
53 Lefebvre, supra note 46 at 533.
54 Rudner, supra note 46 at 214.
55 Svendson, supra note 9; Richard J. Aldrich, '"Global Intelligence Co-operation versus Accountability: 
New Facets to an Old Problem." (2009) 24:1 Intelligence and National Security 26; Chris Clough, "Quid 
Pro Quo: The Challenges of International Strategic Intelligence Cooperation." (2004) 17:4 International 
Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence: 601; Shlomo Shpiro, “ Intelligence Services and Political 
Transformation in the Middle East,” (2004) 17:4 International Journal o f Intelligence and Counter 
Intelligence, 575.
requiring that they be approved by high-ranking Cabinet Ministers.56Section 17 of the 
CSIS Act, for instance, requires that the Minister of Public Safety, after consulting the 
Minister of Foreign Affairs, approve CSIS’ cooperation with a foreign government or 
institution. The Minister must take into account the possible impact of intelligence 
relationships on domestic law and policy, on public confidence, on international legal 
obligations springing from multilateral arrangements and on international human rights. 
Canadian intelligence agencies are also legally obligated to control the information they 
acquire through the course of their investigations. RCMP policy, for example, requires 
officers to consider why a requesting agency wants information, to ensure that the uses to 
which that information will be put are consistent with Canadian law and policy, to screen 
information for reliability, to notify or acquire approval from senior officers in most 
cases, to ensure that disclosure of information complies with Canadian privacy laws and 
to attach caveats to released information outlining the uses to which that information may 
and may not be put.57 CSIS is constrained by similar policies and is, as we have noted, 
subject to regular reviews by SIRC.
Despite these measures, the governance of global intelligence agency cooperation 
has proven to be exceedingly difficult within Canada. Much of this problem has to do 
with tensions between the centripetal force exerted by governmental structures, laws, and 
policies, and the centrifugal force exerted by globalized threat environments. On the one 
hand, the intelligence community is part of a consolidated national security framework 
notionally structured by constitutional norms. On the other hand, it has been asked to 
perform functions that require it to immerse itself in polycentric, fluid, and largely
56 For CSIS and the RCMP, this is the Minister o f Public Safety Canada and the Minster o f Foreign Affairs 
and International Trade. See Lefebvre, supra note 46 at 535.
57 O ’Connor Report, supra note 37 at 22-23, 103-108.
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informal networks which transcend Canadian jurisdiction.
Intelligence officers, and presumably Cabinet members, will sometimes act as 
though the exigencies of counter-terrorism require the prioritization of questionable 
bilateral arrangements over adherence to legal rules. In other words, the ends will be 
taken to justify the means under certain circumstances. The O’Connor Commission 
Report illustrates these tensions well. As the public’s most comprehensive source of 
information on global intelligence agency cooperation, the O’Connor Report was 
concerned with Canada’s role in the US decision to detain and then deport Canadian 
citizen Maher Arar to Syria in 2002, where he was tortured for almost one year. The 
Commission found that the US had falsely identified Mr. Arar as a terrorist threat on the 
basis of inaccurate and misleading intelligence provided by the RCMP. In particular, the 
RCMP ignored policies governing inter-agency information exchange by transferring 
entire files in bulk format to US authorities without scrutinizing information for 
reliability, informing superior officers, or ensuring that they would not be used contrary 
to Canadian law and policy.58 Perhaps the most serious of these omissions was the failure 
to screen information for reliability and to specify that the information would not be 
circulated to third-parties.59 Together, these omissions resulted in Syria receiving highly 
inaccurate information from American authorities that implied Canada was indifferent to, 
if not fully supportive of, Mr. Arar’s deportation.
The Commission concluded that breach of official law and policy was the result 
of a number of factors, including tremendous political pressure applied by the US and
58 Ibid. at 23-24.
59 The O ’Connor Commission received conflicting testimony from investigating, managing, and 
supervising officers concerning whether unrestricted information exchange was a matter o f mistaken 
assumptions about the requirements o f policy or conscious decision to establish alternative, informal 
policies with respect to the Canadian-US intelligence relationship; Ibid. 109-111.
Canadian governments, lack of training for new counter-terrorism officers, and poor 
internal leadership, communication, and supervision. The Commission also concluded 
that Canadian authorities at the very least inadvertently facilitated the torture of Mr. Arar 
as well as Abdullah Almalki, another Canadian citizen detained in Syria, by sending 
Syria questions to be asked of the latter that implicated the former.60 These questions 
were sent despite knowledge of Syria’s human rights record and of the likelihood that 
each man was being or would be tortured.61 Although not directly mentioned in the 
report, it is possible that Canada was engaging in what has been called “extraordinary 
rendition” or “torture by proxy”, whereby persons are illegally removed to foreign 
countries to be tortured, with a view to producing actionable intelligence.62 There is 
considerable evidence that Canadian intelligence agencies worked with the US in 
precisely this way with respect to Ahmad El-Maati, Abdullah Almalki and others.63
B. III. Global Security Intelligence Practices and Extraordinary Measures: The Case of
Security Certificates 
Security certificates are a good example of the problems posed by global 
intelligence agency cooperation. In existence since 1976, the security certificate regime 
was reformulated in the 1990s and then again just prior to 9/11. Certificates are currently 
issued under the joint powers of the Ministers of Citizenship and Immigration and of
60 Ibid. at 206-207.
61 Ibid. at 179-1 SI.
62 “Torture by Proxy: International Law Applicable to ‘Extraordinary Renditions’” (The Centre for Human 
Rights and Global Justice) December 2005.
63 Stephen Grey, Ghost Plane: The True Story o f  the CIA Torture Program (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 
2006).
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Public Safety64 (“the Ministers”) and are issued against permanent residents and foreign 
nationals whom the Ministers to be inadmissible to Canada on the grounds of national 
security, the violation of human or international rights, or engagement in serious 
criminality or organized crime 650nce issued, certificates authorize the detention of non­
citizens pending a review of the reasonableness of the certificate by a Federal Court 
judge. Judges are required to order the continuation of a detention unless they are 
satisfied that the conditional release of a detainee would not be injurious to national 
security or endanger the safety of any person or that the detainee would be unlikely to fail 
to appear at a proceeding or for removal.66
If a certificate is ultimately found to be reasonable, it stands as conclusive proof 
that the person named is inadmissible and becomes, in effective, a removal order.67 
However, during the course of a review on the reasonableness of a certificate, a named 
person may apply to the Minister of Citizenship and Immigration for protection as a 
refugee or person in need of protection.68 In the event that the application is successful, 
the Ministers still may issue a “danger opinion”,69 enabling deportation notwithstanding 
that the person is at substantial risk of persecution (which is consistent with international 
law)70 and, in exceptional circumstances, torture and similar abuses (which is inconsistent
64 The Minister o f Public Safety (formerly the Minister o f Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness) 
replaced the Solicitor General in this capacity in 2005; see Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, R.S.C. 
2001, c. 27, s. 4 as am. by R.S.C. 2005, c.38, s. 118, R.S.C. 2008, c.3 s.l.
65 Ibid. s. 77(1).
66 Ibid. s. 82(5).
67 Ibid. s. 80.
68 Ibid. s. 112.
69 Ibid. s. 115(2)(b).
70 Convention relating to the Status o f  Refugees, 28 July 1951, 189 U.N.T.S. 150, Can. T.S. 1969/6 (entered 
into force 22 April 1954, accession by Canada 2 September 1969), arts. 1(F), 33.
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with international law).71
Thus, the certificate regime is one of the means by which domestic and global 
intelligence is put to practical use. Working under the direction of the Minister of Public 
Safety, CSIS provides the bulk of the intelligence and other information used in support 
of certificates. This information is collected pursuant to ongoing domestic investigations 
as well as from foreign sources. Given countries of origin, significant volumes of foreign 
intelligence concerning named persons come from non-traditional intelligence partners, 
such as Morocco, Syria, Egypt, and Algeria. The fact that named persons are physically 
removed to these countries to face arrest, detention, and possibly prosecution, highlights 
functional similarities between certificate and extradition proceedings, although much 
greater procedural safeguards attend the latter.72In these ways, certificates protect 
Canadian national security and, by denying safe haven to alleged terrorists, help us to 
discharge our international legal obligation to “cooperate on administrative and judicial 
matters to prevent (and punish) the commission of terrorist acts” regardless of where they 
might have occurred.73
Since most of the evidence supporting the Ministers’ allegations is derived from 
security intelligence, much of it is not disclosed to named persons or their legal counsel. 
In fact, until very recently, the Ministers enjoyed unfettered discretion to decide what 
information would be disclosed even to reviewing judges.74 This discretion authorized 
Ministers to withhold exculpatory evidence, such that a judge might only see materials
71 Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, 10 
December 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85, Can. T.S. 1987 No. 36, arts. 2,3,16; United Nations. Committee against 
Torture. Conclusions and Recommendations o f the Committee against Torture: Canada, UN Doc. 
CAT/C/XXV/Concl.4 (2000) at para. 6(a); Suresh v. Canada (Minister o f  Citizenship and Immigration), 
[2002] 1 S.C.R. 3 at paras. 59-75.
72 Graham Hudson, “The Administration o f Justice? Certificate Proceedings, Charkaoui II, and the Value 
o f Disclosure” (2010) 48:1 Alberta Law Review 195.
73 United Nations Security Council, 4385th Meeting, “Resolution 1373 (2001)” (S/RES/1373), 28 
September 2001; United Nations Security Council, 4956th Meeting, “Resolution 1540 (2004)” 
(S/RES/1540), 28 April 2004; United Nations Security Council, 5261st Meeting, “Resolution 1624 (2005)” 
(S/RES/1624), 14 September 200.
74 The Supreme Court removed this discretionary authority in 2008, requiring Ministers to disclose all 
information on file relevant to named persons. Reviewing judges then possess the power to order disclosure 
o f this information to named persons; Charkaoui //, supra note, 4.
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that supported the reasonableness of a certificate. For reasons not directly related to 
certificate proceedings, CSIS had adopted the policy of destroying its operational notes 
that were, in its estimation, no longer “strictly necessary” from the standpoint of ongoing 
investigations.75 These notes included originals of interviews with named persons and 
intelligence received from foreign countries. This policy contributed to the absence of 
full disclosure, not least to reviewing judges.
Security certificates raise issues that are strikingly similar to those identified by 
the O’Connor Commission. For example, in May 2003, the Ministers issued a certificate 
against Adil Charkaoui, a Moroccan-born permanent resident. At this point, several 
proceedings commenced regarding the reasonableness of the certificate and Mr. 
Charkaoui’s detention. On the advice of his counsel, Mr. Charkaoui requested that 
proceedings be postponed and, in July, he unsuccessfully applied to the Minister of 
Citizenship and Immigration for protection as a refugee or person in need of protection, 
pursuant to provisions governing pre-removal risk assessments.76 At the time, 
applications for protection had the effect of suspending the review of the reasonableness 
of the certificate.77 Mr. Charkaoui’s application for protection was refused on August 6, 
2004 and, on November 9, 2004, Noel J. scheduled the resumption of the review of the 
reasonableness of the certificate for February 21, 2005. However, upon hearing that 
Moroccan authorities had recently issued a warrant for Mr. Charkaoui’s arrest, Noel J. 
ordered that the Minister of Citizenship and Immigration reconsider Mr. Charkaoui’s 
request for protection. While this had the effect of suspending the resumption of the 
review of the reasonableness of the certificate scheduled for February, Noel J. properly 
proceeded to schedule a fourth detention review hearing for January 10,2005.
75 CSIS Act, supra note 23, s. 12
76 Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, R.S.C. 2001, c. 27 ss. 112-116.
77 Ibid. s. 79.
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However, on January, 5,2005, the Ministers disclosed to a reviewing judge a 
summary of two interviews which were held between Mr. Charkaoui and CSIS on 
January 31 and February 2,2002. Although CSIS had this summary in its possession in 
2002, it failed to provide it to the Ministers either prior to their decision to issue the 
security certificate or immediately after the commencement of proceedings. The 
Ministers claimed that the document “had not been produced because of an oversight”.78 
They also asserted that the original interviews could not be disclosed because they had 
been destroyed consistent with CSIS policy. A summary of the interviews was passed to 
the court and Mr. Charkaoui in lieu of the originals.
At the same time, the Ministers submitted additional evidence that they had 
recently received from the Moroccan government. This evidence stated that Moroccan 
authorities had identified Mr. Charkaoui as a member of the Groupe Islamique 
Combattant Marocain (GICM), that the GICM is linked to al-Qaeda and is allegedly 
responsible for terrorist attacks in Casablanca and Madrid, on May 16,2003 and March 
11, 2004, respectively, that Mr. Charkaoui took educational and theological training in 
Afghanistan in 1998, that he was identified by the emir of the GICM, that he set up funds 
to support international terrorist cells and that he sent money and resources directly to the 
GICM.79 As a result of these allegations, Moroccan authorities had issued an arrest 
warrant against Mr. Charkaoui and were anxious to have him returned to their 
jurisdiction.
Two interrelated normative issues are at play here. First, there are issues 
concerning the norms that apply to the receipt, retention, and disclosure of information,
78 Charkaoui//, supra  note 4 at para. 8.
79 Charkaoui (Re) (2005), F.C. 149 at para. 27.
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by Canadian agencies in the course of their interaction with countries that have poor 
human rights records. In Mr. Charkaoui’s case, CSIS worked closely with Morocco, a 
country long recognized to engage in torture and other human rights abuses, particularly 
when dealing with alleged terrorists.80 There is no evidence to suggest that CSIS made 
efforts to ensure that the investigative techniques used to generate evidence against Mr. 
Charkaoui were consistent with international or Canadian law or was credible.81 In fact, 
at the time, CSIS was under no serious obligation to do so.
Second, there are normative issues relating to the treatment Mr. Charkaoui would 
likely receive if deported to Morocco. Given Morocco’s human rights record, implicating 
Mr. Charkaoui in terrorism and attempting to deport him exposed him to the substantial 
risk of torture or similar abuse. Canada is internationally obligated to never deport a 
person to face a substantial risk of torture, even if such persons pose a national security 
risk. Generally speaking, parliament has implemented this international obligation, but 
has made an exception in the statute for persons named in a valid certificate.82 The 
Supreme Court similarly refused to give full effect to international human rights in this 
regard, ruling in Suresh v, Canada that the executive may, in “exceptional 
circumstances”, deport persons to face the substantial risk of torture.83In the absence of 
meaningful disclosure and adversarial challenge in certificate proceedings,84 the 
government runs the risk of exposing potentially innocent persons to face torture on the
80 Human Rights Watch. “Human Rights at a Crossroads” (October 2004) Vol. 16, No. 6(E), online: 
Human Rights Watch http://www.hrw.org/reports/2004/morocco 1004/ (date accessed: 11 August 2011); 
Human Rights Committee, 82nd Session, “ Concluding observations o f the Human Rights Committee: 
Morocco” (CCPR/CO/82/MAR1), 1 December 2004 at paras. 10, 14m 15-17, 19-21. For a more recent 
report, see, Amnesty International, Annual Report 2009, online: Amnesty International 
http://report2009.amnestv.org/en/regions/middle-east-north-africa/morocco (date accessed: 11 August 
2 0 1 1 ).
81 Parliament recently amended 1RPA to preclude the admissibility into certificate proceedings o f 
information believed on reasonable grounds to have been acquired, if  even indirectly, through the use o f 
torture or similar abuse; see the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, supra note 64, s. 83( 1.1). 
However, intelligence received through less egregious but still unlawful techniques is still admissible.
821RPA, supra note 64, s. 115.
83 Suresh, supra  note 71 at paras. 59-75.
84 Significant improvements have been made in this regard such as through the incorporation o f a “special 
advocate” regime into IRPA. I will review the nature and quality o f  this regime below.
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basis of misinformation and circumstantial evidence, much as the American authorities 
had done by rendering Mr. Arar to Syria.
C. Filling in the Gaps: International and Comparative Human Rights and
Constitutional Learning
In many ways, the legal dilemmas posed by post-9/11 intelligence practices are 
not new. Legal and political theorists have long observed that law loses its effectiveness 
during times of real or perceived crisis, as executive agencies employ extraordinary 
measures that are not, strictly speaking, justified by or based on pre-existing law.85 The 
legitimacy of such measures tends to be tested against political standards and, more 
practically, successfully invoked through the use of national security language and the 
exploitation of legal ambiguities or “indeterminacy”.
“Legal indeterminacy” describes the inability of law-no matter how clearly and 
definitely it may be described— to determine a single, incontestable solution to any legal 
problem86 It is caused by the dynamic and open-textured nature of legal texts, which 
yield a plurality of possible conclusions depending on how one interprets and presents 
legal and factual premises. As noted in earlier chapters, we can adopt a range of 
theoretical and normative stances on legal indeterminacy. Critical observers, such as 
radical legal realists, insist that judicial decisions are typically based on political or 
ideological assumptions that reinforce relations of domination, which results in the virtual 
collapse of the law/politics distinction.87 More optimistic observers -a  category into 
which one might place Koh, Toope and Brunnee — would counter that indeterminacy 
provides judges with an opportunity to use moral, ethical, and other non-state normative
85 Dyzenhaus, supra note 17; Gross, supra note 17.
86 The problem o f normative indeterminacy was perhaps most famously iterated by such legal realists as: 
Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., “The Path o f the Law” (1897) 10 Harvard Law Review 457; Herman Oliphant, 
“A Return to Stare Decisis” (1928) 14 American Bar Association Journal 71; Underhill Moore & Theodore 
Hope, “An Institutional Approach to the Law of Commercial Banking” (1929) 38 Yale Law Journal; Karl 
Llewellyn, “A Realistic Jurisprudence: The Next Step” (1930) 30 Columbia Law Review 431; Karl 
Llewellyn, “Some Realism about Realism: Responding to Dean Pound” (1931) 44 Harvard Law Review 
1222; Edward S. Robinson, “Law: An Unscientific Discipline” (1934) 44 Yale Law Journal 235
87 David Kairys, “ Law and Politics” (1984) 52 George Washington Law Review 243.
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frameworks to enhance the “congruence” of state law and ambient social values, 
practices, and expectations;88 a process I will describe as “constitutional learning”. In the 
former instance, judges use the values and beliefs of executive officials and other state 
authorities as bases of a decision, while in the latter instance they use the values and 
beliefs of non-state discursive communities and individuals most directly affected by 
state law. Implied in the optimistic view is that legal interaction is concerned with 
generating understanding and that judges will use their interpretive freedom to steer law 
towards the protection and promotion of constitutional values such as respect for rights 
and the rule of law. Also implied is that there exist adequate institutional “pathways” or 
vectors through which desirable public values, beliefs and expectations may find their 
way into discourses. As noted earlier, these pathways function best when participants to . 
legal process adhere to professional rules and principles that insulate dialogical 
interaction from the projection of raw political and ideological power.
In normal situations, either of these perspectives is tenable. In times of 
emergency, however, critical perspectives may seem more plausible. This may be 
because an emergency poses novel and complex problems the solutions to which 
lawmakers have not contemplated. Until such time as legal institutions produce workable 
laws, executive agencies have to base their decisions on non-legal criteria more germane 
to their areas of expertise. Dialogical rules that normally enhance openness and that slow 
down decision-making in order to submit argumentative positions to critical reflection 
become less influential than they otherwise might be; the unilateral decisions of executive 
officials increase in frequency and influence while critical positions are marginalized. 
Alternatively, there may be definite procedural and substantive rules pertinent to the 
resolution of problems that arise during an emergency, but the executive may consider
88 Jutta Brunnee & Stephen J. Toope, “International Law and Constructivism: Elements o f an Interactional 
Theory of International Law” (2000) 39:19 Columbia Journal o f  Transnational Law 19 at 49; Gerald J. 
Postema, Implicit Law (1994) 13 Law and Philosophy 361; Friedrich V. Kratochwil, Rules, Norms, and  
Decisions: On the Conditions o f  Practical and Legal Reasoning in International Relations and Domestic 
AJfairs, (Cambridge University Press, 1989)
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these rules to be inappropriate or impractical under the circumstances. In this situation, 
so-called “strategic maneuvering” increases in frequency and influence, as national 
security language may become relatively more powerful than that of human rights. When 
iterated in secretive and relatively exclusive judicial proceedings, such as certificate 
proceedings, national security discourse helps executive officials rationalize actions that, 
in normal situations, might be more effectively criticized as illegal or immoral. This 
practice is exemplified in the attempt by the Deputy Assistant Attorney General John 
Yoo and Assistant Attorney General Jay Bybee to expansively interpret the legal meaning 
of “torture” to help legitimize questionable interrogation techniques during the so-called 
“War on Terror”.89
Of course, parliament and the judiciary still have a role to play in times of crisis. 
In particular, they must decide how to react to invocations of exceptionality and the 
deployment of extraordinary measures. ̂ Parliament, for example, could amend ordinary, 
statutory law to more expressly prohibit, or alternatively to legalize, extraordinary actions 
post-facto. In the former case, one would rightly question the efficacy of these rules: 
would they lead to changes in executive conduct or stand, at best, as symbolic 
affirmations of the rule of law?9lIn the latter instance, one should query whether the 
“normalcy” formally provided post-facto by law legitimates practices that run counter to 
enduring legal values, such as human rights and the rule of law.92Emergency situations 
can pose a stark choice between upholding the symbolic value of law and promulgating 
rules that may mask “substantial damage to the rule of law” but which at least are 
comparatively effective.93
These are the sorts of considerations Canadian courts have made when reviewing
89 William Ranney Levi, “Interrogation's Law” (2009) 118 Yale Law Journal 1434.
90 John Ferejohn & Pasquale Pasquino, “The Law o f Exception: A Typology o f Emergency Powers” (2004) 
2 International Journal o f  Constitutional Law 210.
91 Even if purely symbolic, there may be value in defending the rule o f law; see David Dyzenhaus, Hard  
Cases in Wicked Legal Systems: South African Law in the Perspective o f  Legal Philosophy (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1991).
92 Gross, supra  note 17 at 66.
93 Dyzenhaus, supra  note 17 at 72.
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the constitutionality of national security law, policy, and practices. Of course, 
constitutional norms are as indeterminate as any other legal norms, if not more so. But 
courts seem to have filled in logical and semantic gaps in constitutional texts by relying 
on international and comparative human rights, suggesting that a TLP perspective on how 
judges can and do deal with indeterminacy even in times of crisis is tenable. In 
particular, we may suppose that international and comparative human rights norms help 
constrain the projection of political and ideological power in two ways. First, they 
reinforce the importance of maintaining adherence to professional rules that govern how 
adjudicative proceedings ought to be structured, thereby maintaining limits on the 
distorting effects which national security discourse can have on critical argumentation. 
Second, and more substantively, they provide a set of clear, definitive criteria concerning 
when and how human rights may be limited for reasons of national security. Legal 
definitions of and justifications for torture, for instance, will typically require one to 
reference international legal texts the meaning of which is clarified by multiple 
interpretive bodies, such as the Committee Against Torture.
Obviously, what kind of doctrinal approach they take to the law of reception will 
influence the relative ease with which judges may rely on international and comparative 
human rights in these procedural and substantive senses. TLP predicts that the relevant 
and persuasive doctrine is the most appropriate approach from a human rights 
perspective. No more determinate than other legal norms, and not always “binding”, 
international and comparative human rights texts nonetheless stand as relatively stable 
clusters of meaning that, when connected to each other, help triangulate points of 
common or shared meaning. When viewed in global context, this is a function that 
Charter rights do not perform; a presumption of minimal protection approach would 
simply invite courts to reduce the scope and content of binding international human rights 
in the same way they would reduce the scope and content of Charter rights. What would 
constrain this practice if not doctrine? In keeping with Toope and Brunnee’s theory, we
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might predict that diverse discursive communities connected to international and
comparative human rights regimes can help facilitate and constrain the interpretation of
domestic legal texts by establishing and reinforcing shared understandings concerning
matters of both procedure and substance. This, in turn, helps facilitate courts' learning
about the nature and context of a problem, the bodies of rules, principles, and standards
that bear on an issue, and the procedures by which political power may justifiably be
exercized. Shared understandings of this sort also constrain courts’ capacity to
uncritically reduce the scope, content, and applicability of rights; but these interpretive
constraints are not accessible if we do not blur boundaries among binding international
human rights, non-binding international human rights, and comparative human rights.
International human rights documents, when interpreted by discursive
communities, contain clear criteria concerning when and by what procedures human
rights may be limited in order to contend with a national emergency. Article 4(1) of the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights provides a typical example:
In time of public emergency which threatens the life of the nation and the existence of which is 
officially proclaimed, the States Parties to the present Covenant may take measures derogating 
from their obligations under the present Covenant to the extent strictly required by the exigencies 
o f the situation, provided that such measures are not inconsistent with their other obligations under 
international law and do not involve discrimination solely on the ground of race, colour, sex, 
language, religion or social origin.94
This sort of provision requires governments to expressly and officially declare a 
state of emergency and imposes limits on what kinds of extraordinary measures may be 
subsequently taken. In addition to ensuring that rights limitations are proportionate to the 
harm being avoided, there are absolute bars on derogations from certain rights, including 
rights to equality and non-discrimination, to life, and to be free from torture or similar 
abuses.95
International treaty bodies as well as international and foreign courts give greater 
depth to these provisions by commenting on whether extraordinary measures are justified
94 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, GA res. 2200A (XXI), 21 UN GAOR Supp. (No.
16) at 52, UN Doc. A/6316(1966); 999 UNTS 171; 6 ILM 368 (1967).
95 Ibid., art. 4(2)
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in particular cases. To begin, this requires the executive to tender justifications for 
extraordinary measures in terms that that are meaningful within a human rights discourse. 
Interpretive communities connected to international and comparative human rights 
regimes then scrutinize these justifications against autonomous legal values, standards 
and principles. This leads to the progressive filling in of legal gaps, as human rights 
norms are concretized and specified in the context of particular public emergencies. 
Ultimately, this discursive process helps compensate for legal indeterminacy in domestic 
norms, lending parliament and judges a richer array of normative materials upon which to 
rely when reviewing executive actions and assertions. It can also help motivate judges to 
ensure that executive officials adhere to professional rules that promote fair and critical 
argumentation, in effect limiting the use of extraordinary legal processes such as secret 
trials. Indeed, human rights-based discursive communities have on a number of occasions 
commented directly on how Canada’s role in global intelligence agency cooperation and 
use of secret legal proceedings have affected its human rights record and how national 
security and human rights may be more effectively balanced.96 As we will soon see, 
Canadian courts can also rely on the judgments of foreign courts that have reviewed the 
legality of similar practices and proceedings in other states.
Finally, a human rights perspective is closely linked to the notion of “human 
security”, which situates individual persons and communities, rather than states, as the 
referents of security discourse.97 This resonates with the kind of open, fluid and poly- 
centric argumentative interaction favoured by TLP theorists, highlighting that compliance 
with rules that protect equality, criticism and fairness in legal proceedings is all the more
96 International Commission o f Jurists, “Assessing Damage, Urging Action: Report o f the Eminent Jurists 
Panel on Terrorism, Counter-Terrorism and Human Rights” (Geneva. 2009) at 67-73; Human Rights 
Committee, Eighty-fifth Session, “Concluding Observations of the Human Rights Committee: Canada”, 
CCPR/Can/Co/5 20 April 2006, at paras. 14-16; Committee Against Torture, Thirty-fourth Session, 
“Conclusions and Recommendations o f the Committee Against Torture: Canada” CAT/C/CR/34/Can (7 
July 2005) at para. 4.
97 Buzan e / a/., supra  note 16; Commission on Human Security, Human Security Now. (New York:
United Nations. 2002), Keith Krause & C. Michael Williams, “Broadening the Agenda of 
Security Studies: Politics and Methods”, (1996) 40:2 Mershon International Studies
Review 229.
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important in times of perceived crisis. It also alters the purchase of securitizing langauge, 
which ordinarily depoliticizes executive action and insulates intelligence activities from 
political or legal contestation. If successfully invoked, human rights language can 
improve judges' willingness to constrain executive discretion concerning such issues as 
whether we are operating in an exceptional moment and, if so, what extraordinary 
measures are justified.
In sum, international and comparative human rights offer a measure of continuity 
necessary for navigating through changing regulatory environments, while also providing 
a package of language and norms suitable for constraining the arbitrary exercize of 
executive power. Functionally, they enable domestic interpretive communities to contend 
with legal indeterminacy in exceptional moments, offering a plurality of legal rules, 
principles, and standards appropriate to the judicial review of national security law and 
policy. Rhetorically, and dialogically, they strengthen jurists’ argumentative position vis- 
a-vis an executive, helping to ensure that legal indeterminacy — which can be a good 
thing— is used to protect and promote human rights rather than to rationalize relations of 
domination. Conceptually, international and comparative human rights resonate with 
autonomous legal values fundamental to the Canadian constitutional order, rendering 
judicial reliance on them both sensible and justifiable. Since classical doctrine is unduly 
restrictive with respect to the kind of human rights upon which judges may rely, the 
relevant and persuasive doctrine is the most appropriate approach to the law of reception 
when dealing with the human rights dimensions of Canadian national security law, policy 
and practices. The presumption of minimal protection is a less compelling option, since 
we can expect that a court that is willing to reduce the scope, content, and applicability of 
a Charter right to suit executive discretion would do the same to a binding international 
human right. The constraint on this practice is to be found, not in doctrinal mandates to 
treat binding international human rights as Charter rights, but in judges’ immersion in 
relatively stable structures of meaning characteristic of non-binding human rights norms
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(international and comparative) the deviation from which would render a judgment less 
principled and persuasive.
D. Putting Theory to Practice: International and Comparative Human 
Rights in Canadian Courts
Although in existence only since 1976, certificates nonetheless have achieved 
extraordinary notoriety for their procedural flaws (e.g. lack of disclosure and adversarial 
challenge) and substantive effects (e.g. discrimination against non-citizens and/or Arab- 
Muslims, indefinite detentions, deportation to face torture, etc.). They have become a 
conspicuous cornerstone of an alternate legal order that facilitates and, to a lesser extent, 
constrains executive discretion over matters of national security.
The utility of certificate proceedings in the context of anti-terrorism depends on 
global intelligence cooperation, both in terms of evidence to be used against named 
persons and in terms of the actionable intelligence received from the countries to which 
named persons are deported. In many of these areas, legal rules have been designed to 
enhance executive discretion and to expedite the judicial review of executive decision­
making. For these reasons, security certificates are a prime source of the problems raised 
by post-9/11 security intelligence practices and bear a disconcerting similarity to the 
processes leading to the extraordinary rendition of Mr. Arar and other Canadians. In this 
section, I will examine how engagement with international and comparative human rights 
during Charter reviews of certificate provisions and practices have helped courts “learn” 
to better regulate aspects of global intelligence agency cooperation. This will include an 
appraisal of whether international and comparative perspectives have helped protect and 
promote human rights in this context or, alternatively, whether they have helped 
normalize what are in many respects extraordinary measures.
182
D. I. National Security Confidentiality and International and Comparative Human 
Rights in the Federal Court (of Appeal) of Canada 
As mentioned, security certificate provisions facilitate executive discretion over 
the identification, detention and deportation of suspected terrorists. The procedural and 
substantive rules that have constrained the exercise of this discretion have changed 
considerably since 1976.1n their original form, certificate proceedings were overseen by 
the Security Intelligence Review Committee, an independent body of national security 
experts mandated to review CSIS. Decisions about the issuance of a certificate were, of 
course, made by the government, but SIRC and its legal counsel scrutinized and 
challenged the government’s allegations, issuing a recommendation about whether a 
certificate should be issued.98 SIRC’s recommendations and the government’s decision to 
issue a certificate were subject to judicial review by the Federal Court.99
As in contemporary proceedings, SIRC-based proceedings were often conducted 
in the absence of affected persons, who were also denied access to confidential 
information. However, SIRC and its legal counsel claimed the authority to access all 
information on the government’s file relevant to a certificate, to subpoena witnesses, and 
to communicate with affected persons throughout the course of proceedings. Legal 
counsel consisted primarily of SIRC in-house counsel and “legal agents” whose primary 
role was to ensure “SIRC’s fair conduct of an investigation”.100 However, outside counsel 
could be employed to help with workload or to conduct aggressive cross-examinations 
that might call SIRC’s impartiality into doubt were they conducted by in-house
98 For a comprehensive treatment o f the SIRC regime and its functions in the context o f security 
certificates, see Murray Rankin, “The Security Intelligence Review Committee: Reconciling National 
Security with Procedural Fairness” (1990) 3 C.J.A.L.P. 173.
99 Al Yamani v. Canada (Solicitor General), [1995] F.C.J. No. 1453 (FCTD); Moumdjian v. Canada 
(Security Intelligence Review Committee), [1999] F.C.J. No. 1160 (FCA).
100 Craig Forcese & Lome Waldman, Seeking Justice in an Unfair Process: Lessons from  Canada, the 
United Kingdom, and New Zealand on the Use o f  "Special Advocates " in National Security Proceedings 
(Ottawa: Faculty of Law [Common Law Section], University o f Ottawa, 2007) at 9.
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counsel.101 Although time-consuming, this process helped balance national security 
confidentiality with meaningful procedural fairness, disclosure and adversarial challenge.
Over the course of the mid-1990’s, parliament gradually eased SIRC out of this 
role, replacing it with the Federal Court. Just prior to 9/11, parliament granted the Federal 
Court exclusive responsibility for reviewing the reasonableness of all certificates and 
certificate-based detentions. Parliament instructed judges to conduct proceedings “as 
informally and expeditiously” as possible, to receive into evidence anything that, in their 
opinion, was reliable and appropriate, even if it is inadmissible in a court of law, and to 
base their decisions on that evidence.102 At the request of the Ministers, judges were 
required to hear evidence in the absence of the public, the named person, and his/her 
counsel, if the disclosure of such evidence could be injurious to national security or the 
safety of any person.103
The Federal Court’s enhanced role implied that executive discretion was being 
made subject to greater review, particularly since the court’s judgments are legally 
binding while SIRC’s views were merely advisory. However, the Federal Court was not 
expressly granted, nor did it assume, many of the powers that SIRC had assumed. This is 
to say that the court did not appoint amicus curae to access secret evidence, subpoena 
witnesses, attend secret hearings to advocate on behalf of a named person or 
communicate with named persons throughout a proceeding.
Shortly after 9/11, transnational human rights advocates challenged the 
constitutionality of certificate provisions on the ground that they undermined named 
persons' s. 7 rights to a fair trial (among other Charter rights). In making these claims, 
advocates relied on a mixture of historical and international and comparative law 
arguments. Historical perspectives included criminal law principles regarding disclosure,
,0' Ib id  at 8.
102IRPA, supra note 64, ss. 83 (a)(h-i).
103 Ib id , s. 83(c)
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procedural fairness, and adversarial challenge, the proven merits of the SIRC system in 
balancing national security confidentiality and rights, and other similar institutional 
arrangements, such as that adopted by the O’Connor Commission. International and 
comparative legal perspectives were rooted primarily in UK and ECtHR jurisprudence 
concerning the legality of national security-based deportation proceedings similar in kind 
to certificate proceedings. This jurisprudence was not, strictly speaking, “binding” as it 
flowed from an exclusively European human rights regime. Its successful invocation 
therefore depended on the authority of the relevant and persuasive doctrine and the 
persuasive appeal of analogical reasoning.
Indeed, underscoring Toope and Brunnee’s interactional theory of law, 
transnational human rights advocates’ primary rhetorical strategy was to analogize the 
9/11 certificate regime to a similar UK regime that the ECtHR had found to be 
incompatible with the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) in its 1996 
judgment, Chahal v. The United Kingdom.104 As with Canadian security certificates, the 
UK regime granted the executive extensive discretion to deport non-citizens that it 
believed threatened national security. It similarly allowed the government to base its 
decisions about deportation on secret evidence the reliability and sufficiency of which 
was not subject to independent review or adversarial challenge. The government did 
allow affected persons to appeal decisions to a special “advisory panel”, which was 
chaired by a judge and a senior immigration official.105 However, the panel was only 
authorized to issue advisory opinions about the merits of decisions, and typically used a 
low standard of review. Although given an opportunity to make representations, to call 
witnesses, and to seek assistance from “a friend” during advisory proceedings, deportees 
were not entitled to legal representation, to knowledge of representations made about 
them by others, or to be informed of the advice the panel gave to the government.
[1996] ECHR 54.
105 /bid. at paras. 29-32, 60.
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One of the ECtHR’s primary concerns was that persons subject to this system 
would face the substantial risk of torture or similar abuse if deported after having been 
labeled national security risks. After clarifying that the UK may not under any 
circumstances deport persons to face torture,106 the ECtHR held that the use of 
confidential evidence in the absence of meaningful adversarial challenge violated Article 
5(4) of the ECHR.107 Interestingly, the ECtHR relied on the then-operative SIRC system 
to demonstrate that an alternative, less restrictive process could have been used in the 
UR 108 While conscious of the necessity of secrecy in national security proceedings, the 
ECtHR demanded that there be an adjudicative framework sufficiently distanced from the 
executive, capable of ensuring that investigations and decisions were made fairly, and 
empowered to provide remedies for human rights abuses. This demand required that 
decisions about the deportation of national security risks be preceded by argumentative 
interactions that reflect principles of equality, criticism/adversarial challenge and 
procedural fairness; principles that ideally minimize the distorting effects of national 
security discourse on legal decision-making.
In response, the UK introduced a Special Immigration Appeals Commission 
(SIAC), which it loosely modeled after the SIRC system. Positively, it provided persons 
facing deportation for reasons of national security with security-cleared special advocates 
mandated to represent their interests during secret hearings. However, the UK omitted 
from the SIAC model many features characteristic of the SIRC system. First, special 
advocates were not authorized to subpoena documents and witnesses, whereas SIRC had 
access to all information on file relevant to a case. UK special advocates have been 
restricted to the use of information the government has prepared for the SIAC, which is 
unlikely to be exculpatory in nature. Second, the UK prohibits special advocates from 
communicating with detainees after having accessed classified documents, whereas SIRC
106 Ibid. at paras. 95-107.
107 Ibid. at paras. 124-133.
108 Ibid. at para. 144.
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counsel possessed the power to communicate with named persons throughout the entirety 
of proceedings. This power was an essential part of the SIRC regime, as it enabled secret 
counsel and named persons to clarify misunderstandings, explain circumstantial evidence 
and modify legal strategies. Third, UK special advocates were denied adequate resources 
and administrative support and prohibited from networking with other advocates. Finally, 
the SIAC was composed of judges as well as immigration officials, whereas SIRC was 
staffed entirely by laypeople with expertise in national security, intelligence, and human 
rights. While advantageous in some respects, the inclusion of the judiciary has led to 
power struggles between legal and national security experts, with one well-respected 
expert having resigned as a result.109
Drawing attention to these well-documented shortcomings,110 transnational 
human rights advocates analogized the 9/1 lcertificate regime to the UK’s prt-Chahal 
deportation model, emphasizing that Canada was dismantling rights protections at the 
same time as the UK was adding them. Yet, the UK’s SIAC model was still defective in 
important respects and, at the time Charkaoui I  was decided by the Federal Court, it was 
not clear whether it was wholly compatible with the ECHR. International and 
comparative human rights served as a useful point of relevance, but the old SIRC regime 
remained the best benchmark against which the 9/1 lcertificate regime could be 
measured.
The Federal Court was not persuaded by human rights advocates’ historical and 
comparative law arguments, ruling that reviewing judges in Canada were capable of 
effectively deciding on the basis of the facts and law relatively free from executive
109 Brian Barder, “On SIAC” (2004) 26:6 London Review of Books 40.
lloForcese & Waldman, supra  note 100. United Kingdom, House o f Commons and House o f Lords, Joint 
Committee on Human Rights, “Review o f Counter-terrorism Powers, Eighteenth Report o f Session 2003- 
2004” HL 158, HC 173 (4 August 2004) at para 40; United Kingdom, House of Commons, Constitutional 
Affairs Committee, “The Operation o f the Special Immigration Appeals Commission (SIAC) and the use of 
Special Advocates-Seventh Report o f  Session 2004-2005” Vol. I, HC 323-1 (3 April 2005)
interference.11’ This position depended on an unarticulated distinction between the 
formal, legislative scheme and the informal, discretionary features of the certificate 
regime. Formally, the 9/11 certificate regime more closely resembled the UK’s advisory 
panel than the SIRC model (or even the SIAC model), as the Federal Court was neither 
expressly granted nor claimed the powers that had enabled SIRC and its counsel to 
effectively perform an adversarial role. If the UK’s advisory system fell well below 
international human rights standards, the post-9/1 lcertificate regime would do so as well. 
Looking beyond legislative language, however, the Federal Court asserted that reviewing 
judges possessed the legal expertise, requisite experience with security intelligence 
matters, and the will to rigorously challenge government lawyers and witnesses. This 
informal or discretionary dimension was, in the court’s view, sufficient to bring the 
certificate regime into conformity with constitutional -  if not international- values 
associated with human dignity and the rule of law. Otherwise put, reviewing judges were 
trusted to secure compliance with professional rules and principles protecting equality, 
criticism and fairness, even though legislation specifically mandated that argumentation 
be expedited and relatively one-sided.
D. II. National Security Confidentiality and International and Comparative 
Human Rights in the Supreme Court of Canada 
On appeal, the Supreme Court overruled aspects of the Federal Court’s rulings, 
holding that reviewing judges were not adequately positioned to decide on the basis of 
the facts or law and, accordingly, that certificate provisions unjustifiably infringed named
Charkaoui v. Canada (Minister o f  Citizenship and Immigration), [2004] 3 F.C.R. 32; Charkaoui v. 
Canada (Minister o f  Citizenship and Immigration) (2004), F.C.A. 421.
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persons’ s. 7 right to a fair trial.112 A threshold issue was whether s. 7 principles germane 
to criminal law should be applied to certificate proceedings which, to recall, are formally 
a part of immigration and refugee law. The government argued that parliament should be 
held to lower constitutional standards in the design of certificate proceedings because 
these proceedings are administrative in nature and because non-citizens do not enjoy an 
unqualified right to remain in Canada. These were arguments that had proven to be 
highly persuasive in the past.113
Transnational human rights advocates responded that immigration and refugee 
law had effectively been subsumed within an alternative legal system rooted within 
global counter-terrorism law and policy. Although historically concerned with 
deportation, certificates were now performing functions akin to extradition, namely, to 
expose alleged terrorists to arrest, prosecution, and/or torture abroad. Again invoking 
analogical reasoning, advocates noted that the ECtHR ruled in ChahalftaX the severe 
impacts of national security-based deportations on individual rights require a high level 
of procedural and substantive rights.
Historically, courts have often sided with the government and parliament on these 
issues. In Chiarelli, for example, the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the 
SIRC system largely on the basis that certificate proceedings are administrative in nature 
and that non-citizens do not possess an unqualified right to enter and remain in 
Canada.114 However, this trend in legal reasoning was refracted when viewed through
112 Charkaoui /, supra note 3.
113 Dehghani v. Canada (Minister o f  Employment and Immigration), [1993] 1 S.C.R. 1053, at p. 1077. For 
critical commentary on this point, see Hamish Stewart, “Is Indefinite Detention o f  Terrorist Suspects Really 
Constitutional?”(2005) 54 U.N.B.L.J. 235.
114 Chiarelli, supra note 1.
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four factual and normative lenses that we may link to international and comparative 
human rights.
First, oral submissions, facta and judicial notice of evolving case law, 
parliamentary and other official reports, scholarship and the views of human rights 
interpretive communities all contributed to the Court’s recognition that security 
intelligence practices have changed markedly post-9/11. The Court was acutely aware 
that persons named in certificates post-9/11 have all immigrated to Canada from 
countries with poor human rights records and with which Canada has only recently 
forged bilateral intelligence relations. The Court was accordingly alive to the human 
rights dimensions of global intelligence networks involving non-traditional partners and 
of the risks named persons would face if deported. Mr. Charkaoui’s counsel and 
interveners on his behalf ~  most notably Barbara Jackman -- were also careful to remind 
the Court of Canada’s international human rights obligations not, under any 
circumstances, to return persons to face torture; an observation that may be confirmed by 
viewing video records of oral submissions before the Supreme Court. Also present within 
these records are repeated suggestions that Canada’s international reputation as a leader 
of human rights would be further tarnished if the impugned provisions were upheld. The 
importance of interveners in communicating global human rights perspectives to the 
Court supports Koh, Toope and Brunee’s emphasis on critical, transnational interaction 
and the prospects of norm-intemalization or persuasion.
Second, the court was therefore conscious of international and foreign trends 
towards providing enhanced protection to non-citizens in the context of national security- 
based detention and deportation proceedings. The United States Supreme Court had
recently affirmed that non-citizens detained in Guantanamo Bay possess the 
constitutional right to habeas corpus} 15The UK House of Lords had similarly ruled in Re 
A and Others that the UK’s version of security certificates unjustifiably discriminated 
against non-citizens. And in Silvenko v. Latvia, the ECtHR expressed a willingness to 
submit states to fairly exacting review of decisions to deport persons for posing a threat 
to national security.116 These decisions, all of which were expressly cited in the 
Charkaoui I judgment and the facta of litigants, made it difficult for the Supreme Court 
of Canada to uncritically accept that non-citizens do not deserve robust procedural 
protections during national security-based detention and deportation proceedings.
Third, the Court’s reasoning was almost certainly influenced by the factual and 
normative findings of the O’Connor Report which, to recall, was expressly cited by the 
Court. This report exhaustively detailed shifting global contexts, the Canadian 
government’s increasing reliance on, or complicity in, extraordinary rendition, and 
obvious human rights abuses caused by intelligence agencies’ circulation of 
misinformation. The Court saw clear connections among security certificates, 
extraordinary rendition and the perils of under-regulated intelligence practices, all of 
which had roots within the darker domains of global counter-terrorism law and policy. 
Quoting the Commission’s report, the Court expressed concern that the unfettered 
circulation of misinformation and the absence of adequate review and accountability 
mechanisms with respect to security intelligence practices may have negative effects on 
the integrity of immigration and refugee law in general, not to mention the rights of
115 Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004); Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001).
116 [GC], No. 48321/99, E.C.H.R. 2003-X.
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named individuals.117 Crucially, analogies between Arar’s experience and that of 
individuals named in certificates were easily made, despite the fact that the latter were by 
definition not Canadian citizens. This underscored the influence of international human 
rights, where such distinctions have little relevance. The overall thrust of the Court’s 
reasoning was that the government was using comparatively lax evidentiary standards 
characteristic of immigration and refugee law to shield it from more demanding standards 
characteristic of criminal and extradition proceedings. Insofar as the Court had already 
analogized the former to the latter, it predictably concluded that unchecked national 
security confidentiality would restrict “the ability of courts to guarantee individual 
rights”.118
Finally, the Court was wary of the language of exceptionality that characterized 
post-9/11 national security discourse. It noted that the nature of terrorism is indeed such 
that the “executive branch of government may be required to act quickly, without 
recourse, at least in the first instance, to the judicial procedures normally required for the 
deprivation of liberty or security of the person”.119 Speaking to the ability of the law to 
guide decision-making of this nature, the Court added that, if the exigencies of counter­
terrorism “makes it impossible to adhere to the principles of fundamental justice in their 
usual form, adequate substitutes may be found”.120
In this last dimension of its judgment, the Supreme Court seemed to be stating 
that, even in exceptional moments, legal interaction should be structured fairly and in 
such ways as to facilitate criticism and adversarial challenge. It also seemed to be stating
117 Charkaoui k  supra  note 3 at para. 26.
11H /h id  at para. 26
119 /bid. at para. 24
120 Ib id  at para. 23.
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that, even in times of perceived emergency, indeterminate law can and should be infused 
with moral and ethical perspectives that challenge relations of domination. It did not, 
however, pronounce on the issue of whether the attacks of 9/11 have in fact created an 
ongoing public emergency. As we have seen, even international human rights allow for 
the limitation of rights to contend with emergencies that plausibly threaten the life of a 
nation. The Charter similarly authorizes the imposition of such reasonable limits on 
guaranteed rights as can be “demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society”.121
It is here that an optimist might have expected the court to directly rely on 
international and comparative human rights norms. Yet, these norms might actually have 
helped to rationalize the further diminution of human rights, supporting the critical 
perspective and weakening the hypothesis of TLP that international and comparative 
human rights improve the quality of domestic decision-making. In Re A  and Others, for 
instance, the UK House of Lords approached the questions of whether the threat of 
transnational terrorism 9/11 stands as a public emergency and what criteria judges should 
use in deciding about the necessity and legality of extraordinary measures. It began by 
stating that “the function of independent judges charged to interpret and apply the law is 
universally recognised as a cardinal feature of the modem democratic state, a cornerstone 
of the rule of law itself’, and as therefore incompatible with excessive deference to 
executive decision-making.122 However, it went on to say that the UK government was 
justified in treating the mere threat of a terrorist attack post-9/11 as a public “emergency 
threatening the life of the nation”.123 On the strength of this factual finding, the court
121 Constitution Act, 1982, Enacted as Schedule B to the Canada A ct 1982, (U.K.) 1982, c. 11, s. 1.
m  A  v. Secretary o f  State f o r  Home Department (Re A), [2005] 3 All E.R. 169, [2004] U.K.H.L. 56 at para.
42.
125 Ibid. at para. 118; this decision was released before the July 7, 2005 London Bombings.
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ruled that derogations from the ECHR in which persons can be indefinitely detained on 
the strength of undisclosed evidence is justified.
The finding that the mere threat of transnational terrorism constitutes a permanent 
or ongoing public emergency does not sit well with the views of most human rights-based 
discursive communities.124 The prevailing view among non-state, or at least non-judicial, 
discursive communities is that emergencies are temporary events that threaten, or are 
imminently about to threaten, a nation and should be invoked sparingly. Derogations 
from human rights should therefore be temporary in nature and demonstrably necessary 
to enable a state to restore order. Extraordinary measures cannot, in other words, be used 
indefinitely, but must be carefully tailored to respond-to a specific threat and then be 
dismantled. The purpose of imposing temporal restrictions on the invocation of 
emergencies is to guard against the gradual ratcheting down of rights and the 
normalization of practices that should be used sparingly and only at the utmost extremes 
of need.
Although perhaps unsurprising in light of the July 7, 2005 London bombings, the 
ECtHR modified its earlier position by siding with the House of Lords in its 2009 
judgment on Re A  and Others. The ECtHR stated in unequivocal terms that certain 
international human rights may be derogated from in order to contend with an emergency 
that is neither immanent nor immediately manifest.125Since the facts and issues of this
124 Report o f Alvaro Gil-Robles, Commissioner for Human Rights, on his Visit to the United Kingdom, 
CommDH(2005)6/8 June 2005 at paras. 5-8; Directorate General o f Human rights. Council of Europe. 
“Human rights and the fight against terrorism: The Council o f Europe Guidelines” (March 2005) ;The 
United Nations Committee on the Elimination o f All Forms o f Racial Discrimination “Concluding 
Observations: United Kingdom” CERD/C/63/CO/11, 10 December 2003 at para. 17; Council o f Europe 
Parliamentary Assembly Resolution 1271 “Combating terrorism and respect for human rights” (2002) at 
paras. 9, 12(v); United Nations Human Rights Committee, “General Comment No 29 on Article 4 o f the 
ICCPR” CCPR/C/21/Rev.l/Add.l 1,31 August 2001 at para. 2.
125 A. a n d  Others v. the United Kingdom. [2009] E.C.H.R. 301 at paras. 178-180.
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case —but not the judgment- arose prior to the London bombings, this argument makes 
clear that a public emergency can be initiated by the mere threat of a transnational 
terrorist attack and the gravity of harm that might follow should the government fail to 
act. It noted that “case-law has never, to date, explicitly incorporated the requirement that 
the emergency be temporary”126 and that “national authorities enjoy a wide margin of 
appreciation... in assessing whether the life of their nation is threatened by a public 
emergency”.127 Still, the ECtHr’s statement does not address the pervasive view among 
human rights communities, constructed out of experience as well as moral considerations, 
that the protection and promotion of human rights requires that invocations of 
emergencies and deployment of extraordinary measures be time-limited. Granting the 
executive a “wide margin of appreciation” with regards to identifying and defining 
emergencies contributes to the legitimization of extraordinary measures that may be used 
indefinitely.
It is perhaps a good thing, then, that the Supreme Court of Canada did not directly 
consider available international and comparative human rights on this point when 
deciding whether s. 7 infringements caused by the certificate regime could be justified 
under s. 1 of the Charter. It instead began by exploring received wisdom about how to 
balance national security confidentiality and individual rights in Canadian contexts, 
paying special regard to the old SIRC system and the procedures adopted by the 
O’Connor Commission. The SIRC system was an obvious candidate for consideration, 
but also problematic given that parliament had deliberately dismantled it. The O’Connor 
Commission was an important additional resource since it was modeled after the former
126 Ibid. at para. 178
127 Ibid. at para. 180.
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SIRC system, was successful in balancing national security confidentiality and disclosure 
in a more contemporary context, and had generated significant public awareness around 
these issues. The insights offered by the O’Connor Commission’s approach to national 
security confidentiality merit special attention. The O’Connor Commission used two 
security-cleared legal counsel (Ronald Atkey and Paul Cavalluzzo) to attend in camera 
proceedings in which privileged information was examined. Commissioner O’Connor’s 
original plan was to examine evidence in these closed proceedings and then make 
available such information as could safely be disclosed to Mr. Arar and others who 
attended the open hearings. This would have given Mr. Arar and others the opportunity to 
challenge the government, thereby producing a better factual record. However, this plan - 
was stonewalled when the government began claiming exceedingly broad national 
security confidentiality and applying to the Federal Court under s. 38 of the Canada 
Evidence Act'28 to prohibit the Commission from disclosing information. These tactics 
would have forced the Commission to delay its investigation in order to fight national 
security confidentiality challenges in court. Commissioner O’Connor responded by 
continuing closed proceedings without disclosing any information, with a view to ruling 
contending with all the government’s confidentiality claims once the Commission 
finished its inquiry. This meant that Mr. Arar, his legal counsel, and other interested 
parties were unable to cross-examine government witnesses or effectively challenge the 
government’s position during open hearings. To compensate for this, Commissioner 
O’Connor authorized Messrs. Atkey and Cavalluzzo to adopt an assertive, adversarial 
role, pressing government witnesses on their testimony and on the strength and 
sufficiency of their evidence.
128 R.S.C. 1985, c. C-5, 2001, c. 41, as am. by R.S.C. 2001, c. 41.
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It is reasonable to say that, post-O’Connor, we now possess a wealth of 
experience, institutional blueprints and received wisdom concerning how to effectively 
protect the integrity of legal proceedings touching on matters of national security. 
However, despite the availability of these resources, the Court chose to view the UK’s 
SIAC model as a possible alternative to the impugned certificate provisions. It expressly 
recognized the deficiencies of the SIAC system as highlighted in successive UK 
parliamentary reports, by human rights organizations and by UK special advocates 
themselves.129 The Court nonetheless went on to note that some members of SIAC have 
“commented favourably on the assistance provided by special advocates”.130
Two implications flow from the Court’s choice in Charkaoui I  to cite the 
strengths of the UK system while minimizing its well-documented flaws. First, the 
international human rights which the UK model transgresses have no binding force in 
Canada; they are norms our government may respect, but is not obligated to do so. It is 
indeed true that the pronouncements of the ECtHR and the norms of the ECHR are not 
binding on Canada. However, the ECtHR’s judgments are sourced in international 
treaties to which Canada is bound, namely, the International Convention Relating to the 
Status o f Refugees and the International Convention Against Torture. Insofar as the UK’s 
system and Canada’s security certificates have analogous effects on affected persons, we 
may infer that the latter contravene international treaty law binding on Canada. The Court 
discounted the relevance of this inference, suggesting, in keeping with the relevant and 
persuasive doctrine, that binding international human rights are no different from 
comparative human rights or any other non-legal interpretive resource and so “may” be
129 Charkaoui I. s upra note 3 at para. 83.
130 Ibid. at para 84.
197
refereed to. In this respect, the presumption of conformity doctrine and the conception of 
compliance it embodies might have been more useful to human rights advocates, 
although even here the resulting norms might have been too vague to add depth to 
domestic normative materials. In any event, the constitutional dimensions of security 
certificates were sketched out in the absence of extensive international human rights 
analysis.
Second, the Court tried to obscure the failings of the SIAC system by suggesting 
that the opinions of the English judiciary on the matter are more informative or 
authoritative than those of non-state actors. The critical views of civil society groups and 
special advocates themselves were apparently regarded as less “legal” than moral or 
political in nature, and so did not stand up nearly as well as relevant and persuasive 
sources of insight. There was a clear selection bias at play in terms of which discursive 
communities the Court was willing to engage with. This underscores the normative 
pitfalls associated with transjudicialism, which may tend less towards the emergence of a 
global rule of law than it does the replication and expansion of well-engrained legal 
ideologies, an observation that is consistent with a critical view of legal indeterminacy, 
most especially in the context of real or perceived crises. It also reinforces the difficulties 
transnational human rights advocates face in penetrating channels of authoritative 
decision-making. Although seemingly influential, the perspectives of non-state discursive 
communities carry considerably less weight than those of foreign state actors.
In any event, following Charkaoui I, the government amended certificate 
provisions ostensibly in the image of the UK’s SIAC system, but failing to expressly 
include many of the features that made the SIRC system and the O’Connor Commission
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effective. Positively, it authorized security-cleared special advocates to represent named 
persons during secret proceedings, to access classified evidence, to challenge that 
evidence, and to seek disclosure of evidence that has been withheld.131 It also reinforced 
reviewing judges’ discretionary authority to make use of SIRC-style powers on a case- 
by-case basis.132 However, the value of disclosure has been only partially realized, as 
special advocates are not expressly empowered to subpoena documents or witnesses and 
were expressly forbidden from communicating with named persons or their counsel about 
any matter whatsoever after having accessed classified evidence, unless authorized to do 
so by reviewing judges.133 It is unclear how often this occurs.
D. III. Appraising the Impacts of International and Comparative Human 
Rights: Current Trends and Future Trajectories 
On the whole, international and comparative human rights were relevant but 
decidedly capricious feature of Charkaoui I. Transnational human rights advocates 
effectively used them to characterize certificates as extraordinary measures; no small feat 
considering that they have been staples of immigration and refugee law since 1976. This 
rhetorical success was made possible by the arguments and facts collected by various 
discursive communities that describe the human rights dimensions of global intelligence 
agency cooperation and that associate certificate proceedings with extradition and, more 
debatably, extraordinary rendition. Advocates were able to arrange this information to 
cast certificates as keystones, not in immigration and refugee law perse, but in a 
functionally differentiated national security framework that facilitates, but does not 
adequately constrain, executive discretion. This motivated the Court to reconsider the
m IRPA, supra note 64, ss. 85.1 (1)(2), 85.2.
132 Ibid., ss. 85,2(c), 85.4(2)(3), 85.5.
m  /b id , ss. 85.4(2)(3), 85.5.
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constitutional dimensions of certificates and ultimately to compel parliament to find 
alternative approaches that better protect human rights. In these respects, transnational 
human rights advocates seemed poised to succeed in securing executive officials and 
reviewing judges’ compliance with professional rules and principles associated with 
critical argumentation and, accordingly, in improving the likelihood that the substantive 
rights of named persons would be better protected.
However, international and comparative human rights had the contrary effect 
during the court’s s. 1 analysis. The Court’s proposition that the SIAC system would 
likely pass constitutional muster if incorporated into Canada ignored the received wisdom 
of various discursive communities and downplayed the viability of domestic approaches 
taken by SIRC and the O’Connor Commission. This made it easier for parliament to 
make the bare minimum of changes and to reject a prior domestic regime with a proven 
record of effectiveness. All this occurred without the court explicitly referencing 
comparative human rights case law, including a holding by the House of Lords that 
courts should defer to the UK government with regards to whether the perpetual threat of 
transnational terrorism stands as a public emergency warranting the indefinite use of 
extraordinary measures.
Still, perspectives contributed by human rights-based discursive communities help 
us appraise the strengths and weaknesses of judgments about the legality of extraordinary 
measures. In particular, we can criticize judgments for deviating in substantial ways from 
shared understandings concerning what is a public emergency, who ought to decide if 
there is an emergency and by what criteria, whether extraordinary measures that limit 
human rights are justified (and for how long), and what rules and principles ought to
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structure adjudication over such matters. Critics would reply that Charkaoui I  was a 
hollow victory, with the Court having used the rhetoric of human rights to legitimize an 
abusive regime. However, there is some evidence to suggest that courts have been 
striving, and will continue to strive, towards imposing more meaningful constraints on 
executive discretion post -Charkaoui f, though ,once again, with virtually no direct 
reference to international and comparative human rights.
In the 2008 case of Charkaoui II, transnational human rights advocates shifted 
gears and challenged the constitutionality of executive policies and practices, rather than 
of legislative provisions. Since the Supreme Court had found that certificate proceedings 
are analogous to criminal proceedings, and since CSIS provides the bulk of evidence used 
in certificate proceedings, it follows that CSIS is performing or facilitating the 
performance of law-enforcement functions. Transnational human rights advocates argued 
that CSIS should therefore be held to evidentiary standards analogous to those binding on 
law enforcement agencies. In particular, it should be obligated to retain and disclose to 
reviewing judges and special advocates operational notes regarding a person named in a 
certificate. An obligation of this nature would enhance the truth-seeking function of the 
court by improving special advocates’ capacity to rigorously challenge the government’s 
allegations and its resistance to requests for disclosure.
This was in effect a second attempt to inject features of the old SIRC system into 
certificate proceedings and it seems to have worked. The Supreme Court sided with 
human rights advocates and required CSIS and the Ministers to disclose to the court and 
special advocates all information on file regarding a person named in a certificate. In 
justifying this unprecedented decision, the Court spent considerable time outlining the
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changing nature and global context of security intelligence work. It noted that CSIS has 
increasingly been co-operating with the RCMP in the investigation of threats to national 
security. Noting that the “activities of the RCMP and those of CSIS have in some 
respects been converging”, and that the information which CSIS collects and distributes 
may be used in criminal proceedings, the court found it necessary to revise its long­
standing assumption that “CSIS cannot be subject to the same duties as a police force”.134 
The Court also noted that a heightened duty to retain information is essential to 
improving the quality of Ministerial decision-making prior to the commencement of 
certificate proceedings:
The submission o f operational notes to the ministers and to the designated judge may be necessary 
to ensure that a complete and objective version o f the facts is available to those responsible for 
issuing and reviewing the certificate. The retention and accessibility o f  this information is of 
particular importance where the person named in the certificate and his or her counsel will often 
have access only to summaries or truncated versions o f the intelligence because o f  problems 
connected with the handling o f information by intelligence agencies. In addition, the destruction 
of information may sometimes hinder the ability o f  designated judges to effectively perform the 
critical role, delegated to them by law, o f assessing the reasonableness of security certificates, 
reviewing applications for release by named persons and protecting their fundamental rights.135
In another passage, the court cited a 2005 decision by SIRC, noting that CSIS’ 
policy of destroying operational notes has been a source of “long-running concern” and 
that “complainants frequently allege that the investigator’s report of their interview is not 
accurate: that their answers are incomplete, or have been distorted or taken out of 
context”.136 The Court also cited the O’Connor Report, which stated that “the need for 
accuracy and precision when sharing information, particularly written information in 
terrorist investigations, cannot be overstated”.137 In order to facilitate judicial and public
134 Charkaoui II, supra note 4 at para. 29.
135 Ibid. at para. 42
136 Bhupinder S. Liddar v. Deputy Head o f  the Department o f  Foreign Affairs and International Trade and  
Canadian Security Intelligence Service, File No. 1170/L1DD/04, June 7, 2005 at para. 72.
l370 ’Connor Report, supra note 37 at 11.
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scrutiny of security intelligence practices and, more fundamentally, to enhance the truth- 
seeking function of the Federal Court, the Supreme Court ruled that CSIS is generally 
obligated to retain its operational notes in much the same way as the police.138
The Court also imposed upon the Ministers an obligation to disclose to reviewing 
judges all relevant information in their possession, irrespective of whether that 
information is inculpatory or exculpatory and whether or not they intend to submit the 
information as evidence.139 Although obligations of this nature have historically been 
reserved for Crown prosecutors,140 the Court repeated that certificates are analogous to 
criminal proceedings insofar as they require indefinite detentions, expose persons to 
severe deprivations of life, liberty, and personal security, and are presided over by judges 
rather than administrative decision-makers.
The imposition of disclosure requirements in Charkaoui II achieves objectives 
similar to those achieved by granting special advocates the power to subpoena 
documents, with some important differences. To recall, SIRC had assumed these powers 
as part of its broader institutional powers, while the Supreme Court declined to force their 
inclusion in amended certificate provisions in Charkaoui I. In Charkaoui II, it indirectly 
enhanced the performance capacity of special advocates by requiring the government to 
provide much of this sort of information to reviewing judges and special advocates as a 
matter of course. Expanded disclosure has had significant effects on certificate 
proceedings. It contributed to the quashing of the certificate issued against Mr. Charkaoui 
and Mr. Alrmei in late 2009.141 Shortly following Charkaoui II, the government was
138 R. v. La, [1997] 2 S.C.R. 680.
139 Charkaoui II, supra note 4 at paras. 2, 56.
140 R. v. Stinchcomhe, [1991] 3 S.C.R. 326.
141 Charkaoui (Re) (2009), F.C. 1030; Almrei (Re) (2009), F.C. 1263.
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ordered to disclose 2000 documents containing at least 8000 pages of information 
relevant to Mohamed Harkat.142 Initially, the Ministers had redacted significant portions 
of this information based on their considerations of relevance and national security 
confidentiality. On March 12, 2009, the Federal Court rejected most of the redactions 
made to 67 contested documents,143 although it has generally been respectful of national 
security confidentiality with respect to human source intelligence, as it is in the criminal 
law context.144 Moreover, while the government has forestalled a judicial reading-in of 
any power analogous to that of SIRC counsel to subpoena witnesses, disclosure of 
documents has certainly exposed the government to greater adversarial challenge.
The precise scope of disclosure obligations has been a contested issue, most 
especially as regards what information may be safely disclosed directly to named 
persons. Ordinarily, named persons are only entitled to information (in full or summary 
form) that informs them of the case against \S\zm. 145 Charkaoui I Idisclosure requires all 
information regarding a named person to be submitted to reviewing judges and special 
advocates, regardless of whether it supports the Ministers allegations or not. In 2009, the 
Ministers tried to appeal a Federal Court ruling on the grounds that a reviewing judge, 
Tremblay-Lamer J., had inappropriately ordered the disclosure of information directly to 
Mr. Charkaoui.146 The Ministers insisted that the contested evidence could not be 
disclosed without compromising national security or the safety of a person. Tremblay- 
Lamer J. nonetheless ordered that it be disclosed during closed hearings, along with
142 Harkat (Re), (2009) F.C. 340 at para. 7.
143 Ibid. at para. 9.
144 Harkat (Re) (2009), F.C. 204; R. v. Leipert, [1997] 1 S.C.R. 281; Bisaillon v. Keable, [1983] 2 S.C.R. 
60; Canada (Solicitor General) v. Royal Commission (Health Records), [1981] 2 S.C.R. 494; Marks v. 
Beyfus (1890), 25 Q.B.D. 494.
145IRPA, supra  note 64, s. 83(1 )(e).
146 Charkaoui (Re), supra note 141.
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original copies of CSIS’ operational notes pertaining to this evidence. Tremblay-Lamer J. 
then indicated that she would forward to Mr. Charkaoui summaries of these originals and 
associated information, and would include details the Minister had insisted could not be 
safely disclosed.
Disputing the factual question of whether or not this information could safely be 
disclosed, the Ministers invoked s. 83(1 )(j) of IRPA, which reads:
the judge shall not base a decision on information or other evidence provided by 
the Minister, and shall return it to the Minister, if  the judge determines that it is 
not relevant or if  the Minister withdraws it.
By withdrawing key evidence, the Ministers deprived the court of its authority to 
compel the disclosure of the contested information to Mr. Charkaoui, either in full or in 
summary form. Of course, by withdrawing this information, the Ministers deprived 
themselves of evidence to demonstrate the reasonableness of Mr. Charkaoui’s certificate, 
a fact which they expressly admitted.147 It seems that this move was designed to invite the 
Federal Court of Appeal to intervene on their behalf.
In the absence of supporting evidence, Tremblay-Lamer J. ruled that there was no 
statutory basis for the certificate, which was therefore null, void, and ultra vires the 
authority of the Ministers. She based this judgment on s. 77(2) of IRPA, which requires 
the Ministers to “file with the Court the information and other evidence on which the 
certificate is based”. Tremblay-Lamer J. also denied the Ministers’ request to certify 
questions for review by the Federal Court of Appeal, holding that there were no questions 
of general importance raised in this case. She had, in her view, appropriately applied the
147 Ibid. at paras. 16, 43.
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criteria laid down in Charkaoui II, finding as a matter of fact that certain evidence could 
safely be disclosed to Mr. Charkaoui.
Except for one case,148 special advocates with whom I have spoken have been 
satisfied with the extent of the government’s disclosure practices following Charkaoui II. 
They have indicated, however, that their performance capacity continues to be 
constrained by strict bans on their communication with named persons throughout the 
entirety of proceedings. This problem is exacerbated by the fact that IRPA stipulates that 
the Ministers, and not judges, are to provide named persons with a summary of the 
evidence against them when certificates are initially filed with the court.149 This means 
that when a named person first communicates with his or her-special advocate, they must 
rely on the Minister’s unilateral appraisal of what is and is not protected by national 
security confidentiality. By the time courts exercise their authority to subsequently order 
disclosure or independently compile additional summaries, special advocates are likely to 
have already accessed classified information and will not be able to receive further 
instruction or insights from the named persons whose interests they represent.
Similar practices have been upheld as compatible with international human rights
by UK courts as well as the ECtHR. In Re A and Others, the ECtHR was asked to decide,
inter alia, if the UK’s reliance on closed materials during SIAC proceedings contravened
Article 5(4) of the ECHR, which states:
Everyone who is deprived of his liberty by arrest or detention shall be entitled to take 
proceedings by which the lawfulness of his detention shall be decided speedily by a court 
and his release ordered if the detention is not lawful.
,4S Harkat (Re) (2009), F.C. 533.
149 IRPA, supra note 64, s. 77(2).
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Notwithstanding that the SIAC system was designed to comply with Chahal, 
associated legislation omitted numerous procedural safeguards and did not expressly 
grant special advocates important powers. Among the omitted powers, it will be recalled, 
is the ability to communicate with alleged terrorists throughout the entirety of 
proceedings -- a power essential to challenge the credibility and sufficiency of 
circumstantial evidence, to design legal strategies, and clarify certain facts. It was 
suggested that, absent this power, special advocates could only perform their roles 
effectively if alleged terrorists are well enough informed at the outset of proceedings to 
engage in meaningful discussion. The problem, in other words, could be resolved, either, 
by ensuring that enough information is disclosed to detainees early enough thatthey can 
meaningfully communicate with special advocates or, enabling detainees and special 
advocates to converse throughout the course of proceedings.
As noted above, the ECtHR had already decided in this case that the mere threat 
of transnational terrorism stands as a public emergency in the UK and that a “margin of 
appreciation” should be granted to the executive over the necessity of extraordinary 
measures. It also ruled that the SIAC regime was, in principle, consistent with the ECHR, 
adding that SIAC is “a fully independent court”, is “best placed to ensure that no 
material...(is) unnecessarily withheld” and that special advocates “provide an important, 
additional safeguard” in these respects.150 It recognized, however, that the disclosure of 
information at the outset of proceedings is not always sufficient and that, when the 
executive fails to make adequate disclosure, the integrity of the proceeding is called into
150 Re A and Others, supra note 125 at para. 219.
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question.151 Whether this has happened, however, is a matter to be decided on a case-by- 
case basis and need not be dealt with by way of legislative amendments.
Pursuant to the UK Human Rights Act, the House of Lords is legally obligated to 
give effect to the ECtHR’s judgments. However, in Secretary o f State for the Home 
Department v. AF,iS1 some judges were reluctant to comply with the ECtHR’s judgment, 
considering it to be an excessive intrusion into executive discretion and state sovereignty. 
Lord Hoffman was particularly strong in his criticism of the ECtHR, stating that he 
thought it was “wrong” and that its ruling may well “destroy the system of control 
orders.153 This criticism misses the mark. The the ECtHR had both endorsed the 
government’s invocation of a state of emergency (contrary to the preponderance of 
opinion among non-judicial authorities), and found the SIAC system cohered with 
Chahal (even though it is widely known to be woefully inadequate in key respects). In 
fact, the ECtHR could have easily addressed issues of procedural unfairness by requiring 
the UK Parliament to legislatively authorize ongoing communication between special 
advocates and detainees. The ECtHR chose not to take this route, leaving it to SIAC to 
ensure that detainees have enough information to give effective instructions to their 
special advocates. In any event, the House of Lords accommodated divergent views on 
this matter by reading down the impugned provisions of the UK legislation rather than 
declaring them to be invalid. This left trial judges with the discretion to decide on a case- 
by-case basis whether proceedings have been fair.
151 Ibid. at para. 220.
152 [2009] U.K.H.L. 28.
153 Ibid. at para. 70.
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The upshot of the ECtHR and House of Lords’ rulings is two-fold. First, they 
uphold the validity of the Prevention o f Terrorism Act, 2005,lSA which in turn strongly 
implies that both courts believed rights-infringements to be relatively rare or the product 
of circumstance rather than parliamentary intent. This is especially problematic given the 
fact that UK special advocates, parliamentary committees, and human rights 
organizations have repeatedly stressed the serious difficulties posed by parliament’s 
express prohibition of ongoing communications between special advocates and detainees. 
Parliament has hardly been unaware of human rights infringements, even if they occur on 
a case-by-case basis, and to that extent knowingly condoned them.
Second, these rulings perpetuate the assumption that the judiciary is the best 
available safeguard against rights abuses. For its part, the ECtHR has repeatedly 
mischaracterized the nature of the SIRC system, falsely stating that SIRC was a judicial 
rather than an administrative body. The ECtHR’s unwillingness to force improvements in 
special advocates’ powers is partly due to unwarranted assumptions about the capacity, 
and willingness, of judges on the SIAC to hold the executive to high standards. The 
House of Lords similarly expects trial judges to compensate for questionable statutoiy 
provisions and omissions — an expectation not justified by experience. In fact, courts 
have a poor track record in holding the executive to account in matters of national 
security.
These developments do not bode well for transnational human rights advocates 
who are currently challenging the constitutionality of Canada’s special advocate system, 
especially if their objective is to force further legislative amendments. Current certificate 
provisions, supposedly designed to replicate the SIAC system, consciously eschew both
154 UK 2005, c. 2.
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the formal and the informal powers possessed by SIRC and its counsel. CharkaouiII 
provides special advocates with some of these powers by requiring the government to 
disclose to reviewing judges and special advocates all information regarding a named 
person. But the Supreme Court has consistently refused to force parliament to adopt a 
specific legislative framework. It has, however, helped expand reviewing judges’ 
discretionary power (and their willingness to exercise it) and consequently has helped to 
constrain executive discretion over matters of disclosure, whether someone is a national 
security threat, and what can legally be done about it. The ECtHR and the UK House of 
Lords have adopted a similar, discretion-oriented approach. They have each ruled that 
SIAC legislation is lawful, but that errors in judicial or executive discretionary decision­
making may render particular proceedings procedurally unfair. It is hard to see how 
international and comparative human rights case law can advance the effort to force 
further legislative amendments in Canada. At best, one might hope for renewed emphasis 
on the need for full disclosure at the outset of proceedings and perhaps more vigilant 
judicial review of the adequacy of initial summaries.
E. Conclusion
Global intelligence agency cooperation poses a wide range of novel and complex 
regulatory challenges. On the one hand, global intelligence networks are transnational, 
hosting interactions among a plurality of state and non-state actors who interact in public 
and private as well as domestic and international contexts. The global scale of 
contemporary intelligence practices transcends the jurisdictional reach of Canadian law 
and has required us to integrate ourselves into various bilateral and multi-lateral regimes, 
often with little to no involvement of parliamentary or judicial institutions. For some, the
transnational and executive-led qualities of global intelligence networks render them 
inherently ungovernable. On the other hand, national security discourses and invocations 
of exceptionality support reliance on extraordinary measures that do not sit comfortably 
alongside legal values, such as the rule of law and respect for rights. During moments of 
real or perceived crisis, the tendency is for executive officials to insist on deference to 
their identification of security threats and their views on the proper design, operation and 
reach of extraordinary measures. Depending on their determination and/or institutional 
capacity to resist the executive, judges may or may not be able to constrain the arbitrary 
exercise of executive power based on claims of exceptionality. Critics argue that 
legislatures and courts will tend to defer to the executive in times of crisis, while 
optimists argue that they simply have to find more creative ways of protecting human 
rights.
There are, of course, many sites within which the dynamics of global intelligence 
agency cooperation could be explored. 1 have approached them from the context of 
certificate proceedings. This approach has emphasized a few trends, including the 
growing role of security intelligence as evidence in legal proceedings, the association 
between global intelligence practices and the human rights of migrants, refugees, and 
Canadian citizens, the fraying of functional boundaries between security intelligence 
work and policing, the impact of international law and relations on Canadian national 
security law and policy and the role of the judiciary in constraining executive discretion 
over the identification and treatment of security threats. These issues point to a slow and 
painful process of learning about the constitutional dimensions of global intelligence 
practices as they intersect with various legal fields, including immigration and refugee
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law, criminal law, extradition, privacy and, of course, human rights.
As one of the most conspicuous fields of contestation post-9/11, certificate 
proceedings offer insights into the trajectory and fruits of constitutional learning. Judicial 
reasoning has been both facilitated and constrained by two, distinct sources of 
knowledge: domestic experience and international and comparative human rights. The 
former includes statutory and regulatory frameworks (contemporary and historical), 
constitutional rules, principles and values, the output of commissions of inquiry and 
parliamentary committees, and the thick institutional histories of national security 
agencies, courts, and assorted oversight and review bodies. The latter includes the 
perspectives of various discursive communities, including international human rights 
treaty monitoring and standard-setting bodies, foreign courts, tribunals, and legislative 
bodies, transnational human rights networks, and regional courts, such as the ECtHR.
One might think that international and comparative human rights would be a 
natural resource for courts, given the global scope of contemporary intelligence practices 
and the extraordinary qualities of certificate proceedings. In order for advocates to 
successfully marshal this resource, though, judges would have to accept the authority of 
the relevant and persuasive doctrine. A TLP theory of this doctrine predicts that 
international and comparative human rights norms function largely through analogy and 
that the logical and rhetorical appeal of arguments constructed out of these norms would 
depend on arguers’ (and judges’) compliance with certain dialogical rules and principles. 
The case study was relevant to these hypotheses because, as many critics would predict, 
the distorting effects of national security language might interfere with the production of 
fair and critical judgment about the constitutionality of certificate provisions,
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contradicting TLP. The critic would indeed be unsurprised that the Federal Court, 
charged to administer an expedited, secretive and uncritical regime, did not internalize 
international and comparative human rights and decided to uphold the constitutionality of 
certificate provisions. The optimist, by contrast, would find encouragement in the 
Supreme Court’s use of international and comparative human rights and its decision to 
declare certificate provisions unconstitutional; a decision that, on its face, coheres with 
Chahal, thereby implying norm-intemalization.
Thus, TLP would see in Charkaoui I k correlation between judicial reference to 
international and comparative human rights and the diminished impact of national 
security posturing. There is, however, insufficient evidence to confirm this and, what is 
more, we might just as easily argue the reverse; international and comparative human 
rights helped rationalize the projection of political and ideological power. At the very 
least, the case study permits us to make the modest descriptive claim that international 
and comparative human rights contextualized the problems posed by global intelligence 
agency cooperation. Human rights communities produced extensive factual records 
concerning the changing nature of security intelligence practices and the human rights 
implications of post-9/11 national security law and policy. Advocates for named persons 
used the judgments and experiences of foreign courts to identify credible solutions to the 
problems posed by changing security practices. They were able to persuade the Supreme 
Court to rule that security certificates, staples of immigration and refugee law since 1976, 
had assumed extraordinary qualities that carried them beyond legally permissible limits.
However, international and foreign case law was then used by the Court to offer 
an alternative that only partially actualized important legal values. But the values of
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pertinent human rights norms were not observably “internalized” by the Court or other 
duty-bearers. Parliament responded with legislation that failed to expressly provide 
special advocates with powers considered indispensable in alternative, domestic regimes. 
Added to this, recent international and foreign case law dealing with analogous 
legislation in the UK has stood for the dubious proposition that public emergencies need 
not be temporary and that extraordinary measures therefore may be used indefinitely. 
International and comparative human rights are supposed to facilitate constitutional 
learning by providing clear criteria concerning when there is a public emergency as well 
as whether and by what procedures rights may be limited. There are certainly clusters of 
understandings shared by non-judicial discursive communities that would support this 
function, but transjudicialism has tended to prioritize the divergent opinions of apologetic 
courts over the perspectives of non-state discursive communities with expertise in human 
rights.155
All of this is to say that the spirit of the relevant and persuasive doctrine as 
illuminated by TLP was not clearly manifested in the Charkaoui judgments. True, TLP 
and associated theoretical perspectives were useful in structuring the rational analysis and 
appraisal of international and comparative human rights arguments. However, its 
normative claims have not been well represented. To the contrary, the case study suggests
155 This can lead to positive results, such as in. Khadr, supra note 5, where the Supreme Court o f Canada 
ruled that Canada violated international human rights by interviewing a Canadian citizen detained in 
Guantanamo Bay. This finding was supported by its interpretation o f the four Geneva Conventions o f  /949  
as well as recent Supreme Court o f the United States decisions whereby military commissions established 
to try detainees at Guantanamo Bay were expressly held to be inconsistent with international human rights 
(Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749 (2006); Rasul v. Bush, supra note 115). The Supreme Court o f 
Canada found that Canadian officials’ participation in processes associated with these military commission 
violate Canada’s international legal obligations, and, that this legal consequence was enough to activate the 
extra-territorial application of s. 7 o f the Charter. It then ordered the disclosure o f records of interviews 
held between Mr. Khadr and Canadian agencies and any information sent to the United States as a direct 
result of the interviews.
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that international and comparative human rights were, at best, highly ambivalent and, at 
worst, used by result-oriented judges determined to spread a veneer of legality over an 
otherwise abusive regime. Strategically speaking, it might be more fruitful for 
transnational human rights advocates to avoid engagement with international and 
comparative human rights and to instead more fully exploit domestic experiences, 
institutional histories and other received wisdom. This approach met with considerable 
success in Charkaoui II, where the Supreme Court largely ignored international and 
comparative human rights and focused instead on how to apply longstanding criminal law 
principles concerning disclosure to CSIS.156 Subsequent Federal Court decisions noted 
above are similar in these respects.157 Interpreting and applying exclusively domestic 
norms, reviewing judges, both at first instance and on appeal, have helped construct a 
markedly improved certificate regime that, though imperfect, imposes serious constraints 
on executive discretion and has reduced -- but has not eliminated — the distorting effects 
of national security discourse.
156 This decision is not without its negative effects. Kent Roach has observed that Charkaoui II  disclosure, 
which requires CSIS to retain personal information indefinitely, may violate privacy rights; see, Kent 
Roach, “When Secret Intelligence Becomes Evidence: Some Implications of Khadr and Charkaoui IF’ 
(2009) 47 Supreme Court Law Review 147.
157 See also Harkat (Re) (2009) F.C. 203.
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The Art of Persuasion: International Law, Domestic Courts, and 
Transnational Human Rights Advocacy in Canada
Chapter 5
A. Introduction
The universal applicability of international human rights render them attractive 
instruments for the protection of non-citizens’ rights in Canada.1 As with constitutional 
rights mechanisms, and the broader Enlightenment traditions of which they are a part, 
international human rights theoretically inhere within individuals irrespective of personal 
characteristics, national political boundaries, or the exigencies of public policy. Unlike 
constitutional law, though, the international human rights enterprise consists in the 
attempt to give practical effect to human rights across national boundaries. While 
certainly rooted in a longer tradition of its own, international human rights have for this 
reason become closely linked to more general developments in international law and 
institutions.
Given serious institutional limitations, the effectiveness of international human 
rights depends upon the cooperation and coordination of domestic legal systems. 
Accordingly, each major international human rights treaty places upon states a special 
responsibility to promote and protect international human rights within their respective 
jurisdictions. This requires that international human rights be given effect through 
legislation, policy and the provision of judicial remedies to those whose rights have been 
breached.
Despite the need for close functional associations between international human 
rights and domestic law, the two frequently diverge and sometimes conflict. In Canada, 
where the law of reception is structured by common law doctrines, the resolution of these
1 As I noted in Chapter 2, there is no need to insist on making hard distinctions among international, 
comparative, and domestic human rights, as they all perform the same essential function. However, when 
recounting dominant/traditional narratives within the Canadian law o f reception, 1 will focus on the inter­
relationships between international and domestic human rights.
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tensions may raise questions about the legitimacy of judicial review. This is because 
judges possess seemingly unfettered discretion regarding whether and how to make use 
of international human rights, most especially when reviewing the constitutional merits of 
validly enacted laws. This discretion does not always sit comfortably alongside principles 
of respect for constitutional supremacy, including federalism and parliamentary 
sovereignty.
As we have seen, Canadian judges have done a fairly poor job justifying their use 
of international human rights. Largely a product of conflicting common law doctrines, the 
Canadian law of reception straddles two sets of principles. On the one hand, the judiciary 
is supposed to respect international law as law, which traditionally has meant they are to 
strive to ensure that the substance of domestic law conforms to the substance of binding 
international legal rules and standards. On the other hand, courts have historically been 
reluctant to interfere with the legislature’s asserted exclusive authority to alter domestic 
rights and obligations. In the pre-Charter era, judicial authority to apply international law 
was for this reason conditional on such law first having been implemented through 
statute.
The emergence of strong judicial review in the Charter era has altered this 
doctrinal landscape. Traditional doctrine has been supplemented, but not replaced, by the 
relevant and persuasive doctrine, which currently rationalizes judicial reliance on a wide 
range of international and foreign law sources when deciding cases. New attitudes 
towards the role of the judiciary in sensitizing state law to the global and multicultural 
context of Canadian society are part of the larger shifts in constitutional power and 
discourse that followed the entrenchment of the Charter o f Rights and Freedoms. Itself 
informed by international human rights, the Charter has unsettled traditional 
understandings of self-government that locate law-making authority solely within the 
legislatures. In light of this shift, international human rights have come to be regarded as 
legitimate constitutional resources. However, whether they do, or should, stand as a
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legitimate source of Canadian law remains subject to debate. Whatever might be the most 
convincing rationale for the relevant and persuasive doctrine, judges have generally failed 
to articulate it.
What is more, the relevant and persuasive doctrine does not seem to have 
constrained judicial decision-making. Originally restricted to the intersection of 
international human rights and Charter rights, courts have used the doctrine to rationalize 
many possible mixtures of international, comparative and domestic law. One result has 
been the deconstruction of hierarchical boundaries between binding/non-binding 
international human rights as well as international/comparative human rights. The 
rejection of classical binaries has strengthened criticisms of the relevant and persuasive 
doctrine as an ad hoc rationale for “result-oriented” judges determined to decide issues 
on the basis of their own political or ideological ends. International human rights and 
comparative human rights each serve as mere rhetoric -critics maintain— mystifying 
judges’ attempts to subvert Canadian constitutional authority by subordinating it to the 
will of external political powers or simply their own, personal values.
This dissertation has been concerned with identifying links between the form and 
function of the relevant and persuasive doctrine, justifying the doctrine in terms of 
traditional juristic principles and developing a set of analytical frameworks useful for 
studying how the doctrine influences the behaviour of, and interactions between, various 
discursive communities. Reflecting on accompanying narratives and theoretical 
perspectives, I have argued that the relevant and persuasive doctrine is designed precisely 
as it should be, given its purposes and functions. I have also argued that it coheres with 
principles of respect for international law and with principles of respect for constitutional 
supremacy. However, we must distinguish doctrine from actual decisions, since the latter 
rarely appears to follow the contours of the former. Decision-making exhibits 
capriciousness, with judges often failing to observe the restrictions imposed by doctrine. 
To an outside observer, the relevance of international law may indeed seem to depend
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only on judges’ personal attitudes and ambitions.
One of my core arguments has been that, despite outward appearances, there is 
principled order to be found in many decisions about the relevance and persuasiveness of 
international and comparative human rights. On the one hand, I have argued that there is 
functional order to decision-making in this field, meaning that decisions are anything but 
capricious or whimsical. Viewed in the right light, seemingly random decisions may be 
seen to be part of identifiable streams of legal processes that are, in turn, structured by a 
range of interlocking actors and institutions. On the other hand, I argued that decision­
making can exhibit normative order, meaning that it may be consistent with the 
expectation that judicial reasoning will be constrained by pre-existing rules, principles 
and values. Links between the.two kinds of order, and therefore between doctrine and 
jurisprudence, can be made by supplementing dominant, formalist narratives of the 
relevant and persuasive doctrine with more sophisticated analytical frameworks.
Using Transnational Legal Process, I have argued that the proper approach to the 
study of the jurisprudence consists in a careful, interdisciplinary review of the context 
within which decisions are made and the problems with which decision-makers are 
concerned.2 Generally, Charter cases arise in global and multicultural contexts, and are 
concerned with providing sustainable solutions to disputes about human dignity. Given 
this context, international and comparative human rights can and often do play an 
important role in framing the very nature of a legal problem and in providing resources 
for appraising the normative and functional merits of alternative solutions. However, this 
role falls short of the expectation that international human rights be clearly distinguished 
from, and considered more important than, comparative human rights. It also diverges 
from the view that “compliance” with international human rights law means that specific 
international norms will either determine domestic decisions or, at least, be transplanted
Myres S. McDougal, Harold D. Lasswell & W. Michael Reisman, “Theories About International Law: 
Prologue to a Configurative Jurisprudence” (1968) 8 Virginia Journal o f  International Law 188; Myres S. 
McDougal & Harold D. Lasswell, “Jurisprudence in Policy Oriented Perspective” (1967) 19 University of 
Florida Law Review 486.
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verbatim into domestic law.
Holding unrealistic expectations of courtrooms as “downpipes” for international 
law, skeptics are blinded to the informal, admittedly modest, influence that international 
and comparative human rights exert on judicial reasoning as part of the institutional and 
intellectual setting within which arguments are formed, expressed and evaluated. 
Sometimes, the direct application of precise international human rights rules is either not 
possible or, more frequently, simply unnecessary. The problem with the Canadian law of 
reception lies not in the jurisprudence per se, but in the theoretical optic we use to 
appraise the jurisprudence and in underlying assumptions about matters of compliance 
and constitutional supremacy that in turn hinder the realization of fundamental normative 
commitments. In this concluding chapter, I wish to consolidate the observations and 
claims made thus far concerning the processes by which international and comparative 
human rights influence judicial decision-making in Canada.
B. The Canadian Law of Reception and International Human Rights: Conceptual
Considerations
Classical approaches to the law of reception have been governed by the belief that 
the judicial enforcement of international law must be reconciled with principles of respect 
for self-government. The presumption of conformity doctrine resolves this tension by 
granting hierarchical superiority to the latter, as is consistent with dualist conceptions of 
international law. Structured by rigorous procedural rules, this doctrine limits the 
judiciary’s role to that of policing constitutional boundaries between federal and 
provincial authority as well as between the executive and legislative branches of 
government. The federal executive is exclusively authorized to assume international legal 
obligations, while the federal and provincial legislatures are exclusively authorized to 
implement international treaties. Only when binding international treaty law has been 
legislatively implemented may judges apply it, but only to resolve ambiguities in 
statutory language. In this way, domestic law and life is hermetically sealed against
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external pollutants, guarded against the destabilizing effects of judicial activism and 
internationalism.
We have seen, however, that the presumption of conformity doctrine has failed at 
this task. To begin, the judiciary regularly disregard its operative elements, rendering 
jurisprudence an “appalling mess”;3 judges quite simply do not respect formal criteria 
governing when and how international law may be judicially received and have gone so 
far as to conflate it with comparative law in many instances. Systematic disregard for 
doctrine may be explained in a number of ways. Charitably, judges may have gradually 
adopted modem, contextual approaches to statutory and treaty interpretation in place of 
the traditional “plain and ordinary meaning” approach; statutes increasingly regulate 
transnational social and economic interactions and so international and comparative law 
stand as viable resources for giving effect to underlying legislative objectives.4 At worst, 
disregard for doctrine signals the judiciary’s utter disrespect both for international law 
qua law and for principles of constitutionalism. International law and contextual 
interpretation become mere rhetorical tools for obscuring judicial forays into the realm of 
law- and policy-formation. Whatever may be the cause, it is clear that doctrine alone has 
neither determined choices about the reception of international law nor served to “map” 
jurisprudence. Something more is needed.
Making matters worse, the presumption of conformity doctrine has almost no 
direct bearing on human rights issues raised in the context of the Charter o f Rights and 
Freedoms, nor does it capture broader transnational phenomena that unsettle dualist 
metaphors pertaining to what is “domestic” and what is “international”.5 Designed 
decades before the entrenchment of the Charter, this doctrine could not fill considerable
3 Stephen J. Toope, “Keynote Address: Canada and International Law”, in The Impact o f  International Law 
on the Practice o f  Law in Canada. Proceedings o f  the 27th Annual Conference o f  the Canadian Council on 
International Law, Ottawa October 15-17, 1998 (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 1999) 33 at 33.
Hugh Kindred, “Making International Agreements and Making them Work within a Multicultural Federal 
State: The Experience of Canada” in Stephen Tierney, ed., Multiculturalism and the Canadian Constitution 
£UBC Press, 2007).
Stephen J. Toope, “The Uses of Metaphor: International Law and the Supreme Court o f  Canada” (2001) 
80 Canadian Bar Review 534.
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“legal gaps” associated with new constitutional arrangements,6 leaving judges few 
justifications for relying on international human rights when interpreting the content and 
scope of Charter provisions. This is not a simple matter of form. The Charter permits the 
judiciary to invalidate laws based on their interpretation of the content and scope of 
Charter provisions. Extensive reliance on international human rights here strongly 
implies that they stand as supplemental sources of Canadian constitutional law, possibly 
undermining democratic values associated with federalism and parliamentary 
sovereignty.
The presumption of minimal protection stands as the best possible account of how 
the presumption of conformity doctrine might be applied to the Charter. However, this 
account would have to do away with or radically revise important organizing concepts, 
such as those pertaining to implementation and ambiguity, and leaves unaddressed 
whether and how we should respect such values as parliamentary sovereignty and 
federalism. Indeed, the presumption of minimal protection sidesteps serious questions 
about the implications of treating binding international human rights as sources of 
Canadian constitutional law. Finally, it ignores the fact that courts have routinely 
disregarded or misapplied doctrine; judges’ choices about whether and how to use 
international law have always been based on informal factors. It is not that the 
presumption of conformity doctrine cannot be applied to the Charter. The issue is that 
this would serve no practical purposes and, what is more, the changes we would have to 
make would render it virtually indistinguishable from the relevant and persuasive 
doctrine. In my view, it is better to do away with the presumption of conformity doctrine 
entirely in the context of Charter review.
I defended this argument in Chapter 3. Problematic in many ways, the relevant 
and persuasive doctrine was part of broader constitutional shifts in the constellation of
6 These may also be classified as “unregulated” disputes; see, Joseph Raz, The Authority o f  Law (Clarendon 
Press, 1979) at 181-193.
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power among the legislatures, the executive and the judiciary, whereby the latter has 
assumed a legitimate law-making role. By enabling the judiciary to review the 
substantive merits of validly enacted laws, the Charter has invited judicial reliance on a 
wide range of extra-legal materials, including social science data, policy, morality, and 
philosophy, all towards the end of making state law more responsive to diverse social 
needs, values and expectations. At root, the relevant and persuasive doctrine 
recommends the use of both international and comparative human rights norms to attain a 
deeper appreciation for the meaning latent in Charter’s provisions and principles, 
improve judgment by making it more responsive to the global and multicultural context 
of Canadian society, and to enhance constructive, rights-sensitive interactions among 
Canadian, international and foreign legal institutions.
In judges’ minds, these functions justify the use of international and comparative 
human rights in the context of Charter review. Part of the rationale for this position is 
that international and comparative human rights resemble Charter rights, insofar as they 
are historically and conceptually linked to familiar legal principles such as equality, 
fairness, human dignity and representative government. Despite these similarities, 
international and comparative human rights add something more to the picture; their 
value lies in their jurisdictional and historical scope, serving as a kind of global 
repository of experience with recurring problems. Relying on the experiences of others 
who share similar legal values, principles and rules, and who have used these same 
resources to contend with similar problems, Canadian judges may be better equipped to 
identify workable solutions at home.
But while international and comparative human rights may resonate with familiar 
constitutional principles they are not, after all, part of the Canadian constitution. Given 
the expanding potential for conflict amongst domestic and international normative orders, 
judges may also use the relevant and persuasive doctrine to entrench external norms into 
the Canadian constitution, a practice that rightly raises concerns about federalism and
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parliamentary supremacy. The relevant and persuasive doctrine as such offers no precise 
means for resolving these tensions; this is the judge’s responsibility.
Two groups of scholars have tried to assist in this task: transnationalists and 
traditionalists. Most transnationalists, Brunnee and Toope notwithstanding, analogize the 
law of reception to an exercise in comparative law, whereby international law is one, and 
only one, among various resources necessary for state law to be made more responsive to 
the kinds of problems that arise in pluralistic societies. This is not so much about creating 
a global community of courts, establishing judicial supremacy over representative 
government, or prioritizing external law over domestic law -- they argue — as it is about 
the much broader project of recognizing the already-existing moral and political authority 
of non-state normative orders. The consideration of international human rights law may 
then be understood as an act of translation, whereby such law helps structure legal 
interactions of a certain kind among globally diffuse discursive communities; a function 
that more localized normative orders cannot perform. International human rights, though 
arguably distinctive in this way, still are by no means “special” or intrinsically superior to 
other kinds of law. What matters is the product as well as the nature of the processes by 
which legal obligations are imposed; these are factors that vary from context to context.
Working with the translation metaphor, it is important to recognize that 
comparative analyses do not provide judges absolute freedom to modify or flatly 
disregard Canadian law. Judges must remain true to the “languages” with which they 
interact with each other and the broader community. According to transnationalists, there 
is a certain syntax, a set of understandings, shared by speakers of these languages that 
constrain interpretive choices: results still must be meaningful to those accustomed to 
domestic legal language. While the relevant and persuasive doctrine encourages the 
movement of judicial consciousness across legal cultures, judges are properly focused on 
their primary concern to sensitize domestic law to the global and multicultural contexts of 
Canadian society. Although it is altered in the process, domestic law remains the site of
224
legal authority and reason. Novel social phenomena are being translated into domestic 
law, hopefully in order to produce healthier interactions among discursive communities.
But there remain questions about precisely how tradition and innovation are to be 
balanced. To begin, there is the issue of compliance and the question of whether a 
comparative law approach loses sight of the fact that international law, unlike foreign 
law, may be legally binding on Canada. This is a problem that Brunnee and Toope are 
concerned with, even though they share many of the anti-positivist commitments of 
comparativists such as Knop. The problem boils down to the recurring concerns about 
respect for international law qua law: does something other than power or ideology 
influence judges’ choice to use international law as an interpretive device? If 
international law is conflated with foreign law, does the law of reception consist simply 
in the spreading of other states’ ideological and political interests across the Canadian 
constitutional landscape? Conversely, might it be that judges’ use of both international 
law and foreign law is constrained by certain values, principles and standards that 
mitigate the distorting influence of ideological and political power?
The concept that is most often used to answer these questions is, aptly, 
“persuasion”. Transnationalists want to say that international law and foreign law exert a 
persuasive influence on legal reasoning because they help judges justify decisions to 
pluralistic communities on the basis of shared values, understandings and expectations. 
Sensitizing law to diverse perspectives enhances the perceived legitimacy of the decision 
and, presumably, the likelihood of it being accepted by legal subjects. Yet, an emphasis 
on decision-makers’ openness to diverse social values, interests, and expectations 
suggests that acculturation, social power, and one’s membership in various non-state 
communities also play decisive roles in decision-making. An important variable here is 
access to legal process and the ability to secure judicial recognition of one’s values, 
interests and expectations. Unless legal process is structured in such a way as to ensure 
that all interested parties have a fair and equal chance to persuade a judge, the values and
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beliefs that influence judicial reasoning may well be those that resonate with judges’ own 
personal cultural, political, or ideological commitments.
There is some empirical evidence to support this claim. While judges do refer to 
the decisions of foreign and international courts, they tend to rely on the decisions of 
courts that share certain cultural, political and ideological characteristics.7 Familiarity 
with legal cultures and practices certainly makes judges more willing and able to explore 
comparative law. But this may result in the further entrenchment, rather than critical 
appraisal, of dominant ideologies. The same can be said about the sorts of international 
laws that judges use. Canadian courts, for instance, tend to rely on international civil and 
political rights norms during Charter litigation, but far less upon international economic, 
social and cultural rights.8 This strongly suggests that choices about the reception of 
international law are driven by judges’ membership in certain cultural and ideological 
communities and their desire to fulfill the expectations of other members of those 
communities. If this is so, “acculturation” or “normative coercion”, far more than 
persuasion, explains decision-making in this field.9 Any account of the relevant and 
persuasive doctrine requires a more refined account of what distinguishes persuasion 
from acculturation and other mechanisms of political influence.
Traditionalists argue that this dilemma highlights precisely why the relevant and 
persuasive doctrine must fail to harmonize respect for international law with respect for 
constitutional supremacy. Treating international law as “mere” comparative law 
diminishes the value of binding international law, robbing rules of their force and
7 Anne-Marie Slaughter, “A Typology o f Transjudicial Communication”, in, Thomas Franck & Gregory H. 
Fox eds., International Law Decisions in National Courts (Transnational Publishers, Inc., 1996) 37.
Bruce Porter & Martha Jackman, “Justiciability of Social and Economic Rights in Canada” in Socio- 
Economic Rights Jurisprudence: Emerging Trends in Comparative International Law, M. Langford, ed. M. 
Langford, ed., (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008); Martha Jackman, “W hat’s Wrong With 
Social and Economic Rights?” (2000) 11 National Journal o f Constitutional Law 235-246; Bruce Porter, 
“Judging Poverty: Using International Human Rights Law to Refine the Scope o f Charter Rights” (2000) 
15 Journal o f Law & Social Policy 117; Craig Scott, “Canada’s International Human Rights Obligations 
and Disadvantaged Members of Society: Finally Into the Spotlight?” (1999) 10 Constitutional Forum 97.
Asher Alkoby, “Theories o f Compliance with International Law and the Challenge of Cultural 
Difference” (2008 ) 4:1 Journal o f International Law and International Relations 151.
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allowing judges unfettered discretion in the exercise of their powers. Traditionalists 
believe that the best course of action is to adapt the presumption of conformity doctrine 
to better guide specific interactions between international human rights and Charter 
rights. In instances where Canada’s international legal obligations are not an issue, the 
relevant and persuasive doctrine should enable judges to use international and 
comparative human rights as interpretive aids. This may be done by deeming the Charter 
to function as the equivalent of implementing legislation or, better yet, by explicitly 
codifying the law of reception in statutory or even constitutional form. Failing these 
steps, courts might adopt the presumption of minimal protection, as suggested by van Ert.
However, even if adapted in these ways, the presumption of conformity doctrine 
does not permit the reception of legal norms unless they can be traced to the express 
provisions of international treaties binding on Canada. Desirable to some, this doctrine 
precludes the judicial reception of a wide range of extremely important international 
human rights norms that are “extra-legal”, hence invalid, sources of international human 
rights law; norms that in part result from the hard work of Canadian officials (and non­
officials) in generating new rights and obligations. The preparatory work of treaty 
negotiators, the opinions of advisory agencies, NGOs, monitoring bodies’ responses to 
Canada’s annual reports, and the decisions of international and foreign courts about the 
content of international human rights norms and their applicability to diverse fact 
scenarios are all, strictly speaking, invalid objects of judicial consideration according to 
traditional domestic and international doctrine. If, on the other hand, we allow judges to 
use these non-binding norms to interpret the content and scope of Canada’s international 
legal obligations, we either must admit that this is in principle no different from the 
relevant and persuasive doctrine, or, we must account for why norms produced by 
international and regional legal bodies ought to be granted constitutional status. While 
possible, no such account has yet been tendered, much less harmonized with one of the 
two most essential features of the presumption of conformity doctrine: respect for
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representative democracy. Finally, traditionalists must also admit that doctrine has had 
little perceptible impact on judicial reasoning; such reasoning was erratic long before the 
relevant and persuasive doctrine came into being. Upon what empirical basis do 
traditionalists believe that formalizing the law of reception now will produce results 
different from previous jurisprudence? I will now consider these points in more detail.
To begin, international human rights treaties make heavy use of abstract, open- 
ended norm types, such as standards, principles, and what might be called aspirational 
goals. It is inherent in a regime founded on universalized, pre-political rights that their 
legal codification requires extensive reliance on vague and abstract values, principles, 
standards and rules. Few states would expose themselves to exacting reviews by 
international agencies unless there exists sufficient ambiguity to enable them to contest 
charges of non-compliance.10 For this reason, the treaty-negotiation process is a crucial 
source of insight into the sorts of issues, values and expectations state parties had in 
mind. As with constitutional documents, international human rights treaties contain a 
wide array of legal concepts, but few rules capable of independently guiding decision­
makers faced with complex legal problems. This problem is only exacerbated by the 
general lack in international law of clear rules governing how disputes about the content, 
scope and applicability of legal obligations are to be resolved.
The centrality of norm-types other than rules in international human rights treaties 
requires that indefinite interpretive communities play an active role in breathing life into 
law and, what is more, that these communities rely on far more than the “plain and 
original” meaning of legal terms or the intentions of those who produce them. This is 
why there has been such an impressive growth of increasingly specific international 
human rights treaties and regional human rights regimes, and their attendant clusters of 
polycentric monitoring, reporting and interpretive bodies; this is both a symptom of and
10 George W. Downs, e t a/., “Is the Good News about Compliance Good News about Cooperation?” (1996) 
50 International Organization 379.
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an antidote to the decentralized nature of international law. But who, precisely, may stand 
as an authoritative interpreter of the law of such regimes and to what degree may they 
fashion new rules out of a synthesis of pre-existing rights and ambient social values and 
expectations? Given that they have a legitimate law-making, as well as law-applying role, 
to what extent should domestic courts be given a “margin of appreciation” over 
international institutions in the interpretation and application of international legal 
norms? 11
Domestic legal institutions have a number of advantages in norm-interpretation 
and -application vis-a-vis their international counterparts. Moreover, respect for self- 
government, as well as principles of comity, suggest that local, state governmental 
agencies should be given considerable discretion regarding whether and how to receive 
international law. With respect to institutional capacity, the presumption of conformity 
doctrine rests on the idea that domestic rights and obligations should be altered only by, 
or at the acquiescence of, the legislatures. Since legislatures presumably will implement 
international law in consideration of a plurality of interests, including domestic policy 
preferences, one can expect that most international/domestic law intersections will 
produce hybrid norms. There is inevitably, then, a measure of tension between the 
guiding-functions of implemented international legal norms, and the realization of the 
goals of domestic laws and policies. Decision-makers must therefore have regard to a 
wide range of competing aims, values and expectations when deciding how to resolve 
disputes about the content and application of implementing statutes. Buried deep within 
the presumption of conformity doctrine, then, is the admission that the congruence of 
domestic law with international rules is not the only value at play.
11 Andrew Legg, The Margin o f  Appreciation in International Human Rights Law 
Deference and Proportionality (Oxford University Press, 2012); Onder Bakirccioglu, “ The Application of 
the Margin of Appreciation Doctrine in Freedom of Expression and Public Morality Cases” (2007) 8:7 
German Law Journal 711; Yuval Shany, “Toward a General Margin o f Appreciation Doctrine in 
International Law?” (2005) 16:5 European Journal o f International Law 907.
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Although my concern has not been fully directed towards debates between 
formalism and anti-formalism, tensions between the presumption of conformity doctrine 
and the relevant and persuasive doctrine engage this controversy. Transnationalists 
defend the relevant and persuasive doctrine in terms resembling legal realism, holding 
that judicial decision-making is both indeterminate and responsive — not always in 
ethically principled ways -  to its ambient society and culture. From this descriptive claim 
follow three normative claims. First, there is no point in pretending that decision-making 
can be any other way ; the presumption of conformity doctrine should be jettisoned as a 
woefully inaccurate description of the actual law of reception. Second, judicial recourse 
to extra-legal norms may help produce better quality judgments, as measured by their 
responsiveness to those normative frameworks that in fact simultaneously regulate 
contested activities and events. Social diversity implies, if not determines, legal pluralism 
and at least in the context of Charter review, judges do and should adapt state law to 
better reflect varied identities, interests and expectations. This view is clearly built upon a 
conception of self-government that includes respect for semi-autonOmous social orders, 
such as those arising in the workplace, family, corporations, ethno-cultural communities 
etc.
Finally, scholars can help to steer decision-making in desired directions by 
helping decision-makers better appreciate the societies they regulate and the means at 
their disposal for doing good, rather than ill. This may be achieved through the infusion 
into decision-making processes of factual data and discussions of relevant values. It may 
also be achieved by distributing among practitioners who share similar normative 
commitments knowledge about patterns and trends in decision-making and, accordingly, 
how to alter the paths decision-making might otherwise take.
Contrary to traditionalists’ claims, all of this is not to say that judicial decision­
making is unprincipled or disordered. It is to say that pre-existing legal categories and 
concepts cannot determine decisions in the sense that they justify one — and only one -
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outcome. It is also to say that pre-existing law may still structure decision-making, but 
that extra-legal factors are, and should be, crucial explanatory variables. This is a 
descriptive claim rooted in sober assessments of the presumption of conformity doctrine, 
judicial decision-making generally, and the ethos of legal pluralism. It is also a normative 
claim that conceives of good judgment as that which is critical, inclusive and justifiable 
in accordance with standards of public reason. Finally, it is part of a theoretical optic that 
is informed by legal realism and other, related perspectives, all of which claim to permit 
some level of predictability to be gleaned from judicial practices that exhibit little 
doctrinal order. From this non-doctrinal order may come refreshed strategic and tactical 
stances, with legal argumentation buttressed by realistic expectations.
C. International Human Rights, Transnational Legal Process, and the 
Spectre of Compliance
One of the core arguments of this dissertation has been that the relevant and 
persuasive doctrine can be justified using principles of respect for international law and 
principles of respect for constitutional supremacy. I have argued that the operation of 
these principles can be glimpsed in the processes through which international law exerts a 
persuasive influence on judicial reasoning. Unhappy with formalism and the failings of 
doctrine, transnationalists have alluded to, but not elaborated upon, a variety of 
theoretical perspectives in defending this sort of claim. However, many of these allusions 
have not been supplemented with concerted hypothesis-building. Not only has there been 
little by way of empirical tests, but there is not enough conceptual clarity to isolate 
important variables.
In Chapter 3 ,1 suggested that the transnationalist narrative can be grounded in 
Transnational Legal Process (TLP), a theoretical perspective that helps analysts organize 
the messy process of law production into cognizable form. This is achieved by 
disaggregating legal process into a set of clearly identifiable functional stages, within 
which legal norms are collaboratively created and applied by a range of state and non­
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state actors in various fora. Particular decisions are subsequently situated within multiple, 
interlocking networks of interaction that occur across various state and non-state legal 
institutions, such as courts, legislatures, civil society organizations and academia. 
Although analytically unnecessary, TLP adds to this a strong normative dimension, 
whereby legal interaction is conceived to be a distinctive mode of rational argumentation 
structured by dialogical rules that protect values of equality, fairness and freedom from 
coercion.
A core hypothesis associated with TLP is that participation in legal processes that 
are substantively and procedurally oriented towards values of human dignity increases 
the likelihood that legal subjects will comply with the resultant norms. Another 
hypothesis is that knowledge of the processes by which law is produced can enhance the 
effectiveness of transnational human rights advocacy. In these senses, TLP is a 
functionalist as well as a normative jurisprudence that helps organizations utilize 
available resources to facilitate domestic decision-makers’ recognition of specifically 
international and comparative human rights. It also directs architects of law to design 
decision-making processes in a manner conducive to equality and fairness.
TLP is particularly useful for the study of the relevant and persuasive doctrine 
because it clarifies, first, what it means to say that law has “persuasive” influence and, 
second, because it advances our understanding of how legal interaction affects the 
identities and interests of multiple discursive communities. This vision is to be contrasted 
with power- and rule-based accounts of compliance that locate the entirety of law’s 
influence in the projection of political or ideological power, the kind of perspective that 
traditionalists tacitly endorse when worrying abut judicial instrumentalism or result- 
orientation. Borrowing from Toope and Brunnee, we may reject this perspective by 
saying that law’s distinctive influence may be felt absent formalism and power; law’s 
distinctive capacity to persuade lies in the organic processes through which participants 
are positioned to “freely” endorse a promulgated legal rule as a part of their internal value
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system. This is to say that judicial instrumentalism is constrained by ethical and 
professional rules that ensure that all disputants have an equal opportunity to initiate and 
perpetuate discourse, forward challenges, criticisms, interpretations and explanations, 
express their internal values, attitudes, feelings and other features of their personal 
identities, and to share in the invocation and application of the regulatory rules that 
structure power relations.
For Toope and Brunnee, this freedom (or, in Koh’s terminology, the possibility 
for “norm-intemalization”) is utterly dependent on participants’ adherence to core ethical 
and professional principles that situate the generation of understanding as the only 
legitimate motive for engaging in legal interaction. Persuasion is accordingly not to be 
confused with acculturation, which describes the unilateral imposition of prescribed roles, 
values and codes of conduct upon weaker or politically marginalized members of a 
community.12 Acculturation entails a scenario of coercion and the threat or use of 
sanctions. Persuasion describes voluntary accessions to arguments.
TLP helps us see why the relevant and persuasive doctrine is and should be 
designed precisely as it is, notwithstanding that Toope and Brunnee do not endorse TLP 
and wish to see doctrinal distinctions between binding international human rights and 
non-binding international and comparative human rights. In particular, it helps us see 
what criteria judges ought to use when deciding on the relevance and persuasiveness of 
international and comparative human rights arguments and how these criteria facilitate 
mutually re-constituting interactions among various discursive communities that wield 
disproportionate levels of political power. These criteria are: 1) The internal logical form 
of legal arguments, 2) resonance between the premises (and presentation) of such 
arguments and the personalized values and beliefs of target audiences (e.g. judges, norm 
entrepreneurs, governmental norm-sponsors, rights-holders, duty-bearers, and 3) 
compliance with ethical and professional rules that are designed to structure fair and
12 Alkoby, supra note 9 at 154-156.
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equal dialogical interaction.
When comparing this account of the law of reception with that of traditional 
accounts, it is important to remind ourselves of the connection between these sorts of 
rules and norm-intemalization. Rules are abstract and formal logical propositions, while 
norms are a function of the attitudes which subjects hold towards rules; attitudes that are 
in turn constructed through actors’ interaction with various social institutions. The very 
existence of a norm depends on the fact that people observe them. Put yet another way, 
rules may be declared or created by will alone and may be ineffective or inactive, but 
norms arise organically out of the collective behavior of members of a given community 
or society, existing as such only when they actively direct behavior in ways that cannot 
be unilaterally willed.
If one were to restrict one’s analysis of the law of reception simply to substantive 
correspondence between international and domestic legal rules, as is conventionally done, 
little would be said about the motivations and impact of decision-making; “compliance” 
could simply describe the coincidence of behaviour and legal obligation. It is open to 
question, for instance, whether the reception of international law is influenced by judges’ 
or state officials’ respect for international law, or their amenability to ideological and 
political power or even their pursuit of egoistic self-interest. TLP helps us conceptualize 
compliance in a far more nuanced and constructive fashion, one which is also more 
conducive to empirical research. According to TLP, norms represent international legal 
rules that have come to guide the behavior of participants to legal process. It may be 
further said that there are two broad classes of rules at work here: substantive rules that 
supply the premises of legal argument, and, procedural rules that structure dialogue about 
the interpretation and application of substantive rules. It is through legal argumentation 
that subsets of the vast array of substantive rules infused into legal process may be 
accepted as norms by participants including, of course, authoritative decision-makers. 
There is accordingly a need to account for rules and process, form and function; neither
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can be viewed independently of the other.
A key assumption here is that procedural rules are by and large already norms, 
meaning that legal argumentation in practice is a process of structured interaction 
concerned with which among a class of recommended substantive rules are to be 
concretized into legal prescriptions. In certain situations, such as in the context of 
emergencies, this may be a poor assumption. However, it may credibly be said that there 
is often enough agreement about procedural rules to support some level of rational 
argumentation in law; one who rejects conventional procedural rules is unlikely to resort 
to law to settle disputes, while extravagant interpretations of these rules will not be easy 
to justify to decision-makers and other participants. In most cases, then, arguers will more 
or less agree on a minimum core of rules that are designed to enable legal argumentation 
to begin with, even though particular rules will be, practically speaking, up for debate. To 
the extent that this is so, the persuasiveness of a legal argument is conditional on its 
internal logic, orators compliance with accepted procedural or dialogical norms, as well 
as the extent to which the facts and values that make up an argument’s premises resonate 
with the beliefs and commitments of the target audience. A maximally persuasive 
argument is one that satisfies all of these standards. Again, this is to say nothing about the 
extents to which these conditions obtain in practice or the relative power of alternative 
modes of influence.
TLP stands only for the proposition that the persuasive influence of international 
law lies in how it reconstitutes pre-existing beliefs and commitments, integrating them 
within shared values and understandings. When one is persuaded, one changes one’s 
beliefs, more or less accepting the position of the speaker. However, to be persuasive, the 
speaker also must moderate her own position to better resonate with those values and 
beliefs that the audience is unlikely to change. Importantly, arguments — not the mere 
assertion of power — are the primary vehicle through which persuasion is achieved. Of 
course, there may be no possibility of persuasion, most especially when positions rest on
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implied premises and assumptions that have yet to be recognized by some or all 
participants. For persuasion to work, both the speaker and the audience must be prepared 
to make explicit and to concede certain points and to prioritize which values are 
indispensable and which values may be (temporarily) cast aside. This interaction 
necessarily must build upon a core of shared values and understandings oriented around 
the ideal of equality.
Norm-intemalization can thus be seen as the end-stage of a discrete type of legal 
process, which progresses from the interaction of transnational actors in legal fora, to 
debates within and among interpretive communities about the content and applicability of 
a set of rules, to participants’ endorsement of a particular interpretation over the 
alternatives. TLP draws our attention to situations where a legal rule influences behavior 
because it has been internalized into legal subjects’ internal value-sets, changing not only 
their perception of self-interest, but potentially the very ends they value and, ultimately, 
their contingent or non-legal identities. Legal rules promulgated by external, third-party 
authorities, such as treaty regimes, legislators, or judges, become at one and the same 
time norms whose justification is congruent with those principles legal subjects already 
regard as ethically or morally authoritative.
All of this has raised the question of what should be the role of a judge according 
to TLP theory and, of course, how such theory supports the rational analysis and 
appraisal of decisions about international and comparative human rights. To begin, 
judges should be regarded as both speakers and audience members in the legal process, 
another advantage TLP holds over traditional accounts. Typically, literature on the law of 
reception focuses on judges merely as passive recipients of international legal arguments. 
That is, litigants attempt to persuade judges to make some kind of use of international 
law. A stumbling block in this literature has been discerning all the various ways judges 
respond to arguments, dissonance between judicial reasoning and the reasoning displayed 
in formal judgments, and whether indeed argument, rather than power, accounts for that
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dissonance.
TLP offers some insight into how arguments of this nature might work and how 
they may be made more effective. As we observed in Chapter 3, a good strategy here is to 
analogize international and comparative human rights with domestic law, highlighting 
principles and values common to both. Analogical reasoning draws judges’ attention to 
the experiences of other legal cultures in resolving similar problems using commonly- 
accepted legal principles. If a judge is committed to the values and principles of relevant 
domestic law, such as the Charter, then this approach can improve their receptivity to 
relevant international and comparative human rights arguments because they can see 
themselves as acting consistently with the domestic bases of their authority. However, 
judges are also speakers and judgments are also arguments. With limited resources for 
physically enforcing their rulings, judges frequently will make and present decisions in 
ways that respond to legal subjects’ base values and commitments, in the hope of 
securing willing compliance. For much the same reason, while power may influence 
whose values and commitments are expressed or considered to be most important, judges 
ought to tailor rulings to appeal to as broad an array of perspectives as possible. As 
Toope and Brunnee argue, they have to provide all legal subjects with acceptable reasons 
for a rule.
Thus, even if a judge is personally persuaded by an international or comparative 
human rights argument, there are factors she must consider when deciding what use to 
make of underlying rules, principles and standards. As speakers, judges may find 
international and comparative human rights useful in making their decisions more 
persuasive to diverse participants. Conversely, they may find that such law is a poor 
rhetorical device under the circumstances. Although international and comparative 
human rights might well have altered judicial reasoning and, therefore, a final decision in 
such a situation, its influence may be hidden from view and quite different reasons 
offered in the recorded judgment. Thus, international and comparative human rights
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might be enormously important variables even if they are not expressly referenced in 
judgments. This alone warrants a radical revision of the methods by which scholars 
customarily assess the significance of international and comparative human rights;13 so 
much is missed if one simply parses reported judgments looking for explicit references to 
formal international and comparative human rights law. But to must that court reports can 
be poor indicators of judicial reasoning raises a host of other problems associated with 
inferring judicial intent and psychology out of reconstructed arguments.14
We should at this point recall that TLP is an idealized if not romanticized 
conception of legal interaction with a host of serious methodological issues. TLP 
presupposes that in most, if not all cases, participants will share base values and 
understandings and that, if the processes through which law is produced are equal and 
fair, the finished product stands a good chance of being internalized by participants. This 
is a dubious assumption which has been roundly criticized by many, including legal 
realists, critical legal theorists, legal pluralists, and others. TLP also sidesteps 
methodological issues associated with whether and how we can accurately reconstruct 
arguments out of reported judgments. It is of course important to place a judgment in 
context and to read between the lines, as it were, but this invites questions about what 
tools we use to disentangle the relative influence of multiple normative and ideological 
forces. It also reminds us that the analyst can all too easily impose her own assumptions, 
biases and ambitions onto objects of analysis. Finally, TLP does not adequately 
acknowledge that ethical and professional rules distinctive to law often serve to reinforce 
relations of domination rather than to guarantee equality. For a self-proclaimed empiricist 
and critical perspective, TLP should lead one to find this both surprising and troubling.
Still, TLP is very useful as a heuristic and critical device and is vastly superior to
13 Examples of the use o f this problematic methodology include: William Schabas, International Human 
Rights Law and The Canadian Charter o f  Rights and Freedoms, 2nd edition (Carswell, 1996); Anne F. 
Bayefsky, International Human Rights Law: Use in Canadian Charter o f  Rights and Freedoms Litigation 
(Toronto and Vancouver: Butterworths, 1992).
14 Duncan Kennedy, A Critique o f  Adjudication: Fin de Siecle (Harvard University Press, 1998).
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traditional approaches in these respects. Heuristically, it offers a set of analytical 
frameworks that help us explore the possible ways in which international and 
comparative law shape norm-production in judicial settings. This can help validate past 
and inspire new approaches to human rights advocacy. More to the point, it is vastly 
superior to prior, traditionalist approaches that stubbornly refuse to account for the reality 
of past jurisprudence, the aspirational nature of human rights, and the poverty of rule- 
based conceptions of compliance in a human rights context (among others). Critically, it 
allows us to evaluate the explicit and implicit uses to which judges put international and 
comparative human rights relative to ethical and professional standards. Case law may — 
and often does — diverge from TLP ideals, but TLP helps us clarify where decision­
making can be improved. This may be small consolation to those who have lost faith in 
state-centred conceptions of law. But it should be appealing at least to traditionalists, who 
proclaim a commitment to the same values as do TLP theorists. It is hard to imagine what 
beneficial alternatives a traditional, rule-based approach offers either in terms of 
descriptive accuracy, explanatory power, or normative appeal.
D. The New Common Law? Constitutional Perspectives on the Law of Reception 
The idealized nature of TLP highlights all the more clearly the need to engage in 
more rigorous empirical tests of its claims. Chapter 4 represents an attempt to begin this 
process. It demonstrates that techniques of persuasion must stand alongside 
manifestations of power as a key variable explaining the reconstitution of the Canadian 
security certificate regime. Before reviewing this claim, though, it is important to cement 
the link between TLP and the relevant and persuasive doctrine. With the concept of 
compliance understood more clearly, the final step is to explain how TLP addresses the 
second pillar of the Canadian law of reception: principles of respect for self-government.
A large part of this dissertation has been concerned with examining how different 
conceptions of constitutionalism influence the perceived legitimacy of the relevant and 
persuasive doctrine. Principles of respect for constitutional supremacy are, in the context
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of the presumption of conformity doctrine, reducible to what Mattias Kumm calls a 
“statist” paradigm of constitutionalism.15 The statist paradigm of constitutionalism locates 
the authority of constitutions in an amorphous “will of the people”, where “the people” 
are coterminous with a given state. That is, the “constitution is seen as the legal 
framework through which a political community governs itself as a sovereign nation” .16 It 
is generally held — wrongly, in my view — that the judicial application of international 
law is inconsistent with constitutionalism so conceived, unless it has first been 
transformed into domestic law by representative institutions. The judicial reception of 
international law is justifiable if and only if judges limit their role to policing the 
constitutional boundaries between the federal and provincial governments as well as 
between the federal executive and federal and provincial legislatures. Resting on statist 
paradigms, the presumption of conformity doctrine cannot be disentangled from more 
general debates about the legitimacy of judicial review as appraised in relation to such 
values as federalism and parliamentary supremacy. Although there are democratic bases 
for justifying judicial review, the presumption of conformity has long been suspicious of 
judicial review.
Following the entrenchment of the Charter, the theory and practice of judicial 
review changed significantly, as did judges’ attitudes towards international law. Although 
they had by then already adopted contextual approaches to statutory interpretation, judges 
in the Charter era more frequently employ both binding and non-binding international 
law when reviewing the substantive merits of validly enacted law. There is here a 
perceptible shift in criteria of legitimacy with regards to the reception of international law 
that arguably rests on an alternative paradigm of constitutionalism. This “cosmopolitan” 
paradigm orients the basis of legal authority towards “a complex standard of public
15 Mattias Kumm, “ The Cosmopolitan Turn in Constitutionalism: On the Relationship Between 
Constitutionalism in and between the State”, in Ruling the World? Constitutionalism , International Law, 
and Global Governance, Jeffery L Dunoff & Joel P. Trachman, eds., (Cambridge University Press, 2009).
16 Ibid. at 268.
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reason” as well as towards the “legitimate concerns of outsiders”.17 This paradigm has 
emerged in response to forces of globalization that fray the boundaries demarcating 
domestic/international, Us/Them, and law/not-law.
Broadening the sources of law beyond those located within specific constitutional 
regimes, cosmopolitan constitutionalism legitimizes judicial recourse to international law, 
and regards it as authoritative in certain circumstances. Depending on the institution that 
has produced a norm, that institution’s recognized authority over a given issue, and the 
material role of a political community in making a problem better or worse, a domestic 
court could conceivably be authorized to prioritize an international legal norm over their 
home state’s constitution. The source of authority here lies not in the roots of particular 
legal orders or artificially circumscribed political communities, but rather in public 
reason, where the “public” in question transcends national borders. In this formulation, 
law is considered to be an autonomous, holistic mode of interaction that transcends and, 
indeed, prevails over, the contingent legal orders of individual political communities.18
Traditionalists’ resistance to the relevant and persuasive doctrine might be 
explained on the basis that they suspect that it may pave the way for cosmopolitan 
constitutionalism. They worry that judges may tend to ignore traditional constitutional 
limits on their authority, either because international and comparative human rights 
provides a virtuous cover for less altruistic ambitions, or because they genuinely believe 
that respect for rights should trump all other constitutional principles. But, despite 
appearances, the relevant and persuasive doctrine does not require that we jettison the 
statist paradigm. The reception of international law still has to be rhetorically justified to 
those affected if it is to be found persuasive on particular occasions. Since the state is 
always affected by Charter review, this strongly implies that a wholesale rejection of 
traditional constitutional values and associated paradigms is unlikely; unless persuaded,
17 Ibid. at 286.
18 Patrick Capps, Human Dignity and the Foundations o f  International Law (Hart Publishing, 2009)
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the government will consistently refuse to endorse decisions and may employ various 
tactics to limit their effect. Ironically, the presumption of minimal protection may itself 
be best understood as an instance of cosmopolitan constitutionalism, insofar as binding 
international human rights may stand as separate sources of constitutional law in Canada.
More fundamentally, though, the desire to protect the constitution from judicial 
tampering rests on a fundamental misconception concerning the nature of rights. As we 
saw in Chapter 2, rights are discursive devices that force us to justify desired distributions 
of value in accordance with standards of public reason. Justifying law in relation to 
public reason and recognizing the global and multicultural context of law are hardly 
values unique to cosmopolitan constitutionalism. Rather, these are values that inform the 
very concept of legal rights, including constitutional rights. Even if no infringements are 
found or no remedies are offered when rights are infringed, the invocation of rights- 
language forces governments to justify the exertion of public power. When issues are by 
their nature global and multicultural, it follows that this justification will have to be 
sensitive to the perspectives of outsiders. This does not require that a judge Choose 
between domestic law and international law; each plays a distinctive role in constructing 
the context, depth, and importance of a problem.
With this in mind, I have suggested that the relevant and persuasive doctrine need 
not be made “strange”, as Knop suggests. Instead, it is built upon fairly traditional 
common law conceptions of judicial reasoning. The law of reception is in many ways 
part of the common law tradition of viewing the constitution as a “living tree” that is 
rooted in social context and that must be tended in order to remain vital. Far from serving 
as an independent source or “root” of Canadian law, international and comparative 
human rights can expand the environment within which Canadian law operates, providing 
room for it to grow in step with shifting social realities. This view is hardly novel, as a 
number of prominent constitutional scholars consider the Charter to be built upon the 
common law tradition in which statutory law is to be interpreted and applied in keeping
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with changing social values.19 International and comparative human rights can serve as 
indicia of these values and, accordingly, may signal the direction technically valid law 
ought to move. This does not require that internationally-derived norms replace or 
overbear domestic law; the Charter itself is the engine of change.
How does this process work? I have asserted that international and comparative 
human rights influence judicial reasoning primarily through analogy. Analogical 
reasoning in the context of the law of reception means that one analyzes the ways in 
which recurring transnational legal problems are separately addressed by domestic law 
and by international or foreign law. Often, international and comparative human rights 
are turned to as sources of empirical data that help judges appraise the possible practical 
and normative consequences of alternative decisions at home. Careful reviews of how 
international or foreign decisions have or have not succeeded in actualizing certain ends 
can help Canadian judges identify the desirability and feasibility of proposed means of 
realizing similar ends in Canada. But the ends desired as well as the legal mechanisms 
through which they are actualized remain in large part domestically constituted; the 
relevant and persuasive doctrine does not authorize judges to simply give effect to the 
will of a foreign political entity without regard to the values, preferences and expectations 
of local communities.
It is crucial to appreciate that the mere consideration of international law as 
comparative law does not displace established processes of domestic law-formation and -  
application, any more than does a judge’s consideration of social science data or moral 
principles and values. International and comparative human rights are not simply taken 
from outside environments and then used to override domestic law, as the cosmopolitan 
constitutionalist would have it. Nor do judges simply ignore Charter provisions, 
precedent, parliamentary will, or domestic policy preferences; the Charter requires that
19 Kent Roach, The Supreme Court on Trial: Judicial Activism or Democratic Dialogue? (Irwin Law, 
2001).
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all of these factors be considered. International and comparative human rights instead 
perform information-gathering and appraisal functions, refining judges’ understanding of 
the causal and normative dimensions of alternative decisions that could, in theory, be 
made entirely on the basis of domestic normative resources.
E. Power, Persuasion, and the Reconstitution of the Canadian Security Certificate
Regime
The reconstitution of Canada’s post-9/11 security certificate regime presents an 
outstanding opportunity to apply the foregoing theory to a modest empirical test; can 
judges be said to have engaged in the kind of reasoning I argue is justified by the relevant 
and persuasive doctrine? If so, what have been the results and, in particular, is there 
evidence to support Koh’s norm-intemalization hypothesis?
Among the attractive features of this case study are: the dynamic, sometimes 
tense interplays between international human rights and Canadian constitutional law, the 
presentation of a confusing, outwardly contradictory jurisprudence that does not easily 
fall within identifiable doctrine, and the interplay between power and persuasion in 
explaining the impact of international and foreign law on judicial reasoning. This case 
study was outwardly marked by intense disorder and the seemingly result-oriented use of 
international and foreign law. Yet, it displayed some evidence of international human 
rights having influenced the gradual realization of values of human dignity in certificate 
proceedings. What motivated judges to take the approach they did to international human 
rights in this case and with what material results?
In Chapter 4 ,1 used TLP to impose a significant level of order on ambiguous, 
ambivalent, and disjointed decisions. I also argued that argumentative persuasion stands 
as a necessary explanatory variable in the Supreme Court’s decision-making process as 
well as in the effects of its decisions on the current state of certificate proceedings. 
However, persuasion certainly is not the only variable at play, nor does this stream of
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legal process convincingly prove the occurrence of norm-intemalization as Koh 
understands it. International and comparative human rights played only a modest role in 
structuring legal interactions both within certificate proceedings and about the 
constitutionality of certificate provisions and associated practices. Other prominent 
normative frameworks included global counter-terrorism law and policy, foreign national 
security law and policy, Canadian constitutional law, criminal law, immigration law and 
national security law and policy. The reconstitution of the certificate regime is in many 
ways a story about the percolation of constitutional principles across many of these legal 
fields, with institutional traditions in each field polarizing the interpretation and practical 
effect of these principles.
In many ways, the story begins with the influence of international political power 
on domestic decision-making and, with this, judges’ unwillingness to abide by the 
principles of the relevant and persuasive doctrine. As we have seen, the post-9/11 
security certificate regime is part of broad institutional response to transnational terrorism 
and one of the means through which parliament and the executive integrated Canadian 
national security law and policy with that of foreign and international regimes. A 
sovereign legislative act to be sure, the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act 
explicitly implements international counter-terrorism law and has been profoundly 
influenced by foreign legislative provisions and political pressures, emanating mostly 
from the United States and the United Kingdom. The same is true of security intelligence 
practices, which are embedded within increasingly effective global networks that operate 
in relative autonomy from serious judicial and parliamentary review. Expressible in terms 
of transgovemmentalism, the vectors of this external influence are rooted in linkages 
among Canadian and foreign legislatures and executive agencies, as evidenced by 
similarities in legislative language and the growing influence of a globalized Canadian 
intelligence community. Integrated within these global counter-terrorism networks, 
security certificates have been used to facilitate the generation and distribution of global
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intelligence as well as the detention and transfer of alleged terrorists to jurisdictions 
where they may be more conveniently interrogated and prosecuted.
Until very recently, judges have deferred to parliament and the executive in this 
area, considering it to be a matter of policy best left to the expertise of relevant agencies. 
Critics would, of course, see here the exploitation of normative indeterminacy and the 
language of exceptionality to rationalize extra-ordinary practices. Slowly, practices not 
authorized by pre-existing law or autonomous legal values are legitimized as legal and 
security institutions adopt cosmetic changes to obscure the substantive damage they 
inflict on the rule of law. Optimists would counter that meaningful gains have been made, 
in part due to the values and insights gleaned from international and foreign experiences, 
as communicated by transnational human rights advocates and other discursive 
communities. The Supreme Court of Canada relied on these insights when it recognized 
that the changing, global context of the certificate provisions rendered them extraordinary 
and, consequently, unconstitutional. In particular, it recognized that this regime facilitates 
and depends upon the expanded territorial reach of Canadian national security agencies -  
a reach that has escaped the grasp of autonomous legal values.
Although international and comparative human rights might have been an 
attractive means of expanding the scope of the Charter, they were not given direct effect 
or explicit acknowledgement in the court’s decisions. In fact, in Charkaoui I, the 
Supreme Court seemingly sought to normalize our continued reliance on what remain 
decidedly abnormal measures. Recognizing that the extremely secretive, expedient and 
discretionary nature of certificate proceedings ran afoul of the Charter, the Court ignored 
domestic alternatives that would have significantly improved the rights afforded to 
named persons. Instead, it encouraged Parliament to adopt the UK’s seriously flawed 
approach. Viewed cynically, there was indeed constitutional learning of a sort going on, 
but the Court was learning how to protect national security law and policy from human 
rights advocacy rather than vice versa. What is more, the court used this experience and
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its role as a (de)legitimizing institution to help parliament and the executive learn the 
same lesson. A skeptic would be justified in suspecting that power — and deference 
thereto — best explained the judgment in this case.
Then, in Charkaoui 11, the Court unexpectedly cast this skeptical account into 
doubt by surreptitiously revising its initial stance. Concerned with the constitutionality of 
executive practices, rather than legislative provisions, the court nonetheless used its 
powers to effect precisely the sort of changes that it could have mandated in Charkaoui I: 
expanded disclosure and adversarial challenge. Viewed in isolation, and literally, this 
case reveals next to nothing about international and comparative human rights, as neither 
of these normative perspectives received the slightest mention. Yet, the Charkaoui II 
disclosure rules clearly corrected some of the most serious flaws with the UK-based 
approach — flaws the Court in Charkaoui I had all but said were constitutionally 
irrelevant. Why did the court not even once cite international or comparative human 
rights in Charkaoui IP. Recognizing the role of the Canadian intelligence community and 
of the certificate regime in giving effect to global counter-terrorism law and policy, the 
court could easily have relied on international and comparative human rights in rendering 
its decision, much as it had with respect to Guantanamo Bay in Canada (Justice) v. 
Khadr. This would have been both logical and well within its authority. Perhaps to 
camouflage its retroactive reversal of its earlier decision, it chose instead to rely on 
traditional Canadian criminal law norms, but made them applicable to what historically 
was regarded as a purely administrative law regime.
These cases may be evaluated in a wide number of ways. Skeptics will doubtless 
see in them all that is wrong with our law of reception. We see in these rulings nothing 
more than the judiciary’s clumsy attempt to use whatever tools were available to achieve 
the results they wanted, namely, the avoidance of complicity in the outsourcing of 
intelligence and law-enforcement activities to countries with deplorable human rights 
records. Forced to recognize that labeling the certificate regime “administrative” would
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no longer absolve the judiciary of its role in constructing and reinforcing questionable 
policy, it did what it could to provide the illusion of respect for human rights. In the end 
of the day, however, it played a central role in re-balancing an arguably discriminatory 
regime that exposes non-citizens to a litany of human rights abuses both in Canada and 
abroad. While not the effective cause of this change, international and comparative 
human rights law played no small role in the reconstitution of the certificate regime as 
well as in the courts’ largely successful attempt to avoid direct responsibility for it.
However, an alternative narrative is equally plausible — one that looks beneath the 
terms of the official reasons for judgment and reformulates the ends towards which the 
Court was working. We might assume that the Court from the very beginning was 
persuaded by the international and comparative human rights arguments submitted by 
Messrs. Charkaoui, Almrei, and Harkat, and those intervening on their behalf. They 
might, in other words, have appreciated the practical and normative deficiencies of the 
UK-style regime as illuminated through international human rights advocacy. They might 
also have recognized the clear advantages offered by the former SIRC system and other 
domestic alternatives. Yet a range of practical problems precluded the articulation of a 
more frank and forceful judgment. The government had firmly declared its intention to 
dismantle the pre-9/11 certificate regime and was committed to using the powerful 
rhetoric of national security to insulate certificate proceedings and associated practices 
from meaningful parliamentary and judicial scrutiny. Canadian courts have traditionally 
deferred to the executive in this field and established a line of precedent clearly indicating 
the inapplicability of robust criminal law principles to this context.
Thus, there were good reasons for the court to tread softly and slowly, introducing 
reform surreptitiously rather than openly. Indeed, the court was acutely aware that judge- 
led attempts to force significant improvements in national security proceedings in the UK 
had met with significant setbacks. In Re A, the House of Lords relied on international 
human rights in finding that the UK’s version of security certificates unjustifiably
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discriminated against non-citizens. The UK government responded by amending the 
impugned regime to permit the targeting of both citizens and non-citizens.20 From the 
government’s perspective, the problem of discrimination had been solved and, in one 
sense, international human rights were given effect. But this effect was purely symbolic 
and painfully ironic; a wider range of people were exposed to potential abuses and, 
despite the form of the new provisions, executive officials retained discretion to apply it 
in an uneven, discriminatory fashion. As we have seen, international and comparative 
case law on national security proceedings in the UK has since become decidedly 
apologetic, with courts uniformly granting the executive a wide margin of appreciation in 
invoking states of emergency, a practice that flatly contradicts the views of virtually all 
human rights-based interpretive communities. These practical realities highlight the 
institutional limits of ambitious judicial decision-making, an issue that is quite different 
from whether or not judges wish to defend human rights. Recalling our earlier discussion 
on the art of persuasion, we see again that the judiciary is not just an audience hearing the 
arguments of litigants; it is also a speaker seeking to persuade its audience to accept the 
soundness of its ruling.
With this responsibility in mind, the Court had a choice: to issue a decision that 
aligned the Charter more closely with available international and comparative human 
rights norms or to issue a decision that was more likely to give practical effect to those 
norms in the long -run. Having recommended the further entrenchment of a flawed, 
foreign-based certificate regime in Charkaoui I, it understandably opted for the latter. 
This approach resonated with the Canadian government’s routine of borrowing legislative 
provisions and practices from the UK, making its respect for the ruling more likely. And, 
although symbolically the ruling was conservative if not outright apologetic, it left open 
the possibility of progressively infusing the certificate regime with more robust 
protections.
on
The Prevention o f  Terrorism Act 2005 (U.K.), 2005, c. 2.
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This is precisely what occurred in Charkaoui II, whereby many of the 
international and comparative human rights perspectives that the court seemed to 
disregard a year earlier were given expression through the extension of existing judicial 
discretion to include matters of disclosure. Importantly, this discretion was conferred by 
parliament through its amendment package following Charkaoui /. Parliament had by this 
time also showed some interest in increasing its oversight over executive national 
security practices, as evidenced by three critical committee reports released shortly after 
Charkaoui I.21 Indeed, it included in its post-Charkaoui 1 amendment package a broader 
array of rights than was judicially required, including provisions governing the 
inadmissibility of evidence believed on reasonable grounds to have been obtained 
through the use of torture.22When Charkoaui II was decided, it may have become clearer 
to the court that parliament was, for the time being, prepared to take a more assertive role 
in constraining abusive national security practices.
Critically, then, the court enhanced the persuasiveness of its ruling by directing its 
attention to the certificate-based practices of executive officials, leaving recently 
amended statutory provisions intact. In one sense, this approach was necessary, given that 
the factual and legal issues in Charkaoui II arose in the context of pre-Charkaoui I 
certificate provisions. If the court was interested in revising its original position on the 
constitutionality of the special advocate system, it would have had to wait for this issue to 
wend its way back up the system, an undesirable delay for human rights advocates 
considering that international and foreign courts had recently upheld the UK regime. By 
focusing on the more general question of disclosure, the court was able to build on s. 7 
precedent in this field, on numerous parliamentary reports and other evidence of shifting 
legislative consciousness, and on the unfolding global disrepute of certificate-like
21 Canada. House o f Commons, Report of the Standing Committee on Public Safety and National Security, 
Rights, Limits, Security: A Comprehensive Review o f the Anti-terrorism Act and Related Issues (March 
2007); Senate, Report o f the Special Senate Committee on the Anti-terrorism Act, Fundamental Justice in 
Extraordinary Times (February 2007); House of Commons, Report o f  the Standing Committee on 
Citizenship and Immigration, Detention Centres and Security Certificates (April 2007).
22 Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, R.S.C. 2001, c. 27, s. 83(1.1).
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regimes to impose upon executive agencies a direct and general duty with respect to the 
retention and disclosure of security intelligence. This had the same prescriptive effect as 
requiring parliament to rewrite security certificate provisions to ensure that special 
advocates be granted the power to subpoena documents and witnesses, except that the 
court was able to approach the issue in a manner less easily derided as “activist”.
What is more, by resting its judgment on well-established constitutional principles 
rooted in Canadian criminal law, the court demonstrated the persuasive appeal of 
analogical reasoning. That is, the decision was made on the basis of Canadian 
constitutional law and not international and comparative human rights. There was no 
question about the judiciary’s authority to make these decisions or doubt about the 
pedigree of the principles used. Yet, the court’s ability to appreciate the problems posed 
by the certificate regime and its willingness to remedy these problems consistently with 
values of human dignity were both improved by its exposure to international and 
comparative human rights arguments and associated social science data. Its appreciation 
of the normative demerits of the UK-style regime and of obstacles to a wholesale 
invalidation of the Canadian certificate regime may have influenced its choice to strike a 
middle ground when redirecting these arguments towards the executive. Though the 
decision seemingly lacked principle, we can glimpse a logical and normative structure to 
the rulings that is expressed through persuasive rhetorical argument.
The truth of the matter probably lies somewhere between these two perspectives. 
It would be easy to be cynical and to see in these cases the normalization of extraordinary 
practices. But valid critical perspectives notwithstanding, one could be forgiven for 
optimistically regarding the quashing of certificates against Messrs. Charkaoui and 
Almrei — as well as the Federal Court’s spirited application of Charkaoui II disclosure — 
as indicative of a long-lasting judicial willingness to more rigorously review executive 
claims of secrecy. We can at least say that international and comparative human rights
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played a modest role in contextualizing the problems posed by security certificates as 
well as in motivating the Supreme Court to restructure the ways in which security 
intelligence is collected, shared, retained, and disclosed.
That said, the case study has fallen well short of confirming the norm- 
intemalization hypothesis as well as the intrinsic normative merits of the relevant and 
persuasive doctrine. International and comparative human rights are quite simply not 
“special” norms that have the power to facilitate courts’ constitutional learning about the 
most ethical distribution of value. Domestic experiences and wisdom were far more 
influential (and normatively compelling), at least in the reform of the security certificate 
regime. But even if international and comparative human rights did perform this function, 
they have done little to alter the base values, identities, and interests of all discursive 
communities — most especially the intelligence community. There have been a number of 
notable examples of non-compliance with Charkaoui II obligations23 as well as attempts 
to re-litigate the issue in hopes of reducing the scope of disclosure. More worrying still is 
the Harper administration’s recent decision to dismantle the office of the Inspector 
General of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service24and to resist implementation of 
the many sound recommendations in the O’Connor Report.
F. Conclusion
That there are so many different ways of interpreting the Supreme Court’s 
reasoning confirms the perils of reconstructing argument out of formal and informal 
texts. The analyst doubtless imposes her own values, ambitions, and assumptions on 
these materials. Still, the case study confirms that meaningful reports on the domestic
23 Harkat (Re), 2009 F.C. 553, 345 F.T.R. 143.
24 “CSIS Inspector General Cut In Tory Budget Bill” The Canadian Press, April 26, 2012 , online 
<http://www.huffingtonpost.ca/2012/04/26/csis-inspector-general-cut-budget n 145623l.html>.
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impact of international and comparative human rights must include far more than a 
review of instances in which it is cited within, or otherwise “incorporated” into, domestic 
legislation and case law. While such reviews have been useful for sketching doctrinal 
terrain, they have failed to place the reception of international and comparative human 
rights into a proper context or to identify the problems with which decision-makers have 
been concerned when fashioning their decisions. Without context and problem- 
orientation, analysts are likely to miss the many kinds of influence which international 
and comparative human rights exert on judicial reasoning and the direct and indirect 
effects this can have on domestic rights and obligations.
Context increases the relevance of research because it situates particular 
decisions, and appraisals of decisions, within an identifiable social and institutional 
setting. This allows scholars to account for a greater range of variables than they 
otherwise would if they were to simply treat each instance where international law has 
(not) been cited as evidence of its (in)effectiveness. We have seen, for instance, that 
international legal norms come in a variety of types (binding/non-binding, hard/soft law, 
rules/principles/standards) and that law’s general effectiveness is affected by its 
intersections with a wide range of informal normative frameworks. While surveying the 
symbolic recognition of international law in an array of cases has its uses, it is too general 
to present one with an understanding of precisely how and why international law has (or 
has not) been effective and, consequently, what are the chances of it working in the 
service of a given end or value.
Problem-orientation sharpens context by focusing our attention on the 
consequences of decisions and of their alternatives. The judge’s dilemma is that s/he is
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required to find a solution to a problem, even though one cannot be derived exclusively 
from available stocks of norms. In some instances, this requires judges to base their 
judgments on incomplete sets of logical premises, relying on extra-legal resources to fill 
in the gaps. In other instances, it requires them to choose from a range of otherwise valid 
or justified decisions the one that best responds to the interests, values, beliefs, and 
expectations of those party to, and affected by, a dispute. The comparative persuasiveness 
of some decisions over their alternatives is not reducible to their formal, logical qualities 
(which is not to say that decisions therefore are unprincipled or arbitrary). Rather, 
contextual factors such as audience, value, social science data, rules which structure legal 
interaction and argumentation, and the rhetorical practices of participants in legal process 
are the most important variables.
TLP provides analytical frameworks useful for imposing order on the Canadian 
law of reception and the relevant and persuasive doctrine in particular. This order is both 
functional and principled, in the sense that it can be justified by reference to principles of 
respect for both international law and constitutional supremacy, should one wish to do 
so.25 At the very least, international and comparative human rights help judges appraise 
the functional and normative merits of alternative decisions. Treating international law as 
similar in kind to comparative law does militate against traditional conceptions of 
compliance, in which courts are expected to faithfully apply pre-existing international 
legal rules. However, in the context of international human rights at least, this traditional 
preoccupation with congruence or conformity is simply not possible; there are few rules 
precise enough to be applied in this fashion and even when rules are clarified by treaty-
25
One could always adopt a more critical stance, adopt a cosmopolitan conception o f constitutionalism, or 
break faith altogether with state-centred conceptions o f law; see Craig Scott, “'Transnational Law' as Proto- 
Concept: Three Conceptions” (2009) 10:7 German Law Journal 877.
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bodies, they remain non-binding. Courts must necessarily be free to interpret the content, 
scope, and applicability of international human rights norms in diverse contexts. 
Compliance is accordingly better understood as a process of engagement, in which 
participants to legal interaction use international and comparative human rights to 
collaboratively construct and evaluate alternative solutions to transnational problems.
Principles of respect for constitutional supremacy are simultaneously respected 
since decision-making remains grounded in the Canadian constitution; in some ways, the 
relevant and persuasive doctrine is actually more in keeping with conceptions of 
constitutionalism germane to traditional doctrine than is the presumption of minimal 
protection. The reception of international law is in the case of the former doctrine best 
viewed as a species of common law, analogical reasoning, where judges use the 
experiences of other legal cultures to appreciate the functional and normative merits of a 
decision that could, in principle, be made on the basis of domestic materials alone. There 
is no need to consider it a “strange” or disturbing practice that needs to be tamed. Indeed, 
the persuasiveness of international and comparative human rights depends on disputants’ 
commitment to ethical and professional rules of a dialogical character that are sourced in 
a plethora of domestic institutions. The authority of domestic law is therefore important 
both substantively and procedurally.
When viewed in this way, we can synthesize the relevant and persuasive doctrine 
with actual decision-making to some extent. If this is not descriptively possible, we at 
least are able to identify the way decisions —and legal interaction— ought to be structured, 
in consideration of the core purposes of the doctrine as well as those ethical and 
professional principles that are conducive to fair, equal and rational argumentation. This
255
is perhaps the most convincing, practical benefit TLP has to offer; it enables one to 
identify or to critically impose principled order on an apparently disorderly body of 
capricious case law. This, in turn, helps one recommend ideal means of organizing legal 
arguments and to predict how advocacy campaigns might fare under certain conditions. 
Less clear are the normative implications of this practical knowledge. The limited 
empirical work conducted here demonstrates that knowledge of TLP may be used to 
improve the effectiveness of human rights advocacy, largely by helping advocates 
marshal procedural norms and substantive values to inhibit the distorting influence of 
political and ideological power. Those who conceive of human rights as universal moral 
principles will find this encouraging. But we have seen that knowledge of this process 
and the adroit use of legal argument may also be used for the contrary purpose — to 
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